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Abstract 
This thesis examines how Russia and the EU officially look at Central Asia as an energy actor 
in an energy security political context. Four aspects of the respective parts’ energy security 
discourses are considered; foreign policy, security policy, energy policy and finally energy 
security, with the aim to examine how Central Asia are framed and presented here. This is 
done to examine how and why Central Asia is important for Russia and the EU in terms of 
energy security, and consequently how the parts seek to approach the region. It is argued that 
not only energy per se is important in the Russian and the EU energy security discourses on 
Central Asia, and that other factors also needs to be considered when. Among these are 
cultural aspects and realpolitikal considerations, and also overall political context in which the 
energy security discourses are situated. This also explains the analytical setup of the thesis. 
In line with this, it is argued that Russia and the EU approach Central Asia in very different 
ways. In the case of Russia, emphasis is placed on Russia’s position as a regional great power, 
as well as the deep cultural bonds that exist between Russia and the Central Asian states. The 
EU approaches Central Asia with an aim to introduce Western norms in the region, and to 
assist Central Asia with various technical programs in order to promote development. These 
framings also spread to the other aspects of the parts’ discourses, which in practical terms 
mean that Russia seeks regional cooperation with the Central Asian states in order to avoid 
what Moscow considers as foreign interference, whereas The EU wishes to include Central 
Asia in an expanded EU structure. In essence, it is argued that both parts want to control 
Central Asia and the region’s energy resources, but that this is impossible in practical terms. 
Thus, they both seek to ingratiate themselves with Central Asia, but with different measures 
and to means.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1. Theme of the thesis 
Energy plays a vital role in ensuring the wellbeing and development of all states. Russia and 
the EU are no exceptions to this rule. Moscow and Brussels have a long-standing relation in 
terms of energy. The Soviet Union and subsequently post-Soviet Russia has been, and still is, 
large-scale energy supplier to Europe. Brussels hoped that after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union Russia would move in a liberal and Western-like direction, hereby cementing the 
relationship between the parts. However, as developments unfolded, it was clear that this 
scenario was unfeasible. There was a growing awareness in Russia of the political power that 
lay inherent in the country’s resource base, which currently makes Russia the world’s second 
largest oil exporter, as well possessing the largest gas reserves in the world (CIA World Fact 
Book 2011). Furthermore, energy export is crucial for fuelling the Russian economy, 
comprising over 70 % of the value of Russian export (Solanko 2011; 19). Consequently, 
Russia sought to ensure its own energy security by keeping its stronghold on the international 
energy market. In light of this the EU, ever more reliant on energy imports to sustain its 
economic growth, was reluctant to become too dependent on Russian energy as this implicitly 
would make Brussels more dependent on Moscow, also in political terms. 
This search led to an increased interest in the energy-abundant Central Asia. The region has 
been present in both Russian and European policy thinking for many years. The “Great 
Game” of the 19th century, where Russia and Britain struggled for dominance in the region, 
and Halford Mackinder’s “heartland” theory, where the Central Asian space constitutes the 
pivot area of international geopolitics, serve as examples of just this. At the same time it is 
clear that the EU and Russia have approached, and still approach, Central Asia differently. In 
Russia’s case, due to the common Soviet heritage and also historical ties that preceded the 
Soviet Union, the Central Asian countries occupy, along with the other former Soviet 
republics, a special place in Russian thinking. This uniqueness has also been expressed 
through the concept of “the near abroad”, which marks that Russia sees its relations with its 
neighbors as special and different from those with non-post-Soviet states. Perhaps even more 
to the point Central Asia is part of what is sometimes referred to as Russia’s “geopolitical 
backyard”, which illustrates that Russia sees the region as its own zone of influence.  
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The countries are also connected energy-wise, as the pipelines constructed during the Soviet 
era exclusively ran from the energy-abundant Central Asian republics to Russia, thus giving 
Russia control of Central Asia’s energy resources. In light of the Western interests for the 
region’s hydrocarbons, Moscow realized that Central Asia actually could emerge as a 
potential export competitor to Russia. The EU, on the other hand, has historically only 
had very limited contact with the region, meaning that a new relationship needed to be build 
following the demise of the Soviet Union.  
Over the past decade Central Asia has emerged as something of a geopolitical hot-spot 
following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The American presence in the region, 
coupled with the region’s abundant natural energy resources and the area’s potential for 
conflicts, meant that Central Asia almost overnight became a region the major global powers 
needed to take into account. By controlling the Central Asian region a power would increase 
its power on at least three fronts; energy, security and economics. Naturally, this also meant 
that they were required to rethink their stance towards Central Asia, which due to the sudden 
changes emerged as an even more important region. Thus, the challenge Brussels and 
Moscow were facing was something of an equivalent to a “battle for hearts and minds”; to 
convince the leadership in the Central Asian countries that they could be valuable partners. 
This was even more important in a situation  when debate on energy security got a boost, and 
that some of the Central Asian states could be seen as important also in that energy context. 
This thesis seeks to examine what role Russia and the EU do assign to Central Asia in their 
energy security discourses. 
1.2. Research questions 
This thesis will focus on how Russia and the EU have officially portrayed Central Asia in 
their energy security discourses. The research question will be answered by a comparative 
case study, using what we in this thesis will call a matrëshka model. The energy security 
framings will be put in a broader context, with examination of four aspects: the parts’ overall 
foreign policy framing of Central Asia; their security policy framing; their energy policy 
framing; and finally their energy security framing. This way, we can break the research 
question down into four sub-questions:   
- How is Central Asia depicted in the overall foreign policy discourse of Russia and the 
EU? 
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- How is Central Asia depicted in the security policy discourse of Russia and the EU? 
- How is Central Asia depicted in the energy policy discourse of Russia and the EU? 
- How is Central Asia depicted in the energy security discourse of Russia and the EU? 
Central Asia is in this thesis taken to mean Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. It should also be clarified that what is meant by energy in the following 
pages is fossil fuels, i.e. oil and gas. This is due to the fact that it is these two energy sources 
that are the most relevant in terms of imports to Europe from both Russia and Central Asia.    
1.3. Contributions of the thesis 
The primary contribution of this thesis is to provide new knowledge regarding official 
Russian and EU understandings of Central Asia from an energy security perspective in the 
first two years of Dmitry Medvedev’s term as president of Russia. Moreover, the thesis seeks 
to highlight the importance of energy security in that regional context. Previous studies have 
focused on possible consequences of policies as they are outlined in the official documents 
and discourses, but relatively little attention has been paid to studying how actors are framed 
within the same discourses. Another point that can be made here is that we also examine 
aspects that are not directly linked to energy per se, but that nonetheless are vital in ensuring 
energy security. This way, this thesis serves as an argument for examining the full width of 
the energy security debate. Related to this, we here also take the parts’ historical relationships 
with Central Asia into consideration, and argue that also culture should be included in order to 
gain a complete understanding of energy security. Hence, by comparing the perspectives of 
these two major energy actors, this thesis hopefully may add some more nuances into the 
actors’ own understanding of the energy security.  
1.4. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 aims to outline and explain the theoretical 
and methodological approach that will be employed throughout the thesis. The main concepts 
that will be focused on are discourse, discourse analysis, frame analysis and of course energy 
security. In chapter 3 and 4 we examine the Russian and EU energy security discourse on 
Central Asia. The chapters are built up in a similar manner: First, we take a step back and 
account for the historical development of Russia’s and the EU’s relations with Central Asia. 
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In accordance with our conceptualization of energy security, of special importance here is 
more overarching foreign relations and Central Asia’s position herein, security issues and 
matters related to energy. This will enable us to contextualize the energy security discourses 
from 2008 to 2010, and thus also to serve as a background for the analysis of the respective 
parts’ energy security discourses on Central Asia. Next, the following subchapters deal with 
the respective parts’ foreign policy framing; their security policy framing and their energy 
policy framing. The last subchapter of both chapters concern Central Asia’s role in the energy 
security understanding of both parts. Here, we first examine major themes and projects related 
to the parts’ more general understanding of energy security, before we move on to see how 
these relate to Central Asia.  
Chapter 5 will sum up the findings of chapter 3 and 4.  We will here also discuss the nature of 
the “energy game” in Central Asia, and examine whether this should be understood as matter 
of cooperation, competition or confrontation. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations 
2.1. Introductory remarks 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical and methodological framework that 
will be applied throughout this thesis. The structure of this chapter is inspired by the idea that 
that discourse analytical approaches are combinations of theoretical and methodological 
elements that together constitutes a whole (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999; 12). This is also the 
reason why theoretical and methodological considerations are assessed in the same chapter, 
rather than being examined separately. We will start by examining the main theoretical 
concepts that will be used in the following pages. This thesis can best described as a case 
study, in which discourse analysis is used in order to examine how Central Asia is being 
framed in the EU and Russian discourses on foreign policy, security, energy and energy 
security. The chapter discusses the key theoretical and methodological issues relevant for the 
thesis, as well as conceptualizes and operationalizes the concept of energy security. We will 
here also present the matrëshka model, which is the analytical setup used in the thesis. Next, 
we will then look at how the thesis was carried out in praxis, discuss possible sources of error 
and the validity and reliability of the study, before the chapter will be concluded by looking at 
previous research relevant for the thesis. 
2.2. Case study defined 
John Gerring defines of a case as a “spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a 
single point in time or over some period of time” (Gerring 2007: 19). A case study is here 
understood as the study of the properties of the phenomenon in question. As this thesis is 
comprised of a comparison of how Russia and the EU respectively portray Central Asia in 
their official energy security discourses in the period 2008-2010, the phenomena, or units of 
analysis, are the depictions of Central Asia in the Russian and the EU discourses. 
2.3. Comparing cases 
Guy E. Swanson states that “thinking without comparison is unthinkable. And in the absence 
of comparison, so is all scientific thought and scientific research” (Swanson 1971; 145, cited 
in Ragin 1989; 1). The comparative method may be understood as an approach based on 
comparisons between, and analyses of, observed phenomena within a defined area of analysis 
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(Store Danske Encyklopædi 2009). By allowing a feature-by-feature comparison of cases, 
comparative research enables us to investigate “the similarities, differences, and associations 
between entities” (Mills 2008). In this respect this thesis contains a synchronic comparative 
element, in the sense that we will examine and compare the similarities and differences in 
Russia’s and the EU’s energy security discourses on Central Asia. This will make it possible 
to identify how these actors perceive Central Asia in relation to this concept. 
2.4. Defining the case study approach: Interpretative case study 
Charles Ragin argues that an advantage of the case study approach is the emphasis on 
understanding complexity of a subject matter rather than attempting to generalize: 
In the case-oriented approaches (…) it is clear that the goal of appreciating complexity is given 
precedence over the goal of achieving generality (…) The case-oriented approach uses theory to aid 
historical interpretation and to guide the identification of important causal factors; the variable-oriented 
strategy, by contrast usually tests hypotheses derived from theory (Ragin 1987; 54).  
 
Hence, case studies are not seen as the best vehicles for providing generalized theories that 
can be applied over a range of scientific fields. We are therefore dealing with what can be 
called non-general knowledge. Understanding the internal dynamics involved in a particular 
case is therefore given precedence over external generalizations. This is, however, not to say 
that case studies are without value. Arend Lijphart has argued that “case studies can make an 
important contribution to the establishment of general propositions and thus to theory building 
in political science” (1971; 691). Lijphart goes on to outline six different case study “ideal 
types”1 (ibid; 691), one of which is the interpretative case study which will be used in this 
thesis
2
. 
An interpretative case study approach may be selected in instances where there is “an interest 
in the case rather than an interest in the formulation of general theory” (ibid; 691)3. A 
                                                 
1
 The remaining five types of case studies outlined by Lijphart include atheoretical case studies; theory-
confirming case studies; theory-infirming case studies; hypothesis-generating case studies and deviant case 
studies. 
2
 This is not to say that this thesis exclusively relies on this approach; Lijphart himself stated that the types 
merely represent ideals. In practical terms an exclusive focus on only one approach in a study may be deemed 
impractical or even outright inadequate for studying the object at hand.  
3
 This characteristic the interpretative approach shares with the atheoretical approach, thus underlining the point 
made by Lijphart about the futility of searching for an exclusive ideal type approach.  
7 
 
generalization is here applied to a specific case “with the aim of throwing light on the case 
rather than of improving the generalization in any way” (ibid; 692). By allowing empirical 
theory related to a specific case to be interpreted and analyzed due to its particular 
characteristics, the approach carries a value on its own. The emphasis in this thesis is on the 
respective parts’ official discourses and the portrayals that lie herein of Central Asia. As these 
are not objectively given facts, an interpretive approach is suitable.   
2.5. Discourse analysis: Theoretical preliminaries 
2.5.1. Defining discourse 
A discourse can be understood as a way of talking about and understanding the world (or a 
section of the world) (Jørgensen & Phillips; 8). The way we speak of the world around us 
does not simply reflect the world in a neutral and unbiased manner, but constructs the world 
in a particular way (ibid; 8)
4
. In accordance with this, systems of meaning are contingent, as 
the social world is in a constant state of flux. Language is here seen as more than just a 
channel for the communication of information or facts; it is also various practices and 
understandings that are manifested in what we perceive as social reality. Humans, through 
speech and writing, construct a particular view of the world at a given point in time, which in 
turn is acted upon through interaction with others.  
This in turn introduces power into the equation, as the ability to affect what is to be 
considered knowledge can influence social practices on a large scale. Taking this into 
consideration, Phillips and Hardy summarize discourse more narrowly, defining it as “an 
interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception 
that brings an object into being” (Phillips & Hardy 2002; 3). Social reality is seen as a 
construction that is made real through discourses, “and social interactions cannot be fully 
understood without reference to the discourses that give them meaning” (ibid; 3).  
There is a dialogical relationship between the social world and the language we use to 
describe this. Accordingly, any attempt to create a clear-cut division between reality and 
                                                 
4
 Iver B. Neumann has inferred that because of the dynamic nature of the social world where everything is 
constantly in flux, discourse analyses are primarily concerned with epistemological issues, understood as the 
origin, nature, methods, validity, and limits of human knowledge, rather than ontological ones, that deals with 
the nature of social entities (Neumann 2001; 14). 
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discourse is futile, as the discourse we use at any given time is adapted in order to fit our 
surroundings. For this reason, humans have access to a reality, not the reality. This way, 
discourse analyses are based upon the acceptance of a division between reality understood as 
physical reality and reality understood as social representation. The goal of a discourse 
analysis is therefore to shed new light on the premises that are always parts of political and 
social practices (Neumann 2001; 15). 
2.5.2. Basic discourse analytical assumptions 
Gill has outlined four themes that have a prominent position within the discourse analytical 
paradigm: discourse as a topic; language is constructive; discourse as a form of action and 
finally discourse as being rhetorically organized (Gill 2000; 141-143, Bryman 2004; 371). 
These themes will be further explained below, with reference to how these can be related to 
this thesis.  
First, Gill states that discourse per se is a topic. Accordingly, discourse must be seen as the 
focus of enquiry itself, and not as a gateway to some social reality that lies behind the 
discourse. Discourse analyses are therefore related to investigating the “content and 
organization of talk and texts” (Gill; 141), making language and emerging patterns in the texts 
analyzed the main focus of investigation. In relation to this thesis this means that the aim is 
not to find out what the players really mean about Central Asia, but rather how the language 
employed to describe and discuss Central Asia creates a specific understanding of the region. 
The discourse analysis aims to uncover these language mechanisms. 
Second, Gill notes the constructive nature of discourses. This means that a particular version 
of social reality is constructed through the use of discourses. Throughout this process, choices 
are made regarding how this view is most appropriately presented, which in turn reflect the 
“disposition of the person responsible for devising it” (Bryman 2004; 371). Related to this 
thesis, we here see that among all the possible representations that can be used to depict 
Central Asia, a few are chosen and highlighted, attempting to present the truth according to 
the players. Our goal here is therefore to examine which representations that are chosen.  
Thirdly, discourse is regarded as a social practice, in that it is “action oriented” (Gill; 142).  
People employ language in order to carry out certain acts (presenting a case from a specific 
point of view, attributing blame, etc.), which underscores that discourses interact with the 
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context in which they are being used, and must be interpreted in relation to this context.  By 
recognizing the historical and cultural specificity of knowledge this also means that a given 
action must be endowed with meaning by being placed in a cultural or conceptual context 
(Burr 1995; 6; Matz 2001; 69). Accordingly, the respective Russian and EU energy security 
discourses must be seen as mirroring specific understandings of the world at the time they 
were constructed. The goal of the discourse analysis is therefore to examine the interaction 
between the discourse and the context within which the discourse takes place, which in turn 
justifies these portrayals from the respective parts’ point of view.  
Finally, Gill sees discourses as being rhetorically organized, where the aim is to establish a 
particular version of the world. This happens in competition with other discourses that aim to 
achieve the same, in a form of bargaining game. The successfulness of a particular discourse 
must be considered in terms of the backing and acceptance a discourse gets, which enables it 
to establish and present its particular version of the “truth” at a given point in time. By 
addressing the rhetorical nature that is intrinsic in texts, we can see how discourses are 
organized in order to present themselves as viable alternatives. This thesis will not address the 
bargaining game as such, as the focus here is on the established official discourses. The point 
here is rather to examine which depictions that are constructed of Central Asia within the 
official discourses; this way attempting to establish an overall and complete portrait of the 
region within the official discourse.   
2.6. Narrowing down: Framing and frame analysis
5
.  
Frames
6
 can be understood as cognitive models through which people interpret the world and 
organize experiences. Our thoughts and understandings of the world are being guided by 
frames, in the sense that certain features of social life are highlighted while others are 
neglected or downplayed. Reality is being filtered and simplified, and we interpret input from 
the world through already established frames, constructed through selection and salience 
(Jensen 2009; 3). This way, frames provide us with a background or point of reference when 
we are faced with new experiences, as understanding a situation can be seen as a process of 
                                                 
5
 This is not to say that a frame analytic approach is necessarily synonymous with a discourse analytical 
approach. Frame analysis is a multi-disciplinary research method that can take on a number of various practices. 
See Fisher (1997) for an extensive overview. 
6
 Frames are often also referred to as cognitive structures or mental schemas. 
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comparison and matching the present situation with the pre-existing frames stored in the 
mind.  
How an issue is framed have direct implications for how we do relate to it. This way, frames 
also mediate the rules for human cognition and communication. By using a specific frame, a 
specific problem definition is promoted, along with a particular interpretation of coherence, 
moral evaluation and (or) a problem solution (Entman 1993; 52; Ihlen 2007; 10). This shows 
the political power that lies in frames, as they work as imprints of power by registering the 
identity of actors or interests that have competed to dominate a text (Entman; 55). Hence, 
frames should not be seen only as a mechanism explaining the construction of political issues; 
framing is per se policy-making as players use frames in order to constitute an issue as a 
political one, and themselves as political subjects. The point here is not that frames are being 
used, as everybody employs frames to express their points of view. Rather, what is to be 
emphasized is that these frames are social constructions that promote certain interpretations 
and representations, whilst rejecting others (Ihlen 2007; 10).  
It is of vital importance to endow discourses with a sense of rationality, consistency, 
legitimacy, etc. if a particular discourse is to become dominant and hereby powerful. Frames 
help discourses achieve this as they enable narrative fidelity and empirical credibility, 
understood respectively as the congruence of a frame with the life experience of its addressees 
and the fit between a frame and what is perceived as real world events (d’Anjou 1996; 56, and 
Gamson & Modigliani 1989; 5, both cited in Koenig 2005a). In order to receive backing for a 
proposed definition of a problem, a player must formulate this in a rhetorical, political 
language that makes sense on the collective level (Matz; 71). Related to political matters – 
and hence this thesis – it is important that the policy makers understand the situation in which 
they act.  
Accordingly, the Russian and EU leadership respectively need to agree on how Central Asia 
should be presented and represented, in order to construct a consistent stance. Hence, the 
frames presented in this thesis are seen as collectively held and socially shared in Russia and 
the EU respectively. In relation to this thesis, the overall goal in the creation of an official 
discourse on Central Asia must therefore be seen to be to combine and intertwine two 
processes: frame problems and issues related to energy security and Central Asia so that they 
are in accordance with what can be called national interests and understandings, and at the 
same time present the frames that have been decided upon in a way that they may be deemed 
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legitimate and understandable by the public. Based on this, we can discern that the frames 
within which Central Asia is placed in the parts’ energy security discourses should be based 
on collectively held pre-established and accepted depictions of the region. This underlines the 
links between culture and meaning, which in turn illustrates that the Russian and EU 
discourses and consequent framings of Central Asia are distinct and unique; underpinned by 
separate logics. Hence, the aim of frame analysis is to “identify the framing and reasoning 
devices and to relate them to a condensing symbol, which is part of a shared culture” (Van 
Gorp 2010; 92). We will in the following outline the approach that will be used to achieve 
this.  Before doing this, we shall first examine the concept of energy security. 
2.7. Understanding and operationalizing energy security 
The World Economic Forum (WEC) and Cambridge Energy Associates (CERA) have 
conceptualized energy security as an umbrella concept that covers various aspects linked to 
energy, economic growth and political power (WEF/CERA; 9). As the goal in this thesis is to 
examine framings of Central Asia, this conceptualization is useful as it equips us with a 
framework within which to elaborate the concept of energy security that still allows for more 
narrow operationalizations according to the scope of investigation.  
Actors in different links of the energy chain have different stakes in the field of energy 
security and consequently also attach different interests to the concept. An energy producer 
(exporter) understands energy security differently than an energy consumer (importer), and 
transit countries may approach the matter in a different way than the two previously 
mentioned parts
7
 (Godzimirski 2009; 174). Elena Shadrina has aptly noted that 
“producers/exporters and consumers/importers of energy resources may operate by the same – 
volume, price, and continuity – categories, but the parameters paid attention to are different; 
the two sides emphasize their interests and formulate their concerns differently” (Shadrina 
2010; 29).  
This can be exemplified by considering that both producers and consumers of energy are 
interested in stable markets and predictable prices, but there is also a fundamental conflict of 
                                                 
7
 As a fourth category we may also include the energy industry, whose priorities may differ from that of a 
government. This category is in some instances somewhat shady, especially in Russia’s case, where a large 
portion of the energy industry is controlled by the Kremlin, thus operating with an aim to promote national 
interests. However, as this thesis’ focus is on the governmental, in the EU’s case perhaps even supra-
governmental, niveau of policy formulation, this category has not been considered. 
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interests between the parts over control of activities and market, as well as over such concerns 
as prices, taxes and division of profits. Exporters argue between themselves over long-term 
strategies, prices and market shares, whereas importers have conflicting views on access 
supplies and positioning in the exporting countries (Noreng 2009; 207-208, 217). Adding 
even more complexity to this, some actors may occupy several positions in the energy 
structure simultaneously. A relevant example in this thesis is Russia, that on one hand is a 
major global energy producer, but on the other also serves as a transit country for energy from 
Central Asia and also as a buyer of gas from the region in order to meet Russian commitments 
both in Russia and abroad (Godzimirski; 174). Consequently, actor identities and interests are 
not necessarily clear-cut or uniform, which requires the actors to weigh its interests against 
one another in order to appear with a comprehensible and consistent strategy.  
Studies of energy security have traditionally been divided into two distinct schools; one 
arguing for a market analytical approach to the subject matter, hereby stressing a focus on 
economy, market mechanisms and liberalism. The other has emphasized geopolitics, i.e. 
realistic power politics (Nakamura 2002; 12-17). This also implies that these two principal 
classes also follow different logics regarding their viewings of energy. The former sees 
energy as a market-oriented concept and an internationally tradable good, while the latter 
views energy through a geopolitical lens, meaning that energy emerges as a strategic good 
(Shadrina; 28). In the prolongation of this argument it can be assumed that international 
energy relations are in a constant and intrinsic tension between cooperation and conflict (ibid; 
28). At the heart of these categories is the issue of competition over different energy-related 
aspects
8
. 
This means that the parts in the energy chain must choose its strategy to ensure energy 
security from its position in the energy chain. Confrontation assumes a position of strength 
and an ability to dominate the counterpart militarily, whereas cooperation suggests reciprocity 
and interdependence between the parts (Noreng; 217). These categories are naturally not 
mutually exclusive: states can and indeed do bring both categories into consideration when 
deciding upon an energy security strategy. Furthermore, it ought to be emphasized that the 
scenarios for interaction above are merely ideal types, and that international energy relations 
                                                 
8
 These dynamics will be discussed in chapter 5, with relation to how these pertain to Central Asia. 
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in praxis mostly lie somewhere between these9. Rather, the point that should be made in 
relation to this thesis is that regardless of which of the abovementioned foci is dominant, 
energy security “inescapably rises as a pivotal issue of (global) energy governance and 
international relations (at large)” (Shadrina; 28). Therefore, due to the multifaceted character 
of the concept of energy security, it can be examined from various angles, and consequently 
operationalized according to different criteria. In this thesis we will be examining the Russian 
and energy security discourses according to a matrëshka model consisting of three “layers”; 
foreign policy, security policy and finally energy policy. 
The rationale for this approach is that in order to understand the role Central Asia plays in an 
energy security political context we also need to consider the way in which the region is 
depicted in a larger and more general context. Consistent with this, we also need to take into 
account the political, geopolitical and security political motives and considerations of Russia 
and the EU. Due to just this, the following pages will not solely concern “pure” energy 
considerations, but also other issues and challenges that were relevant in the parts’ 
relationships with Central Asia. This also means that we need to take into account the identity 
of the actors more broadly, as well as cultural relations between the parts. Hence, it is here 
argued that there is a close relationship between the actors’ understandings of goals and 
instruments in energy security and their foreign, security and energy policies10. This is of 
perhaps especially pertinent in the case of Russia, which has long-standing historical relations 
with the Central Asian states. This may have led to a culturally-based cementation of attitudes 
and perceptions vis-à-vis the Central Asian states, in other words what is sometimes referred 
to as implicit knowledge. Hence, by examining the energy security according to the thesis’ 
analytical setup, it is here suggested that energy security indeed contains a cultural 
component. 
                                                 
9
 How this pertains to this thesis will be addressed in Chapter 5. 
10
 An apt illustration of just this point can be seen in the EU’s Energy Strategy until 2020, where it is stated that 
“energy security is closely intertwined with EU's foreign and security priorities. Diversification of fuels, sources 
of supply and transit routes is essential for EU security as are good governance, respect for the rule of law and 
protection of EU and foreign investments in energy producing and transit countries” (EC 2010c). 
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Figure 2: Graphical Outline of the Matrëshka Model 
 
 
Before moving, a remark should be made about the thesis’ analytical distinction. More 
specifically, this relates to the division between energy policy and energy security. Given that 
both categories deal with energy related matters, it is unavoidable that there are overlapping 
elements
11. However, it is here contended that the examined actors’ understanding of energy 
security serves as a basis for their energy policy more generally. In turn, given energy 
policy’s centrality in the formulation of foreign policy in general, we here argue that there are 
spill-over effects from energy security that influence other political levels than merely energy 
related issues. Moreover, energy policy is of course linked to many aspects and is thus more 
than just energy security. However, as the focus the of this thesis is the energy security 
discourses of Russia and the EU, the energy policy section is construed in such a way as to 
illustrate how the energy policy is framed in order to enhance the parts’ energy security 
situation. 
2.8. Frame analysis applied 
This thesis will be based on a qualitative approach to the identification of frames. More 
specifically, we will in the following employ an interpretative approach through a narrative 
analysis of texts which will help us identify the frames used to portray Central Asia. This 
means analyzing texts as narrative stories, and examine their construction, structure, plot and 
                                                 
11
 How this was dealt with in practical terms will be discussed in section 2.8. 
Foreign Policy 
Security 
Policy 
Energy  Policy 
Energy  
Security 
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character. Silverman (2006; 166) has identified the following questions as useful to answer in 
a narrative analysis:  
- What is the content of the examined story? 
- Who are the principal agents? 
- How is the story told (structure and sequence)? 
- What purposes does the story serve (functions)? 
- In what place or setting is the story told (context)? 
- Does the story have a clear culmination with a moral, as in a fairytale, or does it 
follow a different pattern (issues of genre)? 
Drawing on Silverman’s questions, the objective throughout the analysis process is to 
examine how a comprehensive and coherent portrayal of Central Asia emerged, rather than 
examining the various questions separately. This is not to say that the following analysis does 
not answer some of these questions specifically at some points; the point is rather that this is 
done in order to highlight the construction of a holistic presentation of Central Asia in 
accordance with the examined themes and “layers”12. Hence, Silverman’s questions served as 
guidelines rather than a strict methodological outline.  
In practical terms, the following was done to approach the subject matter. First, official texts, 
statements, speeches etc. were read and categorized thematically according to their relevance 
to the four “layers” in the matrëshka-model. The main selection criterion here was explicit or 
implicit references to Central Asia in the context of the categories chosen for analysis, i.e. the 
layers. Consequentially, texts that did not fit the analytical scheme were omitted from the base 
of texts that were to be analyzed further. As to the texts that were kept on, it was obvious that 
different aspects needed to be searched for in the different layers. In terms of the foreign 
policy layer, documents and texts were searched for more overarching frames and themes 
regarding the parts’ general perception of Central Asia. The security policy framing was built 
                                                 
12
 It should here also be pointed out that some linguistic features were examined, albeit to a rather modest 
degree. Drawing on Thomas Koenig’s (2005b and 2006) exemplification of heuristic framing devices, suffice it 
here to mention that constructions of collectivization were assessed by looking for deictics, more specifically 
personal pronouns. Particularizations and generalizations were seen by examining synecdoches, also known as 
“collective singulars”, that are used to explain the actions of a person or persons by referring to his or her 
attributes, such as for instance nationality. These devices were used to support and substantiate the already-
constructed frames rather than assisting in the actual construction of these.   
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up by examining the threats and dangers the parts associated with the region, what depictions 
the parts had of Central Asia in light of these threats, and how the parts sought to overcome 
these problems. The parts’ energy policy framing was examined by looking at the role of 
Central Asia in the parts’ energy outlook, and how the parts sought to approach the region in 
light of these outlooks. Lastly, the energy security aspect was examined by examining the 
major themes in the parts’ discourse on this topic, and how Central Asia would help the parts 
in overcoming the challenges the parts faced. 
Next, an important point was to identify emerging framing patterns of Central Asia as a result 
of the respective official discourses’ portrayal of the region. This is what often is mentioned 
as master frames
13
 or meta-narratives. These are ideational models that are highly culturally 
resonant and inter-subjective within a given society, and serve as starting points for how 
something, in our case Central Asia, can be addressed within a given society. The logical 
place to find the master frames was in the parts’ overall foreign political assessment of 
Central Asia, the first step of the analysis, as this obviously serves as a fundament for how to 
understand Central Asia more generally from the respective parts’ point of view. The master 
frames are “custom-made” and were identified on the basis of recurring narrative features in 
the official discourse, which in turn places restrictions on how Central Asia could be 
understood from the parts’ perspectives. Having identified these, the thesis’ presupposition is 
that the identified master frames would “move downwards” when moving from general 
considerations to more particular ones, which also affecting how the parts mentioned and 
related to Central Asia in the spheres of security, energy and energy security. Hence, although 
the different layers are examined taking their internal logic into consideration, it has also been 
an objective throughout the thesis to show how a constructed stance carries certain 
implications throughout the whole discursive “chain”. 
Before moving on, a few remarks should be made about the analytical scheme and the 
practical methodology employed. First, it should here be pointed out that the layers do not 
constitute watertight bulkheads, meaning that issues may be intertwined or overlapping. This 
is perhaps especially pertinent in the distinction between energy policy and energy security. 
To overcome this challenge during the categorization and analysis of the texts related to these 
                                                 
13
 An oft-cited definition of the term has been worked out by Snow and Benford who states that master frames 
are "modes of punctuation, attribution, and articulation”, but their punctuations, attributions, and articulations 
may color and constrain [the collective action frames of] any number of movement organizations"(Snow and 
Benford 1992; 138). 
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two themes, a practical distinction was introduced: when the discourse referred to “energy” or 
“energy policy” these were placed in the energy policy category, whereas instances where 
“energy security” was discussed were placed in the energy security category. Another aspect 
related to the selection criterion outlined above concerns the actual descriptions of Central 
Asia. As the thesis’ topic is the parts’ Central Asian discourses, descriptions of multilateral 
relations have been preferred over bilateral relations. In other words, descriptions of Central 
Asia
14
 as a region have mostly been given precedence over descriptions of Russia’s or the 
EU’s bilateral relations with the separate countries in the region.   
As to the empirical research, official strategies and documents were taken as the main points 
of departure, which means that these will be referred to relatively frequently throughout the 
thesis. As some of these documents officially have rather long names and may be published 
by different official agencies, we will for the sake of simplicity refer to abbreviations of these 
documents when citing these. However, in order to make the thesis as transparent as possible, 
the documents will when introduced by accompanied by a footnote that shows the location of 
the document in the bibliography. 
It should also be noted that this has not been a strict methodological guideline throughout the 
thesis. Due to the thesis’ scope and the research questions posed, some of the Central Asian 
countries are considered to be more pertinent in investigating the subject matter at hand than 
others. Of special importance here is Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which are the two most 
energy-abundant states in the region. Given that the thesis also examines energy related 
issues, these countries occupy a somewhat special position in the parts’ framings, and thus 
also in this thesis. Therefore, although Central Asia in the following pages mainly is treated as 
a whole, reference will, when fitting, be made to these countries as well.   
2.9. Identifying possible sources of error 
First, we only examine limited period of time, namely the period from 2008 to 2010. As with 
politics in general, energy security is a dynamic field where rapid developments occur. 
Because of this, the temporal limitation may be a challenge, in the sense that the analytical 
setup may be unable to pick up more recent currents and trends of the political climate. In 
order to remedy this, reference will also be made to pertinent developments that have 
                                                 
14
 In Russia’s case this also includes coverage of the CIS, in which the Central Asian states, with the exception 
of Turkmenistan which has not ratified the commonwealth’s charter, are members.   
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occurred in 2011. Second, the focus here is mainly the discursive aspect of the official 
outlooks, meaning that the thesis for the most part does not examine how the parts’ policies 
are pursued in practice. This could be a potential source of error, as discrepancies might very 
well occur between rhetoric and what is done in real life.  
Moving on, it is unavoidable that a thesis such as this one aims at highlighting a generalized 
or stereotypical depiction of the object studied, in this case Central Asia. As the goal is to 
present main tendencies in the discourse, variations in depictions are not necessarily picked 
up, which in turn may lead the author to add more fuel to an already established depiction. In 
relation to this point, it should also be noted that frames are not static, but are continuously 
altered in the dialogical interplay between the social world and the language humans employ 
to describe this. Moreover, it is clear that the Russo-Central Asian and EU-Central Asian 
relations do not arise in a vacuum or as isolated cases; they are part of a continuum where 
other actors, most notably China, also are present. In relation to this it ought also to be 
mentioned that the Central Asian states’ own views on both their relationships with Russia 
and the EU and the energy security situation in the region are not analysed in this thesis.  
As to the theoretical approach, there is some fuzziness regarding the conceptualizations of the 
theoretical concepts used in the thesis. This has led some theoreticians to separate between 
frame and discourse studies
15
. This thesis does not attempt to serve as a theoretical defence 
for the bridging of these two directions. Rather, it is here contended that frames emerges as 
discursive constructions, meaning that framings can be detected by scrutinizing the 
discourses. As was also mentioned above frame analysis is a multi-disciplinary approach, and 
discourse analysis is accordingly just one of several possible angles of approach.  
Next, we need to examine the validity of the research. We may here distinguish between 
external and internal validity. High external validity is achieved when the findings of the 
study can be applied or transferred outside its own setting, whereas a study achieves high 
internal validity when the findings are valid for the sample studied. As this thesis is dealing 
with the energy security discourses of Russia and the EU, it can be said to have a high internal 
validity for the samples studied, but a low external validity as the thesis’ findings cannot be 
applied to the energy security discourses of other actors.  
                                                 
15
 See Johnston (2002) for an elaboration of this.  
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In relation to the validity of the thesis we should also mention the role of the researcher. To 
which degree a project has been influenced by its researcher is of course intrinsically difficult 
to assess. Rather, what should be emphasized here is that the researcher must adopt what 
Stephanie Taylor has called a “policy of openness” (Taylor; 19). By positioning her or 
himself in relation to what is being studied, the researcher shows hers or his contextual and 
interpretive point of departure. Therefore, I will in the following briefly outline how my 
position may affect this thesis. I am a student of Russian area studies, which may lead to a 
“knowledge bias” towards the Russian stance. Moreover, seeing as Norway is not an EU 
member I might be considered what Van Gorp has termed a “relative outsider”, in the sense 
that I am not a citizen of either of the examined subjects (Van Gorp; 94). However, I am 
familiar with both a European context through my upbringing, and a Russian one through my 
studies. 
As to the reliability of the study, a qualitative approach such as this one is based on data 
reduction to compress the material analyzed into more general categories, i.e. the various 
frames and framings. Michael T. Maher states that due theoretically demanding character of 
the concept of framing, it has proved to be an elusive concept to measure (Maher 2001; 84). 
This is also the case in relation to this thesis, as the depictions of Central Asia were 
categorized into overarching themes on the basis of an interpretative and subjective approach, 
rather than on the basis of an established methodology. As both the selection and analysis of 
texts are based on the judgment of the researcher the reliability of the study may be an issue, 
as other researchers may assign the selected texts to different categories, or construe new 
categories altogether. Hence, there is risk that analytical creativity could be translated into 
analytical arbitrariness (ibid; 84). Summing up the last four paragraphs, it is fitting to quote 
Hank Johnston, who notes that “because textual data come contextually embedded and are 
often gathered in ways that offers insights into their interpretation that are often lost in survey 
techniques, qualitative analysis offers higher validity of the findings but less reliability” 
(Johnston 2002; 69).  
2.10. Previous studies and research 
This thesis touches upon a number of different research directions and traditions. Perovic and 
Orttung (2010) provide a concise account of the various aspects involved in energy security 
thinking, and also illustrate the change and continuity in the conceptualizations of energy 
20 
  
security. Noreng (2009) discusses conflict, confrontation and cooperation as different 
strategies for achieving energy security. Locatelli (2010) examines the stakes involved for the 
EU in supplying the Union with gas from both Russia and the Caspian region at large. 
Øverland, Kendall-Taylor and Kjærnet (eds.; 2010) address both how petroleum wealth has 
affected the Caspian States domestically, and the relationships between the Caspian states and 
Russia and China. Warkotsch (ed.; 2011) covers a variety of issues connected to the EU’s 
engagement in Central Asia. Shadrina (2010) examines Russian foreign energy policy on 
three fronts: towards the EU; towards Central Eurasia; and towards Northeast Asia. Anker et 
al (2010) discuss the development of the Caspian Sea region towards 2025, hereunder also the 
role of the region’s energy resources. 
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Chapter 3: Central Asia in the Russian Discourse on Energy 
Security  
3.1. Contextualizing the Russo-Central Asian relationship 
Introduction 
The demise of the Soviet Union meant that Russia needed to reconstruct its discourse in order 
to better fit the post-Soviet reality. Borrowing Johan Matz’ phrase, it was here a matter of 
“framing a new reality with an old language” (Matz 2001; 95). As Russian perceptions of 
political realities have changed, so have the stances taken towards Central Asia. This section 
aims to provide a contextualization for these stances. Paramonov and Strokov (2008) identify 
three stages in the evolvement of post-Soviet Russia’s policy on Central Asia; 1992 to 1995; 
1996 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008
16
. We will in the following employ this division to provide an 
overview of Russia’s policies and views of Central Asia. This will make it possible to 
contextualize the Russian energy security discourse from 2008 to 2010, and will further give a 
broader understanding of how Central Asia has been perceived and approached by Moscow.  
First stage (1992-1995)  
The early 1990s saw Russia in political disarray. The Russian leadership had for the time 
being excluded any ambitions of retaining its former international status, and focused 
primarily on legitimizing and consolidating domestic power. Moreover, Moscow sought to 
transform Russia into a Western-like democratic and capitalist country.  From the outlook of 
the then-liberal Moscow Central Asia did not fit well into this scheme, as the region was seen 
as an obstacle to Russia’s modernization (Paramonov & Strokov 2008; 3). Consequentially, 
this meant implementing a policy of isolationism from Central Asia. Russia considered 
Central Asia to be geographically too remote for Western impact, which led Moscow to treat 
the region “more as an extension of internal affairs than as external affairs” (Perovic 2005; 
62). This way, Moscow conveyed the message that the “near abroad” could be left alone until 
the Kremlin decided otherwise. 
                                                 
16
 In order to allow a better overview of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the third stage that deals with just this has 
been divided in two, which looks at each of the periods of Putin’s reign.  
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Russia was still keen to maintain its geopolitical “sphere of interest”, meaning that Moscow 
still wanted the role as security guarantor for the region as well as being the main promoter 
for economic cooperation (Jonson 2006; 9). To this effect, and in addition to infuse Russian 
influence directly, Moscow promoted the Commonwealth of Independent (CIS).  Established 
in 1991, its main aim was to bring about a “peaceful divorce” between the former Soviet 
republics and to provide a vehicle for coordination within such spheres as trade, finance and 
security. However, Russia’s lack of ability to project its power meant that Moscow had to 
match available resources against political aspirations and priorities. Thus, instead of 
influencing the region through active policies, Russia tried to control Central Asia by 
hindering potential competitors from entering the region. This way, the Russian sway was 
kept by maintaining status quo. Cooperation was desirable as long as Russia was in charge; 
otherwise Russia would follow a policy of obstruction. The inconsistency of the Russian 
practice can here be illustrated, as Central Asia was framed as a geopolitical asset and a 
burden at the same time. This, in turn, reflected the Russian view of Central Asia as part of 
Moscow’s geopolitical back alley, and that Russia was in charge.   
Second stage (1996-1999) 
The appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as Russian foreign minister signaled the end of the 
liberal Western orientation in Russian policy. Wishing to enhance Russia’s position in global 
affairs, Primakov launched the concept of multipolarity (ibid; 7, Tsygankov 2010; 19). In 
practical terms, this signaled the promotion of Russia as an independent center of power, 
which also meant a halt in the integration with the Euro-Atlantic community (Paramonov & 
Strokov; 7). In this sense Primakov’s approach also contained an Eurasianist17 element, as it 
promoted the enhancement of Russian geopolitical influence and power in the post-Soviet 
space, Central Asia included.  
During this period Russia’s awareness of Central Asia’s importance was increased, especially 
in terms of security. This was spurred by such events as the outbreak of the first Chechen war 
in 1994, the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan and also the plans to enlarge NATO into the post-
                                                 
17
 De Lazari provides us with a clear definition Eurasianism, stating that it is “one of the trends in Russian anti-
Westernism, justifying the reasons for which the West and Russia cannot be unified ideologically. According to 
this concept, Russia is neither Europe, nor Asia, but a continent in its own right: Eurasia” (De Lazari 1999; 171). 
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Soviet space (ibid; 7, Rutland 2003; 30, Perovic; 62, Tsygankov; 112)
18
. As noted above, 
Russia saw itself as the exclusive guarantor of Central Asia’s security.  In turn, this meant that 
any advancement made by foreign powers into the area was deemed incompatible with 
Russian interests (Perovic; 62). This may explain why Russia in this period sought closer 
relationships with the Central Asian on several fronts: on security and military matters as well 
as economic and socio-political cooperation. This way, Moscow attempted to revive the 
interdependent coherence of the former union without evoking any political neo-imperialist 
notions (Tsygankov; 114).  
By addressing these issues, Moscow tried to “embrace and to cautiously promote the idea of 
Eurasianism as a multicultural, multiethnic, and multireligious community in the place of the 
former Soviet Union” (ibid; 120).  Jos Boonstra writes that this change in Russian policy also 
was a reaction to the Central Asian efforts to look for new political partners, which, perhaps 
somewhat paradoxically, was motivated by the lack of Russian  interest in the region 
(Boonstra 2008; 70). Moscow realized that a policy of obstruction left the Central Asian states 
with no choice but to seek alliances elsewhere. By adopting a policy of cooperation Russian 
authorities were more able to control the unfolding of events (Perovic; 64). 
Still, it should not be forgotten that the overall aim was to increase Russian influence and 
power, making geopolitical considerations more important. In practical terms, the Russian 
influence was boosted through the improvement of cooperation on defense issues and, of 
special relevance to this thesis, the fact that the Soviet-era energy pipelines flowed from the 
south to the north, thus effectively giving Russia a monopoly on energy transport from 
Central Asia. Hence, energy was a means to maintain Russian influence. Russian perceptions 
of Central Asia in this period therefore seem as a twofold image: Partially based on an image 
of Central Asia as a region dependent on Russia for its development, and partially based in a 
belief that Central Asia needed Russian “nourishment” if this dependency were to last. 
Despite the lack of tangible achieved results, this period clearly highlights а resurgence of 
Central Asia in Russian politics. 
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 This is not to say that the model presented by Primakov necessarily implied a confrontational stance towards 
the West. Although Russia remained skeptical of NATO’s activities, Primakov believed that pragmatic 
cooperation on areas important for both parts were useful (Tsygankov; 97). 
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Third stage (2000-2008) 
2000-2004 
The Primakov doctrine was still very much a part of Russian policy at the time of Vladimir 
Putin’s accession to power, but in a more suited form; based on pragmatism and flexibility 
(Paramonov & Strokov; 12). Nevertheless, Putin oversaw the revision of the National 
Security Concept where it was stated that Central Asia was one of the areas in which the 
strengthened Russia could exercise its national interests. Consequently, the opposition of this 
was deemed by the document as a “threat to the Russian Federation’s national security” 
(Soviet Bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federatsii 2010)
19
.   
However, the stated geopolitical outlook had to give way to pragmatism following the 9/11 
terror attacks and the subsequent stationing of Western troops well inside what Russia 
deemed its “zone of interest”. This marked the definitive breakthrough for US and Western 
presence in Central Asia, which in turn required a Russian policy shift in its relations with 
both the Central Asian states and the “aliens” (Jonson; 88). Hence, Central Asia became 
pivotal for the further development of Russian foreign policy; both in terms of Russo-Central 
Asian relations per se, but also as a means to further rapprochement with the West (ibid; 195) 
Russia was still seen as the single most important ally for the Central Asian states, but at the 
same time previous leadership models based on Russia as the region’s gravitational center and 
Moscow’s hegemonic domination of the neighboring states had to be discarded. This 
illustrated an acceptance of a larger degree of power-sharing as the new modus vivendi as the 
political power of the Central Asian states had increased (Antonenko 2007; 49).    
In practical terms the reframing of the relationships was done by entering into a “strategic 
partnership” with the United States and its allies. This meant that Russia now emphasized 
cooperation with the West, but at the same time also focused on a more active policy in 
Central Asia than earlier , thus making sure that Russia did not become a passive spectator in 
the region (ibid; 98). One aspect of the multi-faceted cooperation was naturally centered on 
security and military issues in order to stabilize the region and enhance security, and also to 
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 Lena Jonson notes that the issue of terrorism was at the forefront of Putin’s political agenda even before the 
9/11 attacks due to unrest both in the Caucasus (Chechen rebels invaded Dagestan) and in Central Asia proper 
(the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s (IMU) incursions into Kyrgyzstan during his time as Prime Minister in 
1999. Hence, Central Asia was framed as a terrorist threat already before the beginning of the new millennium, 
which in turn made it a prioritized task to develop military and security cooperation in order to counter the 
terrorist threat (Jonson; 63). 
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aid in the fight against terrorism. However, the Russian scope of attention was further 
widened to also include economics as a measure to promote cooperation. This was primarily 
within the energy sector where Moscow sought to restore the common grid and pipeline 
system (Perovic; 67; Jonson; 188)
20. Russia’s pragmatism should not be seen as a signal of an 
overall acceptance of “foreign” presence in Central Asia. The Russian skepticism was 
explicitly expressed in 2002, when the main driver of Russia’s efforts in the post-soviet space 
was stated to be national security
21
 (Flikke & Wilhelmsen 2008; 25-26). In addition to fuel an 
argument that the partnership was more a matter of practical collaboration than of global 
integration, this also seems to suggest a Russo-Central Asian cooperation hierarchy where 
Russian objectives, rather than mutual ones, were given prominence from Moscow’s point of 
view. 
2004-2008 
Russia’s relations with the West started to sour as the USA prepared for the Iraq war. A clear 
manifestation of this came in February 2007, in what has later been known as Putin’s Munich 
speech. Here, Putin accused Washington of seeking to establish a unipolar world, stating that 
“the United States has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the 
economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations” (Prezident 
Rossii, 10/2 2007). This, in turn, led Moscow to resume its focus on multipolarity and 
downplay the role and significance of the partnership with the West (Flikke & Wilhelmsen; 
11). Consequently, more attention was given to the post-Soviet space, and the focus on 
security and economy in relation to Central Asia was extended (ibid; 13)
22
. 
Russia assumed the role of coordinator as it sought to create a regional security system, which 
was achieved in practice by stepping up activities within the Collective Security Treaty  
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 In regard to the overall economic sphere the situation did not change radically, which meant that the general 
trade between Russia and Central Asia remained underdeveloped (Paramonov & Strokov; 15). 
21
 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically designated this area as a prioritized zone for Russian 
policies; a choice “dictated by national security interests and economic interests” (“Rossiya i SNG: Sostoyanie i 
perspektivy”, cited in Flikke & Wilhelmsen 2008; 26) 
22
 On another note, overall cooperation not only improved because of Russian initiatives; there was also an anti-
Western rise in Central Asia, as a normative rhetoric concerning democratization started to spread (Matveeva 
2007; 57). Russia seemed to capitalize from this situation in a double sense; not only did Russia increase its own 
power in an economic sense, it also consolidated its relative position vis-à-vis the West, as the West lost 
influence. 
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Organization
23
 (CSTO) (Paramonov & Strokov; 14). This clearly emphasized the return of 
Central Asia as a strategically important area. Although the institutionalization of relations 
was an important part of the Russo-Central Asian collaboration in this period, a perhaps even 
bigger emphasis was placed on the “economization” of the relationship. Arguably, this 
process was also made easier by the growth of prices on hydrocarbon in the years before 
2004, as the prices for crude oil rose from $12 in 1998 to $37.5 in 2004 (BP 2010). 
Russia reinforced its position by providing state support for Russian businesses abroad and 
continued to develop the Russian position in sectors deemed strategically important, most 
notably the energy sector (Perovic; 65).  It was a goal to “ensure that existing energy 
dependencies [were] stabilized and that Russia [maintained] its monopoly over energy flows 
via its transportation system” (ibid; 65). This way, Moscow could attend to both national and 
corporate interests simultaneously as it sought to secure both Russian influence and market 
shares (ibid; 65). In Central Asia the Russian state-owned gas monopolist Gazprom expanded 
its involvement, with reported investments of $1.5 billion in Uzbekistan’s gas sector in 2006, 
as well as the creation of a joint venture with the Kazakh company KazMunayGaz which 
planned to supply 15 billion cubic meters of gas from Kazakhstan to Russia annually 
(RFE/RL 28/3 2006). This also illustrates that Russia sought bilateral ties with the Central 
Asian states. 
On a multilateral level the Eurasian Economic Community (abbreviated EurAsEc, founded in 
2000) and the CSTO constituted, and still constitutes, the major institutional frameworks for 
cooperation between Russia and Central Asia (Laruelle 2009; 6). The increased cooperation 
in turn made it easier for Russia to regain its position as main trade partner in the region; aptly 
illustrated by a tripling of Russo-Central Asian trade between 2003 and 2007; a third of which 
came from trade with hydrocarbons (Paramonov & Strokov 2007, cited in Laruelle; 7).  
During Putin’s reign as president Russia managed to stop the downward spiral that seemed to 
trouble the relationship between Russia and Central Asia, by focusing on flexible policies and 
approaching matters pragmatically. Central Asia was therefore framed as a strategically 
important area in which Russia could and should have a share. Paramonov and Strokov notes 
that a recurrent theme in the Russian outlook seems to be that Central Asia is framed in its 
capacity to enhance Russia’s global status, and perhaps even more importantly as a means for 
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 First established as the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in 1992, but reestablished as CSTO in 2002.   
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promoting Russian economic development (Paramonov & Strokov; 19). Though 
acknowledging that Russia was incapable of regaining the geopolitical role the Soviet Union 
had had, Moscow has maintained a desire to improve Russia’s standing.  
It is therefore possible to argue that Russia moved from viewing Central Asia through a 
geopolitical prism to rather seeing the region through an economic one during the three stages 
we have outlined here. A seeming defining feature in the Russian framing has been an 
implicit knowledge of Central Asia as somewhat inferior, in the sense that Russian power is 
seen as the most important from Moscow’s point of view. Based on this it could be argued 
that Russia sees its southern neighbors through a top-down perspective, with Moscow firmly 
on top. This provides the context for examining the period from 2008 to 2010. 
3.2. Central Asia in Russian Foreign Policy  
 
QUESTION: Are you a Westerner or a Slavophil? The world wants to know who you are. 
DMITRY MEDVEDEV: You know, if I lived, say, at the end of the 19
th
 century, I probably could have 
answered you this question with ease. Having read the best examples of Russian classic literature, one could just 
answer this question straightforward. But the world has changed, and today we have to be modern, therefore I 
assume the priority of Russian interests (Medvedev 2008). 
Introductory remarks 
Pavel Baev noted that the then newly elected president Dmitry Medvedev was faced with the 
two seemingly incompatible tasks of demonstrating consistency with the political course 
outlined by Putin while also showing that he himself was in charge of molding a policy that 
reflected both the contemporary world and Russia’s interests (Baev 21/7 2008). The need for 
Moscow to take the new international context into consideration was also expressed by 
president Medvedev himself, stating that the impending foreign policy revision was a matter 
of inventarizatsia, i.e.  taking inventory (Kozyrev 15/7 2008). The modification of policies 
received its outcome through the revision of several central policy documents. Of special 
interests here is the “new” Foreign Policy Concept (in the following FPC), the first security 
document signed by Medvedev following his inauguration, which will be referred to in the 
following pages and sections
24
.  
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 The FPC is filed under Prezident Rossii (2008) in the bibliography. 
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Reflecting that Russia now operated from a position of strength, an aspect which at the time 
was highly debated due to the recently ended Georgia conflict, president Medvedev also 
presented what has come to be called the “Medvedev Doctrine” in August 2008. The so-
called doctrine consisted of five points that were to guide Russian foreign policy 
considerations during Medvedev’s tenure as president, and could be summarized as follows: 
(1) Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which 
define the relations between civilized peoples; (2) the world should be multipolar, as 
domination is unacceptable and such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict; (3) Russia 
does not want confrontation with any other country, and has no intention of isolating itself; 
(4) protecting the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they may be, is an 
unquestionable priority for Russia, this also includes the interests of the Russian business 
community abroad; (5) there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These 
regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound 
together as friends and good neighbors” (Prezident Rossii 31/8 2008).  
However, these guiding principles should obviously not be taken as a signal that Russia’s 
foreign relations were of a uniform or universal character. Wilson Rowe and Torjesen have 
argued that Russian conceptualizations of multilateralism operate in two geopolitical circles; 
the post-Soviet space and the world outside it (Wilson Rowe & Torjesen 2009; 3), In line with 
this, it is clear that this division also had practical implications as to how Russia understood 
its relations with the countries within the two dimensions, and consequently this affected the 
Russian framing of these relationships. Indeed, Stina Torjesen writes that the Russian 
multilateralism in Russia’s “neighborhood” is qualitatively different from the instruments 
utilized in what is in Russian debate termed the “far abroad” (Torjesen 2009; 153).  
It therefore seems fair to argue that Russia’s policies towards Central Asia, although founded 
in the general Russian foreign policy principles, carries with it some distinct features and 
idiosyncrasies that are unique to this region. In order to catch up both of these , we will in the 
following pages start by giving a brief outline of Russia’s view on the international political 
arena, before we move on to the main topic of this section, namely the Russian foreign policy 
framings of Central Asia. This explains the geographical dimension of the Russian outlook we 
introduced above, as it seems natural to claim that it was the post-Soviet states, hereunder also 
Central Asia, that were referred to when Medvedev spoke of the Russian “regions of 
influence”. A further indication of the area’s importance in the Russian outlook, and the 
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desire to frame relations with the CIS in a positive manner, can be found in the following 
sentiment expressed in the FPC: “Development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with 
the CIS Member States constitutes a priority area of Russia's foreign policy” (FPC). 
Brief outline of Russia’s general foreign policy outlook  
As reflected in Medvedev’s points Russia was on the rebound, seeking to claim increase its 
powers internationally in light of Moscow’s strengthened position. The international Russian 
interests and ambitions was also reflected in the 2009 National Security Strategy to 2020 
(hereafter, the NSS), where it was stated that Russia had “restored the country's potential to 
enhance its competitiveness and defend its national interests as a key player within evolving 
multipolar international relations” (NSS 2009) 25.Consequently, an important point here was 
the adoption of a more active foreign policy. This was also reflected in the FPC, where 
priority, inter alia, was given to achieve “(…) strong positions of authority in the world 
community which best meet the interests of the Russian Federation as one of the influential 
centers in the modern world, and which are necessary for the growth of its political, 
economic, intellectual and spiritual potential” (ibid.)26.   
In terms of Russia’s international engagement it was emphasized that Russia was to be guided 
by pragmatism. This underscored that Russia, although strengthened, saw its interests best 
met through pragmatic interaction and cooperation with the outside world. This notion was 
also reinforced by president Medvedev, who during a speech noted that “with all the acute 
contradictions on the global arena today, we are seeing a clear general eagerness to harmonize 
relations, establish dialogue, and reduce conflicts” (Prezident Rossii 12/7 2011). The Russian 
international involvement may here be seen as a means to accomplish just this. 
This should, however, not be taken as a signal that Russia was completely content with the 
state of the global institutional framework. Moscow wanted to bring about a revision of the 
international system, which was also accentuated in the FPC:  
Russia looks forward to the emergence of a stable system of international relations which is based on 
the principles of equality, mutual respect, mutually beneficial cooperation as well as the norms of 
international law. Such a system aims at ensuring reliable and equal security for every member of the 
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 The NSS is filed under Soviet Bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federatsii (2009) in the bibliography. 
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 Two other points were also seen as preeminent in the FPC; safeguarding national security and preserving the 
country’s sovereignty (FPC). 
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international community in the areas of politics, military, economics, information, humanitarian aid and 
others, and employs multilateral diplomacy as its main tool (FPC). 
 
Russia here sought to attain a more level playing field that that took into consideration the 
current state of global politics. This meant making adherence to international rules and 
cooperation on the basis of multipolarity the ruling principle for interstate interaction. This 
way, integration into the international framework helped fulfilling three Russian objectives: 
guaranteeing Russia’s equal standing on the international stage; legitimizing Russia’s equal 
standing by framing Moscow as a responsible player that adhered to international conventions 
and rules; while also making Russian foreign policy more effective as playing by the same 
rules at the same time also placed the same limitations on all actors
27
.  
Summing up, the discourse depicts Russia as an international power pole, pursuing national 
interests and enhancing its power accordingly. However, this is not to say that these interests 
were to be pursued blindly; decisions were to be made on the basis of pragmatism, marking 
that restraint was perhaps equally as important when considering which options to choose.  
Framing Central Asia 
Taking control and responsibility: Russia as the regional powerhouse 
From a Russian point of view it was clear, as was the case with its international dealings in 
general, that it was necessary to legitimize both Russia’s status and its presence in the former 
Soviet area. One way to do this was by highlighting the structural legacy of the Soviet Union. 
Here, Russia, although riddled with problems, emerged as massively superior in relation to 
the other post-Soviet states in terms of territory, military power and economic strength 
(Torjesen; 153). Hence, the dominating position of Russia in the Eurasian space allowed 
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 Commenting on just this, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the following about the global system at that 
time: “The international community for far too long passively watched the processes of imbalance in the existing 
global system of management, which runs into major snags not only in politics, but also in economics and 
finances. In the absence of common rules of conduct crises phenomena and instability will continue to pursue 
us” (Lavrov 2008a). 
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Moscow to act in an assertive manner
28
. This point was also mentioned in the FPC, which 
noted the following about Russia’s own estimation of its policy: 
The distinguishing features of Russia’s foreign policy are its balanced and multivectoral character. This 
is due to the geopolitical position of Russia as the largest Euro-Asian power, its status as one of the 
leading States of the world and being a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Our 
contemporary national interests make it imperative to actively promote positive agenda that covers the 
whole spectrum of international problems (FPC). 
 
Although the term “Euro-Asian” is somewhat contentious, and may be interpreted in different 
manners, the emphasis of Russia’s sheer size as a factor contributing to Russia’s power would 
naturally also increase Russia’s importance for the states in the near abroad. In effect, 
Russia’s strong regional power base, here illustrated through its geographical positioning, 
would legitimize an active Russian policy in the region. This could be used as a mechanism 
for placing Russia in the forefront of dealings here. It may therefore be argued that Russia 
saw itself as balancer in the region and the CIS countries therefore were reliant or even 
dependent on Russia. Hence, Russia sees itself as “the first among equals”, which gives 
Moscow a special position in the region.  
However, this is not to say that Moscow saw itself as having a carte blanche to do as it 
pleased in its own “backyard”. This can also be seen from the statement above, where Russia 
was to promote international problem solving as one of its foreign policy features. This way, 
it could be argued that Russia sought to position itself as a sort of patron to the region. This 
can also be seen from a statement made by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigory 
Karasin, who stated that  
The Central Asian region is strategic and prioritized for Russia. For us, it is essential that the five states 
develop in the context of stability and security, which successfully tackles the challenges they face in 
terms of political, economic and social problems. We will continue to provide them with it all necessary 
assistance to help ensure that the Central Asia region establishes itself as a region of effective 
international cooperation, and not competition (Karasin 2009). 
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 We can here also note an interesting parallel to the stance taken by Russia when speaking of the international 
structures. Whereas Russia spoke of revisionism in order for the international structure to reflect the global 
power balance, Russia employs an assertive tone that suggests that Russia was pleased with maintaining status 
quo on this area in Eurasia. 
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In line with what we outlined above, we here see that Russia places itself as a Central Asian 
benefactor which works towards the goal of promoting overall development in the region. 
Moreover, Russia here places itself as a provider of both stability and security, this way 
perhaps seeking to live up to the reputation as a regional “big brother”. Moreover, the views 
outlined above were also in accordance with the overall provisions of Russian foreign policy. 
The FPC stated that one of the chief objectives of Russian foreign policy was “to promote 
good neighborly relations with bordering States, to assist in eliminating the existing hotbeds 
of tension and conflicts in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation and other areas of 
the world and to prevent emergence of the new ones” (FPC). 
The assistance here has a dual advantage for Moscow. First, it illustrates Russia’s willingness 
to contribute to helping the near abroad-countries in overcoming their problems. This may 
buy Russia some goodwill which Moscow can employ elsewhere, presumably in dealings 
concerning more acute Russian objectives. Second, this helps keeping problems away from 
Russia proper. Combined, it can therefore be argued that the approach was driven by both 
protective and proactive factors. Related to what we have discerned above, a point can be 
made about the direction of interaction between the parts. As Russia was by far the most 
powerful of the states in the region, it is perhaps not too surprising that the framing here 
implies that the projection of power was mainly, if not wholly, one-directional; from Moscow 
to its former co-republics. This is also an indication of the “new” great power positioning of 
Russia; it is not only able to interact with its surrounding states, but is also able to provide 
them with help if necessary.  
In such a way, Central Asia is framed as an area in which cooperation has a strong standing, 
but at the same time a focus is placed on the potentiality of the region as a threat to Russian 
interests. The CIS states are hence framed in a somewhat asymmetrical manner as Russia, 
with its self-proclaimed status as a great power, sees itself as the solution to dangerous or 
threatening situations that might arise. In turn, this suggests that Moscow saw the region as 
needing such protection, hereby underscoring the asymmetry between the parts. On another 
note, it could be suggested that Russia used this asymmetry to offset and increase Russia’s 
international standing; thus transforming regional superiority to international equality. Apart 
from delimiting its sphere of interest, this also helped Moscow mark a clear stance towards 
the West.  
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This way, this regional frame implicitly carries an international dimension, as Central Asia 
and the other post-Soviet states enable Russia to fulfill its ambition of participating in setting 
and carrying out the political agenda due to Russia’s relative strength in the region. By 
framing the area in this manner Russia could use the area as a means to enhance its 
international status, and at the same time confirming its regional preeminence. The objective 
of this frame is therefore to reaffirm the position of Russia as an international power in a 
multipolar world by seeking to promote an image of Russia as a regional unipolar actor; 
simultaneously fronting Russia as a global center and a regional powerhouse.  
Common ground 
In an article from December 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov remarked the 
following about the post-Soviet area: 
For us the CIS space is not a “chessboard” for playing geopolitical games, nor an “arc of distrust.” This 
is a common civilization area for all the peoples living here. It preserves our historical and spiritual 
heritage. Our geography, economic interdependence, and cultural/civilizational commonality give all 
CIS countries tangible competitive advantages. And the integrative imperatives of globalization make 
themselves strongly felt here as they do elsewhere (Lavrov 2008b). 
 
Here, the cultural commonalities and interlinks between the parts were highlighted. That the 
preservation of the area’s cultural distinctiveness was a priority in Moscow can also be seen 
from the fact that the FPC stated that “the cultural identity of the overwhelming majority of 
countries and peoples suffers the increasing onslaught of globalization” (FPC).  
Moreover, the FPC also underlined that  
Russia actively develops interaction between the CIS Member States in the humanitarian sphere by 
preserving and increasing the common cultural and civilizational heritage that provides an important 
resource for the whole of the CIS and for each of its Member States in the era of globalization (ibid.). 
 
Hence, the framing here can be suggested to signal that protection of both the Central Asian 
states’ and the other CIS states’ culture served as a form of survival mechanism for the region 
as a whole. By evoking the psychological sentiments of affinity between Russia and the CIS 
states, Russia sought to gain a comparative advantage vis-à-vis its contenders in the region. 
Reflecting that Russia saw its relations with its closest neighbors as something more than a 
simple business-like connection, president Medvedev stated that “there are some long-term 
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strategic relations that do not have a direct monetary value. How can you calculate the value 
of friendship or of the historical ties that bind our peoples? These are things that cannot be 
expressed in dry figures” (Prezident Rossii 26/7 2009).  
Moscow here drew upon the common history and experiences between the parts; which in 
turn had created a form of civilizational bond between the states in the region. This would in 
turn tie the Central Asian states more to Russia than to other powers. Apart from appearing as 
an attractive and obvious partner for the Central Asian states Russia could here also 
demarcate its domain in relation to both China and the West, hereby marking its regional 
preeminence. Extending this line of thought, we might argue that the civilizational focus 
creates a form of meta-frame where the countries, despite their differences and disagreements, 
appeared as united. This was also advantageous in regards to the Western aspect of Moscow’s 
foreign policy; as it marked a distance to Western structures and made the CIS appear as a 
united space. The effect this has vis-à-vis “foreign” actors such as China and USA is that it 
signaled that if these wished to deal with the Central Asian states, they also had to deal with 
Russia. In turn, Russia’s regional engagement could be used to fulfill Moscow’s international 
ambitions. 
Naturally, this also necessitated an emphasis on the commonalities between Russia and the 
Central Asian states. One example of this is the Russian emphasis placed on celebrating the 
65 year anniversary for the Second World War in 2010. In relation to this, the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent out a press release following a proposal from Kazakhstan to 
build a monument over Kazakhstani soldiers in Rzhev in Western Russia, stating that   
Large-scale events held in Russia and Kazakhstan in the year of the 65
th
 anniversary of the Victory in 
the Great Patriotic War reflect the high level of Russo-Kazakh relations and are clear conformations of 
the friendship, mutual trust and continuity of the historical memory of the events of those days to the 
generation of today (MID 2010). 
 
What we see from the statement above is an attempt to draw historical lines to emphasize the 
commonalities between the parts, hereby showing that the good neighborliness has its 
fundament in a common history, of which the parts still can reap benefits today.  At the same 
time, Moscow displayed a clear eagerness to decouple its involvement in Central Asia and the 
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remaining CIS states from any ideological, in this case, neo-imperial notions
29
. This point was 
also addressed by Lavrov, who stated in the aforementioned article that the Russians could 
not agree “when attempts are being made to pass off the historically conditioned mutually 
privileged relations between the states in the former Soviet expanse as a “sphere of influence” 
(Lavrov 2008b).  
Based on this, it seems reasonable to propose that the defining feature of this part of the frame 
is the seeming move away from a strict reading of the Medvedev Doctrine’s point about 
“regions of privileged Russian interests” by substituting politics with culture as the basis for 
Russian interaction in the area. In effect, this helped de-politicizing the Russian relationship 
with CIS, and consequently also “acquitted” Russia of its involvement in the CIS area. Hence, 
it could perhaps be argued that the phrase “near abroad” can be connoted in two manners: not 
only can it be used to illustrate the geographical closeness between Russia and its neighbors; 
it also highlights cultural and psychological nearness between the inhabitants in these states. 
This notion was also expressed in the NSS: 
Russia will seek to develop the potential for regional and subregional integration and coordination 
among member-states of the CIS, first of all within the framework of the Commonwealth, and also the 
CSTO and EurAsEc, which exert a stabilizing influence on the overall situation in the regions bordering 
on the CIS. Moreover, the CSTO is regarded as the main interstate instrument for responding to 
regional threats and challenges of a military-political or military-strategic nature, including the fight 
with illegal trafficking in narcotic and psychotropic substances (NSS 2009). 
 
What is new here is the coupling of political areas to organizations; that is EurAsEc with 
economic dealings and CSTO when dealing with security matters. Moreover, the framing here 
implies a connection between institutional vehicles and the stability of the region, 
understating the importance of both aspects to Moscow. Also, this passage reaffirms CIS’ 
preeminence as a general forum and a vehicle for cooperation and coordination within several 
spheres. At the same time, great pains were taken to decouple the specializations of organs 
from any ideological motives. Sergei Lavrov wrote: 
Regrettably, many of our western partners have been unable to appreciate the essentially postmodernist 
and ideology-free tendencies in the CIS space, predicated on a striving to use common values, the 
combined potential and heritage in the interests of our peoples. The Russia-Belarus Union State, 
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 This also related to a more general point in Russia’s discourse. Noting that post-Soviet Russia’s policies were 
seen by some as being guided by ideological overtones and motives, Lavrov noted that the policies of Russia as a 
full-fledged global actor were “guided in international affairs by understandable, pragmatic interests, void of any 
ideological motives whatsoever” (Lavrov 2008a).  
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EurAsEc or CSTO – these are not bloc, but integrating organizations. Relationships in them have their 
own civilizational specificities – here we do not oppress one another, do not twist arms, which far from 
all in the West can understand (Lavrov 2008b). 
 
In light of Lavrov’s statement above it might be argued that the expressed criticism served a 
specific function in this context. That is, rather than being a specifically Russian criticism of 
the West, this marked a united regional front against Western skepticism. Parallel with this, 
we may discern a temporal aspect, as Lavrov distinguished between institutional blocs, a 
concept with clear connotations to the cold war, and “integrating organizations” that 
suggested not only a leap in terms of years passed, but also a change in Russia’s mentality 
regarding the CIS states.  
Summing up 
Summarizing the findings in the preceding pages, we see that the Russian framings of Central 
Asia share a common feature, namely Russian control in the region. The first framing 
suggests highlighted Russia’s status as a regional great power, which in turn legitimates an 
assertive Russian in Central Asia. Moscow here depicted itself as playing a central role in 
ensuring peace and stability in the region. This way, Central Asia was portrayed as somewhat 
inferior and weak, and in need of its powerful “big brother” in order to manage. This also 
suggests that there exists a structural hierarchy between the parts; with Russia firmly on top.  
The second framing was markedly different from the one summarized above. An emphasis 
was here placed on common historical and cultural bonds between the parts, which implicitly 
saw the Russo-Central Asian space as more of a regional community than distinct and 
separate states. Structurally speaking, the framing here places Russia and the CIS countries on 
an equal footing. This way, Moscow, refined its regional engagement, putting more weight on 
creating an environment for continued and even enhanced cooperation with the CIS states 
within a cultural framework. This changes the focus and tone of the discourse, as the point 
here is to attract the CIS countries to maintain their relationship with the former “big brother” 
As was noted initially, we see that the Russian focus is on keeping and maintaining its clout in 
the region, which means that the discourse still has control as one of its focal points. This also 
illustrates the framings’ international dimension. Through consolidation of the countries 
within Russia’s orbit and under Russian supervision, Moscow wanted to make it harder for 
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other players to make their entrance in the region. In essence this meant solidifying the 
Russian position: Russia’s power was to be illustrated by a clear Russian presence in Central 
Asia, which, combined with the civilizational aspect, provided Russia with leverage that was 
difficult for outsiders to counterbalance. The main goal of the frame, however, is to promote 
regionalism through institutional arrangements in order to arrive at solutions that were most 
beneficial for all parts, thus making regional concerns the centerpiece in the foreign policy 
orientation. 
3.3. Central Asia in the Russian Security Discourse 
Threat perceptions 
The national reorientation that took place under Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency also meant 
that Moscow needed to update its security policy. For this purpose the FPC provided an 
elaborate enumeration of the potential dangers at the time, illustrating that Russia employed a 
broad-brushed conceptualization of security. Most notable is perhaps the stressing of the 
negative consequences of one-sided use of force in international relations, along with the need 
for international cooperation and coordination. Furthermore, the FPC emphasized threats 
emanating from inter alia terrorism, nationalist sentiments, separatism, drug and human 
trafficking, religious radicalism and socio-economic turmoil (FPC).  
It can be argued that the list above provides a differentiation between threats. On one side, 
international security threats are addressed, highlighting the potential fragility of the 
international structure. On the other, we see that the challenges presented are somewhat 
diffuse in terms of uniting features, but they can nonetheless be categorized as being of a 
more spatial or regional character. This restricts them to a more or less confined area
30
. This 
differentiation in relation to the threats’ geographical scope resembles the concentric approach 
to foreign policy outlined previously.  
Naturally, these considerations also played part in Russia’s framing of security in the CIS 
area. Unlike the overall framing, we can detect heterogeneity within the CIS space in terms of 
threat perceptions, this way leading to a concentric security differentiation also within the 
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 This is not to argue that terrorism does not constitute a global challenge; the point is rather that terrorism often 
is manifested through attacks within a certain geographically concentrated area. Hence, what is meant here is 
that although the very notion of terrorism is a global concern, it finds its expression, with some very notable 
exceptions, in a regionalist manner.  
38 
  
region. More specifically, two separate CIS security “fronts” emerged: in the Western part of 
CIS Russia continued to express an unequivocal skepticism regarding the plans of admitting 
Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, as well as the bringing of NATO’s military infrastructure 
closer to the Russian borders (ibid.). The second front, which will be the main focus of this 
section, was Central Asia. The FPC explicitly mentioned the regional security situation, and 
noted the following about Russia’s engagement in the area: 
Russia will increase the cooperation with the CIS Member States in order to ensure mutual security. 
This includes joint efforts to combat common challenges and threats, primarily international terrorism, 
extremism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, and illegal migration. The priorities here include the 
neutralization of the terrorist threat and drug trafficking threats emanating from the territory of 
Afghanistan, and prevention of risks of destabilization of the situations in Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia (ibid.). 
 
In addition to reaffirming the importance of maintaining stability in the region and illustrating 
the region’s complexities in terms of security matters, we see that the prioritized tasks are 
related to problems originating in Afghanistan. This reflects that although the Central Asian 
states themselves struggled with a wide variety of problems, an important task was still to 
hinder spill-over effects from Afghanistan, which would worsen the situation in the CIS area. 
Hence, by creating a Russo-Central Asian bulwark against external threats, most notably 
Afghanistan, the states involved could consolidate the security efforts in the region, while also 
provide a sense of community in relation to mutual security. 
Securing the “sphere of influence” or securing Russia? 
Despite the abovementioned Russian fear of destabilization in the region, this was not the 
only motive in the Russian security outlook. The NSS expressed “in the sphere of 
international security, Russia will maintain its adherence to the use of political, legal, 
economic, military and other instruments to defend state sovereignty and national interests” 
(NSS 2009). Apart from stating that securing Russia and its interests was the centerpiece in 
Moscow’s security thinking, the statement can be read somewhat different in this context. The 
Russian “sphere of influence”, of which the Central Asian countries constitute an important 
part, is naturally an area in which Moscow has vital interests.  
Hence, by securing Central Asia, Russia also secured its own vested interests. In light of this, 
it could be argued that Moscow saw Central Asian security as an extension of domestic 
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security. Central Asia’s function in this equation, then, is that Russia secured itself by 
assisting in the maintenance of security in the region. Although securing Russia was the most 
important aspect here, the Russian leadership understood that a holistic approach needed to be 
in place in order to hinder the spread of dangerous elements and keep Russian interests under 
Moscow’s control. Exemplifying just this, president Medvedev noted in connection with 
Russia’s commitment in Afghanistan that “the situation in Afghanistan has an impact on the 
situation in Central Asia in general. The problems that arise in Afghanistan eventually crop up 
in Central Asia, unfortunately, and ultimately make their way here to Russia too” (Prezident 
Rossii 27/12 2009).  
This way, threats against Central Asia was framed, if not as direct threats, but at least as 
negative indirect influences on Russia. Another indication of this can be seen by examining 
the Russian anti-drug strategy which was launched in 2009. One of the main threats listed 
here was “the smuggling of Afghan opiates and cannabinoids from the Central Asian 
countries”, and that Russia, in order to improve the situation, would  “increase Russia's role in 
providing technical assistance to Afghanistan and other countries in West and Central Asia in 
combating the Afghan drug threat” (MID 2009) 31. Apart from highlighting one of the major 
security challenges in the region, the spill-over effect is here further highlighted. Moreover, 
this allowed Russia to reiterate its role as an active player in the Central Asian space. 
Promoting regional security solutions 
As we saw above, Russia sought to promote international cooperation in order to defeat 
common threats. However, this was not to say that Russia welcomed all parts into the security 
cooperation. Moscow displayed an eagerness to keep regional security matters regional; that 
is avoiding unnecessary involvement of external actors or institutions. The Russian wish to 
keep security matters related to the CIS space within its then present framework was also 
pointed to in the NSS, where it was stated that “there is an increasing tendency to seek 
resolutions to existing problems and regulate crisis situations on a regional basis, without the 
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 Related to this, Moscow also displayed a clear discontent with NATO’s engagement in the field of curbing the 
production of narcotics in Afghanistan, something that naturally caused the amount of drugs in Central Asia to 
grow. Russian UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin even stated that NATO’s “incomprehensible passivity” in the 
combat against drugs combined with terrorism “has become a threat to peace and stability” (Eurasianet.org 15/10 
2010). This way, Russia was also able to criticize the lack of tangible results from the NATO presence in 
Afghanistan, thus in effect fulfilling two objectives: mark Russia’s skepticism towards the organization, whilst 
also labeling the organization ineffective, if not to say obsolete. In turn, this could allow Moscow to promote 
itself as a better security providing alternative.  
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participation of non-regional powers” (NSS 2009). Concomitant with this, it could also be 
argued that regional organizations were better suited to address the issues the region faced, as 
they were more adaptable and prepared for “local” security scenarios, hereby allowing for a 
customization of the institutional framework to fit the threats at hand. This creates a common 
understanding of the threat perceptions, which allows for closer coordination and cooperation 
on security matters. Moreover, the common perceptions could here also be used to facilitate 
further integration with the southern CIS countries; something that concords with the 
promotion of civilizational bonds between Russia and its former Soviet compatriots in the 
south.      
The FPC stated: 
The deepening crisis in Afghanistan poses a threat to the security of the southern CIS boundaries. 
Russia, in collaboration with other countries concerned, the United Nations, the CSTO, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and other multilateral institutions, will make consistent efforts to 
prevent the export of terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan, find a just and lasting political solution to 
the problems of this country while respecting the rights and interests of all country's ethnic groups and 
achieve post-conflict rehabilitation of Afghanistan as a sovereign and peace-loving State (FPC). 
 
We here see that Afghanistan is given an additional position in the security discourse in 
addition to the one discerned above. Not only is it presented as a hornet’s nest to Central Asia, 
hereby explaining the Russian presence in the region, but it also appears as an area in which 
both Russia and the world community at large has coinciding interests. This illustrates that 
Moscow did not pursue Central Asian security in an absolutist manner; pragmatism was also 
an important aspect in order to contain the Afghan problem. Despite this, it could be remarked 
that even though the world society is involved in Afghanistan, this should not be read as a 
Russian invitation to further cooperation to address problems inside the southern CIS 
countries. This reinforces the notion about a form of barrier or buffer between the CIS states 
and Afghanistan, reflecting the present dualism in the Russian discourse between control of 
its perceived sphere of influence and partnering with other actors to reduce the spread of 
instability. 
Also, we can note the emphasis placed on soft power measures through institutional 
arrangements as the means to deal with security related issues in the area.  Concomitant with 
this, it is interesting to note that all three of the organizations mentioned above are 
organizations in which Russia has a strong standing. This may also explain Russia’s wish to 
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restrict participants’ access to the Central Asian area, as maintaining the then current 
framework allowed Russia to keep its sway in the region. Through this, we also see that 
Central Asian security was a sphere within which Russia wished to promote itself as an 
important and powerful actor. In turn, this frames the power relations between as Russia and 
the Central Asian states as asymmetrical; where Central Asia’s security is framed as being 
dependent on the presence of Russia, the most powerful player in the region, to provide just 
this. 
It also seems possible to suggest that the different organizations mentioned in the passage 
above have different functions in the Russian outlook. Internationally, Moscow sought to 
promote the UN as its main channel for promoting and addressing global causes. Russia, as a 
permanent member of the Security Council, would here be able to influence decision making 
processes, thus allowing Moscow to promote its own view. Furthermore, by involving the UN 
in matters related to Afghanistan Russia would legitimize its own role as part of the global 
framework. Still, the overall tone suggests that it was preferable to keep matters regional. This 
notion was reiterated through the phrase “the countries concerned”; marking that Moscow 
placed more emphasis on pragmatic problem solving than the format of cooperation. This also 
marks the Russian wish to keep control over the events in the area. This explains the explicit 
mentioning of the regional organizations CSTO and SCO
32
. As with the UN, they are 
strategically important, albeit for somewhat different reasons. We will briefly assess both 
organizations in the following, in order to clarify their significance for the Russian security 
framing.   
CSTO 
President Medvedev perhaps said it best when he noted the following about the CSTO: “[The 
CSTO] includes countries very close to us. This is not a military bloc in the traditional sense 
of the word but rather an organization responsible for guaranteeing the security of a group of 
countries that have come together in union” (Prezident Rossii 7/5 2010). 
In line with this, the Russian Military Doctrine (MD) stated that one of the main military-
political priorities of Russia in the following years was to cooperate with CSTO member 
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 CSTO and SCO are actual organizations, and are therefore not only pure discursive themes. However, they 
could be described as institutionalized security practices that are rooted in the Russian discourses and 
understandings of Central Asia.   
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states to “consolidate efforts and create collective forces in the interests of ensuring collective 
security and joint defense” (Prezident Rossii 2010)33. First, we can note that the CSTO 
constituted the main structure for Russo-Central Asian multilateral military collaboration. In 
effect, this turned the CSTO into a regional security community; gathering all the Central 
Asian CIS states, with the notable exception of Turkmenistan, under one umbrella in terms of 
military security. By institutionalizing military cooperation Moscow sought to create a stable 
basis for problem resolving, while also reduce potential friction between the countries. 
Second, it is noteworthy that CSTO is presented as being designed to facilitate both collective 
security and collective defense. This division is of importance when dealing with Russia’s 
near abroad, as collective security concerns the regulation of behavior within a group of 
states, while collective defense focuses on external threats to its participants (Sakwa & 
Webber 1999; 384 in Weinstein 2007; 170). This means that the CSTO was to deal both with 
security related concerns emanating from inside the member countries and threats emerging 
from the outside of the organization’s perimeter, most notably Afghanistan. This serves 
Moscow’s security priorities in the region. Both of these aspects were also highlighted in the 
NSS: “the CSTO is regarded as the main interstate instrument for responding to regional 
threats and challenges of a military-political or military-strategic nature, including the fight 
with illegal trafficking in narcotic and psychotropic substances” (NSS 2009). The CSTO is 
framed as an organization that can address both current and more longstanding issues. 
The notion that Moscow saw the CSTO as a main vehicle in its engagement in Central Asia 
was strengthened in the FPC: 
[Russia will] promote in every possible way the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a 
key instrument to maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS area focusing on adapting the CSTO 
as a multifunctional integration body to the changing environment, as well as on ensuring capability of 
the CSTO Member States to take prompt and effective joint actions, and on transforming the CSTO into 
a central institution ensuring security in its area of responsibility (FPC). 
 
Apart from reiterating that the member countries stood together in the handling of regional 
security, of special interests here is the mentioning of CSTO as “ensuring security in its area 
of responsibility”, i.e. taking responsibility in Central Asia. Russia, the biggest geopolitical 
player of the CSTO members, naturally occupied a leading position within the CSTO 
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 In addition to these countries, Armenia and Belarus are also members in the CSTO. 
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framework. In practical terms, Russia then then was the dominant decision maker in the 
organization. Russia was now able to influence the agenda setting considerably, hereby 
promoting Russian views and interests, while also increasing Russia’s presence in the region. 
Hence, the CSTO provided Russia with a mechanism to exert and strengthen its power 
internationally, which was in line with the overall Russian outlook. Moreover, CSTO became 
a viable Russian-led alternative to NATO in terms of military defense in and of the Central 
Asian space. This made it possible for Moscow to check any NATO-moves in the CIS space, 
hereby clearly marking its territory. The Russian wish to be seen as on par with the rest of the 
world also found its expression in the framing of CSTO. Because of this, it is not surprising 
that president Medvedev on a CSTO summit in Moscow in 2009 was quoted stating that the 
newly established rapid-reaction force of the CSTO would be “just as good as comparable 
NATO forces” (RIA Novosti 4/2 2009).  
Based on this, it seems possible that Central Asian military security had a two-fold purpose in 
the Russian framing. First, by uniting most of the countries within one structure, Russia was 
more in control of the security situation in the area. Security threats were here framed as being 
of common character, meaning that a threat to one country represented a threat to all CSTO 
members. This ensured a common ground for military security cooperation, as threats here 
were seen as having either a spill-over or a domino effect. Apart from easing coordination and 
created a fundament for dialogue, this at the same time this allowed Russia to increase its 
security presence in the region. Hence, security is used as a uniting and integrating feature 
among the CSTO members, but with Russia as a regional security manager.  
Second, the CSTO enabled Russia to institutionalize its skepticism towards NATO; by 
marking that Russia had backing for its security priorities in Central Asia. Central Asian 
security is here framed as something best dealt with through the CSTO; making this a better 
overall security solution for the Central Asian countries than NATO. Securing the southern 
CIS area was therefore not only a matter of keeping the area stable; the CSTO also provided 
Russia with a mechanism for turning Central Asian security into an arena for a great power 
game with the West.   
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SCO 
Marcel De Haas has noted that the focus on the SCO pointed to a different trend in the 
Russian outlook, where an increasingly larger emphasis has been placed on Moscow’s 
Eastern partners (De Haas 2010; 88).  Reflecting this, the FPC stated that one of the regional 
priorities of Russian  policy to “further strengthening of the SCO, promoting its initiative for 
setting up a network of partner ties among all the integration associations in the Asia–Pacific 
Region occupy a special place” (FPC). It could be argued that this “special place” means that 
the SCO comprises a distinct component in Russia’s multilateralism in the Central Asian 
space. This distinctiveness is largely derived from the fact that China occupies the dominant 
position in the SCO along with Russia. This sharing of security responsibility in turn also 
influenced the regional security cooperation dynamics.  
That the SCO was a different phenomenon in the Russian security framing of Central Asia 
was also apparent in the NSS: “Of particular significance for Russia will be the reinforcement 
of the political potential of the SCO, and the stimulation within its framework of practical 
steps towards the enhancement of mutual trust and partnership in the Central Asian region” 
(SBRF 2009). We can discern two features from this passage. First, we see that the SCO is 
promoted as political organization. This makes it distinct from CSTO, which primarily serves 
as a military-political organization. Second, the main emphasis is placed on the strengthening 
of a common fundament that facilitates a higher degree of cooperation. Based on this, it could 
be argued that the function SCO first and foremost is as a distinct platform for cooperation, 
enabling countries with distinct forms of government coordinate their positions. This could be 
interpreted as a Russian wish for the SCO to work as an Eastern-based international 
community, which in turn allowed the organization to counterweight Western and U.S. 
presence in the region. Moreover, it is clear that SCO also helped Moscow keeping an eye on 
China’s moves in the region. This can be explained by a Russian fear of China being in the 
process of “outgrowing” Moscow in economic terms. By maintaining the importance of an 
arena of dialogue with Beijing, Russia had at least some way of making its views heard.  
In an interview with the Chinese newspaper Zhenmin Zhibao, president Medvedev outlined 
which threat concerns that the SCO primarily concerned itself with. Apart from noting that 
the “SCO had every reason for becoming the main platform for regional cooperation on 
Afghanistan”, Medvedev noted in relation to security matters that “within the SCO we fight 
together against terrorism and separatism, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking. 
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The organization's joint counterterrorism military exercises help enhance its role in combating 
new threats and challenges” (Prezident Rossii 26/9 2010). Hence, the SCO’s security domain 
largely coincided with Russia’s own security concerns in the area. However, Russia did not 
approach SCO-cooperation in the same manner as it did with CSTO. Whereas CSTO 
constituted the military-strategic aspect of regional security, president Medvedev in the same 
interview stated that “the main focus of our cooperation within the SCO is economic and 
humanitarian. I am convinced that sustained progress in all fields in which we work will 
contribute to further strengthening our organization” (ibid).  
What is interesting here is the introduction of economy and socio-political prosperity into the 
Russian security equation. Central Asian security is here approached in a more infrastructural 
manner, where economic development was seen as the basis of future socio-economic 
stability. Based on this, we can argue that SCO primarily is concerned with the non-traditional 
security, which separates it from the CSTO in terms of remit. Furthermore, the emphasis 
placed on economic and humanitarian collaboration as the fundament for SCO’s involvement 
may be seen as instruments to promote regional integration as a security tool. Having seen the 
expensiveness and futility of the US engagement in Afghanistan, it can be argued that the 
SCO members with their huge economic muscles here represent an alternative security 
dynamic, based on stability and economic development. Because of this, it can be said Russia 
through the SCO framed security through what we might term a “silk road”-approach, 
characterized by a focus on trade and development. This can be seen in contrast to a “great 
game”-style of security, which connotes hegemonic behavior. 
Summing up 
Summing up, we see that the Russian security framing of the southern CIS space is a complex 
matter that seeks to comprise many elements into an overarching narrative. The threats 
identified in relation with the area were both multifaceted in terms of character and in 
geographical scope. To a very large extent, threats were either treated as internal, Central 
Asian issues or spill-over problems related to Afghanistan. Russia is interested in global 
cooperation on some threats, including stopping drug trafficking and terrorism. This 
illustrates both a Russian pragmatism and opportunism, as Moscow understood that it could 
not successfully deal with these matters unilaterally. At the same time, Russia sought to keep 
its sway in the region. By institutionalizing security and only using organization where Russia 
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had a strong standing, Russia could control the area by functioning as a regional security 
manager. This effectively frames the Central Asian states as secondary to Russia in their 
providing for their own security. Within the organizations, however, the threats were framed 
as being equally worrying for all parts, hereby creating a sense of Russo-Central Asian 
community in security matters. 
The organizational diversification to counter threats pertaining to Central Asia can also be 
seen as an expression of a more general Russian view on Central Asian security as a great 
power game. In relation to the West, Central Asia’s security was related to military means, 
marking willingness to restrict Western presence in the post-Soviet space. This way, Russia 
put up a “hard” security stance vis-à-vis the West, which in effect framed Central Asia to fall 
under Russia’s security domain. This approach is moderated in Russia’s security cooperation 
with the East. The main emphasis is here placed on socio-political and economic development 
to contain security threats. This indicates a more “soft” security approach. This may be seen 
as a reflection of the international geopolitical climate, where Russia uses more 
compromising measures in its relations with the mighty China than it does when addressing 
the weakened West. Nevertheless, a uniting feature for both of these directions is that Central 
Asian security is placed within a “checks and balance”-framework. Here, the security 
structures are not only important in order to secure Central Asia, but they also constitute ways 
for Russia to keep a certain control of the West and China respectively. 
3.4. Central Asia in the Russian Energy Policy 
Taking a new reality into consideration 
The 2008 financial crisis had a profound impact on the global energy markets, as prices fell 
sharply. That this also was a dramatic event for Russia can be seen from the fact that energy 
exports according to official Russian figures accounted for 66.7 % of Russia’s total export 
earnings in 2009, which clearly highlights the Russian dependence on its energy resources to 
keep the economy going
34
 (Rosstat 2011). Taking these developments into account, the 
Russian government expedited a revised energy strategy that better reflected the new realities 
and priorities. The new strategy, officially named Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up 
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 Of this, crude oil accounted for 33.4 % and gas 13.9 %. 
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to 2030 (hereafter, ES 2030), was adopted in November 2009
35
. In light of the fact that 
Russian authorities saw it necessary to produce a new energy strategy to deal with the then-
current energy political climate, it is here argued that this also impacted on the Russian 
framing of Central Asia, some of which states occupies important positions in the 
international energy system. Hence, given that the ES 2030 reflects the most current official 
Russian understanding of energy, and thus also Central Asia’s role in the Russian energy 
framing, the following analysis will be based on this document. The ES 2030 mentioned 
Central Asia five times, respectively in relation to sections dealing with three different 
aspects: Russia’s position in world energy markets; the gas industry and finally foreign 
energy policy. This is also the order in which the Central Asia’s role in the Russian energy 
context will be analyzed.  
Russian energy dominance  
The ES 2030 was eager to emphasize the leading role of Russia in the global energy complex, 
this way underscoring the structural importance of the country. The strategy reads: 
Russia is world leading in terms of natural gas reserves (23% of the world reserves) and annual 
production of natural gas. Russia provides 25% of the world trade in natural gas, dominating both on the 
European gas market and on the gas market of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russian gas 
accounts for approximately 30% of the overall gas consumption in the European countries (including 
Turkey, but excluding the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States). With its unique gas 
transportation system, Russia is also playing an important role in ensuring the supply of gas from 
Central Asia to Europe and to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (ES 2030; 
8). 
 
The statement highlights that Moscow saw both Central Asia and the field of energy as such 
through a multidimensional prism, which in turn necessitated Moscow to consider Central 
Asia’s role on several “fronts” simultaneously. Hence, we can here see that the framing 
applies to a variety of energy relations; the Russian-Central Asian, the European-Central 
Asian, the Russian-European, the Russian-CIS, as well as European-CIS. Consequently, this 
also makes it more difficult to examine Russo-Central Asian relations isolated from other 
developments. One may read this as an awareness on Moscow’s part that geopolitical 
developments had indeed altered the international power balance, necessitating to Moscow to 
treat the Central Asian countries as independent actors on this field rather than taking them 
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for granted. Even so, this is not to say that the statement does not convey a message of 
interdependency between the different parts, where Russia is framed as the strongest part of 
the two. This reiterates the Russian foreign policy framing we outlined earlier. 
This can be seen through the emphasis on the Russian-controlled old Soviet pipeline system, 
whose uniqueness should be interpreted as signaling the Russian monopoly on Central Asian 
energy at the time
36
. Because of the low costs of oil and gas production in Central Asia 
relative to Russia, Moscow attempted to secure long-term and large-scaled supplies of energy 
from the region to complement its own export obligations. This way, Central Asian energy 
reserves had a function in both Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. Domestically the 
Central Asian hydrocarbons enabled Moscow to keep energy prices low for Russian 
companies and consumers, thereby alleviating social pressures in Russia (Woehrel 2009; 2). 
In terms of foreign policy, two aspects can be mentioned. First, the Russian keenness in 
keeping a close eye on energy developments in Central Asia can be explained as due to the 
fact that an interruption of the flow of energy from south to north would constitute a major 
problem for the decision makers in Moscow. Second, Russia was also aware of the interest 
taken in Central Asia’s energy resources by the other players in the region, most notably, the 
US, the EU and China.    
Thus, in the scenario depicted above, Moscow was able to control the export of oil and gas 
from Central Asia to Europe, hereby acting as both an intermediary in Europe-Central Asian 
energy relations and as a (re)exporter of Central Asia’s energy products. This way, Central 
Asia is framed as being structurally dependent on Russia, something that in turn places 
Russian in the forefront of energy relations with both Europe and the Central Asian states. 
Highlighting this dependency, the ES 2030 stated that the completion of various infrastructure 
projects
37
 would allow for the commencement of large-scale development of the energy fields 
on the Yamal Peninsula, which is connected to the westward-flowing Russian pipeline 
network. In turn, this would “reduce transit risks with regard to the gas exports to Europe and 
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 However, just a month after the launching of the 2030 Energy Strategy China opened a big gas pipeline in the 
area, running from Turkmenistan to China. This reflects both the necessity of multidimensionality in matters 
relating to energy and the rise of China as a geopolitical factor in Central Asia. Moreover, this also signaled the 
end of Russia’s pipeline monopoly in the region. The Turkmenistan-China will also be dealt with later in this 
section. 
37
 Two of the projects referred to are the “Severniy Potok” (Nord Stream) gas pipeline and the northern areas of 
the Tyumen Region – Torzhok gas pipeline (ES 2030; 49).  
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allow for the possibility to expand the transit of Central Asian gas to Europe through the 
Russian gas transport system” (ES 2030; 53). 
This framing is noteworthy, as it places Russia and the Central Asian states on the same side, 
and the transit states on the other. Hence, by building the pipelines Russia, and possibly also 
the Central Asian states, could export its energy products to the European markets without 
having to cross Ukrainian or Belarusian territory, through which nearly 80% and 20% 
respectively of the Russian gas export to Europe was going (Godzimirski 2011; 124). This 
way, the discourse here frames Russia and the Central Asian states as having converging 
interests as energy producers in getting rid of the transit dependence.  By doing so Moscow 
also sought to maintain Russia’s own transit advantage vis-à-vis its neighbors in the south, 
hereby keeping control of both the direction of the energy flows and export volumes from 
Central Asia. 
Political measures 
Nonetheless, the political realities also necessitated Russia to address the region in manner 
that reflected the region’s power boost. The ES 2030 noted the following as a goal in 
Moscow’s dealings with Central Asia:  
Attain a stable development of gas imports from the Central Asian states, mainly from the states in the 
near abroad. The volumes of import will be formed depending on the economic conditions on the 
foreign gas markets and the state of the fuel and energy balance of Russia (ES 2030; 52). 
 
First, we can note that Central Asia is important due to its position in the energy market chain, 
and due to the fact that Russia imports gas from the region in order to meet its own export 
obligations and needs of the domestic market (Paramonov 2008; 1). In light of the 
developments in the region over the past few years, it could here be argued that Russia needed 
to take into consideration the power boost Central Asia had had. Hence, rather than seeing the 
region as a post-imperial space that Russia could control, Russia here had to consider some of 
the Central Asian states as actual or potential competitors at the international energy markets. 
This growing internationalization and competition in the energy field can indicate that Russia 
saw it necessary to treat its southern neighbors in a more business-like manner than was the 
case for instance throughout the 1990s. Related to this, we see that the volume of imports of 
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Central Asian energy resources to Russia were to be decided based on assessments of the 
current economic situation.   
At the same time we can detect a Russian wish to expand and enlarge the Russo-Central 
Asian energy relations, indicating that the region was indeed a priority in the Russian energy 
outlook. This enlargement would be advantageous in two manners for Russia. First, this 
would secure Central Asian energy supplies to Russia
38
. Second, this would in Russian eyes 
bring positive spill-over effects as it made it more difficult for other foreign actors to establish 
bonds with the regional states,  as parts of their energy reserves then already would be tied up 
in other, notably Russo-Central Asian, deals. In turn, this would allow Moscow to keep its 
market shares on the international energy market, as other energy importers hereby would 
become more dependent on Russia for supplying the required volumes of energy. Hence, 
although illustrating an awareness in Moscow of the reduced Russian clout in the region, this 
framing shows that cooperation with the Central Asian states were preferable as this was the 
best alternative for Russia given the overall situation to influence developments in the region.   
The rise of the East 
The creation of stronger bonds to Central Asia was also beneficial for Moscow in another 
sense. The ES 2030 states: 
Еxport of gas, which is carried out mainly on the basis of long-term contracts, will allow to maintain the 
required volume of supplies from Russia to the European market, while the Eastern direction (China, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea) will be increased drastically. At the same time Russian gas producing 
companies will take an active part in the development of gas fields in other countries (Algeria, Iran, the 
Central Asian countries and others) and the construction of new interregional pipelines particularly in 
South Asia, in addition to coordinate their export policy with these countries (ES 2030; 52). 
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 The Energy Strategy of Russia to 2020, the ES 2030’s predecessor, was even more sincere, stating:     
“Россия заинтересована в долгосрочном и масштабном вовлечении в свой топливно-энергетический 
баланс углеводородных ресурсов (особенно природного газа) центрально-азиатских стран-участниц 
СНГ. Это не только позволит экономить ресурсы северных газовых месторождений России для будущих 
поколений и избежать необходимости форсированных капиталовложений в их разработку, но и даст ей 
возможность уменьшить давление на рынки, которые представляют стратегический интерес для самой 
России“ [Russia is interested in long-term and large-scale involvement in its energy balance of hydrocarbon 
resources (especially natural gas) from the Central Asian CIS countries. This will not only save resources of the 
northern gas fields in Russia for future generations and avoid forced investments in their development, but also 
enable it to reduce pressure on markets that are of strategic interest for Russia.] (ES 2020; 47). 
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Highlighting one of the Russian strategic priorities in the field of gas exports, the paragraph 
emphasizes Moscow’s desire to attain a higher degree of export market diversification. In 
practical terms this meant maintaining Russia’s position in Europe while increasing the share 
of the Asian markets in Russia’s energy export. This also meant lessening Russian export 
dependence on Europe. At the same time, the above quoted passage can be taken as a sign of 
a Russian wish for further integration with the Central Asian states on energy related matters. 
Initially, it could be noted that the Russian assistance in developing the countries’ gas 
deposits may be read as an indication of a perceived Russian technical superiority within the 
energy sector. This meant that Moscow’s help could be seen as a development project.  
This aside, we can also detect another possible explanation for this particular focus. The 
Russian intention of close cooperation with other important gas producers would allow 
Russian policymakers to promote the use of Russian firms, probably most notably Gazprom, 
in the development of Central Asian countries’ gas resources, which were not yet fully 
developed. This, in turn, would give Russia a place in the gas structure of the country in 
question, which would be in accordance with the Medvedev Doctrine outlined earlier, as 
Russia here could assert itself abroad through the its businesses. Given the Russian states’ 
control over the industry, especially in the gas sector, the promotion of Russian industry 
would naturally also give Moscow “a foot in the door” in terms of both developing and 
operating the host countries’ energy complexes. Hence, through investments Russia sought to 
attain a certain degree of leverage or control the respective states’ energy policy, which would 
allow Moscow to monitor production and transit. This interpretation is also strengthened by 
the fact that the ES 2030 stated that “Russian pipeline infrastructure is to become an integral 
part of the power bridge between Europe and Asia, and Russia will become the key center of 
its management” (ibid; 54). This would in turn place Moscow in a highly favorable position 
both vis-à-vis the Central Asian states and, equally important, other competitors in the region. 
Hence, it could here be argued that Russia saw investment in the Central Asian energy sector 
as a means to an end, namely to control the flows of energy from Central Asia. 
Energy integration 
The wish to create transport hegemony through regional consolidation was also apparent in 
the following section of the ES 2030: 
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Russia will step up its efforts to consolidate its gas transport infrastructure around major regional gas 
production centers (the Central Asian countries, Iran). Russia will also form an integrated Eurasian 
system for transporting gas in order to secure export and transit flows between Europe and Asia (in 
particular, the building of the “Yuzhniy Potok” (South Stream) pipeline will be completed) (ibid; 54)  
 
Here, Russia frames itself as a co-participant of the development of the so-called “gas 
producing centers”, hereby acting as a facilitator. Through this role, which also could be 
explained by reference to Russia’s status as a core energy player, Russia could promote its 
views and guide the developments in a direction that the Kremlin would feel comfortable 
with. In other words, rather than assuming direct control over developments, Russia sought to 
influence the decision making processes by actively engaging in them. This in turn reiterates 
the notion of a movement towards market based dealings.   
Furthermore, we should here note the use of the word Eurasia
39
 to describe the scope of the 
Russian-thought transport system. Moscow here employs this term to denote an integrated 
European-Asian space, which means that the geographical positioning and the resource 
fundament of both Russia and the Central Asian states would grant the countries a central 
position in this complex. Hence, the investments in the development of the Central Asian 
states energy sectors would allow Russia to promote its own interests in a two-fold manner. 
Internationally, Russia would be able to monitor the international energy flows; and on a 
more regional basis Russia would have a legitimate say in the formulation of the Central 
Asian policies. Both of these mechanisms would thus be used to ensure sufficient supply of 
Central Asian gas to Russia. 
In light of this, it is not surprising that Moscow sought to attain a higher degree of energy 
cooperation than what had been the case previously. Naturally this also had implications for 
the pattern of cooperation with the Central Asian states. Commenting on the format of energy 
dialogue the ES 2030 stated the following: 
An active energy dialogue is conducted with the largest countries – consumers and producers of energy 
resources, as well as with major regional groupings (the European Union, the Eurasian Economic 
Community and others) and international organizations (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Forum for Gas Exporting Countries, the International 
Energy Agency etc.)
40
 (ibid; 56). 
                                                 
39
 See footnote on page 22 for definition of this term.  
40
 The ES 2030 even stated that one of the mechanisms for ensuring the fulfillment of state policy objectives was 
“development of energy cooperation with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Eurasian 
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In relation to Central Asia two points should be made here. First, we can note the prominent 
position of multilateral regional diplomacy in the Russian energy outlook; as Moscow sought 
to cooperate with both the EurAsEc and the SCO. This indicates the rise of Asia, both Central 
and Northeast, in global affairs, and consequently that Moscow saw to transform the form of 
interaction to reflect the new realities of both regional and global integration. The fact that 
these organizations largely deal with security and economy respectively, seems to suggest that 
it was through focus on these points that Moscow attempted to approach the Central Asian 
states and their respective energy sectors. In addition, as we outlined earlier, these are both 
organizations in which Russia has a prominent position. In relation to this thesis this meant 
that Moscow gained flexibility, as it could differ between framing Central Asia’s energy 
resources as being either a “merely” a resource that could be traded on par with other 
commodities or as a matter of strategy and security. The framing aside, this creates an 
impression of the Russian energy policies in Central Asia as being guided by realpolitikal and 
pragmatic considerations, where pros and cons were being weighed up against one another. 
Second, we see that the Russian framing’s “energy categorization” is based on the respective 
countries’ position in the energy chain, thus showing the need for Moscow to consider 
multiple roles in the energy complex simultaneously. This reveals something about the logic 
which Moscow assumes when dealing with its southern neighbors. As the different Central 
Asian countries belong to various categories Moscow was required to employ different 
approaches to the individual countries. This will briefly be examined in the next sections, by 
focusing on the two countries with the largest gas and oil reserves respectively, namely 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
41
. 
Turkmenistan 
The importance of energy in the Russo-Turkmen relationship was emphasized by president 
Medvedev, who during a two-day visit in Turkmenistan in October 2010 was quoted stating 
                                                                                                                                                        
Economic Union, North-Eastern Asia, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and European Union as well as with 
other international organizations and countries” (ES 2030; 35-36).  
41
 According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy from 2010, Turkmenistan possessed 8.10 trillion cubic 
meters of gas, placing the country 4th in the world in terms of gas resources, with a share of 4.3%. Kazakhstan, 
with 39.8 thousand million barrels of oil, is the largest oil producer in Central Asia. With a 3% share of the 
world’s total oil resources, Kazakhstan is the 9th largest producer in the world (BP 2010).  
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that “energy is the key element” in the Russo-Turkmen cooperation, and that Russia was 
ready to develop it in further areas (RIA Novosti 22/10 2010). Expanding on just this point, 
Medvedev noted the following:  
I think that energy efficiency and new technology are extremely important areas for our future joint 
efforts, and we have therefore agreed to hold a forum on innovation, new technology and energy 
efficiency. I believe that our countries should work on this if only because we are big energy suppliers 
and so the question of what technology is used in the energy sector – and in other sectors too - is of 
great importance for us. This is a good idea and we will definitely work on it (Prezident Rossii; 
22/10 2010).  
First, the emphasis on the parts’ similar roles as energy suppliers in the energy complex could 
be read as a Russian attempt to frame the parts as peers with similar interests and challenges 
within the sphere of energy. This could in turn create a fundament a normative convergence 
that could be used to promote further approximation between the parts. However, we should 
here also notice that cooperation could commence “if only” because of the positioning of the 
parts in the international energy complex. This indicates that although energy cooperation 
could be enhanced, this was because of realpolitikal considerations and not due to an intimate 
overall Russo-Turkmen relationship
42
.  
Second, the focus on the energy infrastructure illustrates Moscow’s wish to promote 
development of more comprehensive energy cooperation, centered on mutually beneficial 
programs. In light of what we outlined earlier in this section, this could indicate that Moscow 
sought to create an opportunity for Russian companies to participate in the development and 
extraction of the Turkmen energy fields, this way expanding the companies’ reach. The 
interpretation that this was the intended message behind this statement is strengthened by the 
fact the next sentence in Medvedev’s speech was that “we value the active work big Russian 
companies are pursuing in Turkmenistan’s market and we are ready to expand these ties” 
(ibid.). This way, Moscow would also be in a better position to check other international 
players’ interest in the Turkmen energy resources.   
                                                 
42
 That this relationship was far from cloudless can be seen in relation to an explosion on the Turkmen part of the 
“Central-Asia Center” gas pipeline system, which runs from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to 
Russia in April 2009. Turkmen authorities quickly placed the blame on Russia and Gazprom that according to 
Ashgabat had abruptly cut its gas imports through the pipeline due to a lack of European demand as a result of 
the financial crisis in 2008. This created a sharp change in the pressure of the pipeline which in turn created the 
explosion. For a summary of the chain of events as seen from a Russian point of view, see 
http://lenta.ru/story/pipeline/ (in Russian).   
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The fact that Russia needed to take into consideration both the power boost of Turkmenistan 
and the emergence of other players in the area was clearly exemplified by the fact that Russia 
was prepared to start buying Turkmen gas at market prices, thus marking that “there is no 
need for Turkmenistan to implement energy projects with other countries” (RIA Novosti; 3/7 
2008). This marked that although Russia at that point was in a strong position due to the 
pipeline structure, a new approach was necessary so as to avoid Ashgabat in seeking to 
diversify its export.  
On the question of whether Russia was about to lose its traditional strong economic position 
in Turkmenistan, Sergei Lavrov reflected that the preservation of the “old system” was 
impossible as he noted the following:  
If we use as a starting point the initial and immutable chart of the Soviet times when all Turkmen gas, as 
well as any other, ran through main gas pipelines of the Soviet Union we all understand that this is not a 
realistic perspective. What is happening today with the hydrocarbons that are produced in 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan is the solution emerging from their economic 
interests (Lavrov 2010).  
 
Reflecting Ashgabat’s increasing powers, Turkmenistan entered into no less than three large-
scale energy deals during the course of just a year. Except the previously mentioned 
Turkmenistan-China pipeline that was agreed upon in December 2009, Ashgabat concluded a 
pipeline deal with Iran in the following month, and finally the so-called TAPI-pipeline in 
December 2010. The latter pipeline would go from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to India. These projects naturally helped augmenting Turkmenistan’s bargaining 
position vis-à-vis Russia, hereby making it easier for Turkmen authorities to require Moscow 
to pay market prices. 
However, it seems erroneous to claim that Turkmenistan’s diversification projects were 
interpreted in a negative manner in Moscow. On the contrary, Lavrov stated that “nothing of 
what is being done by these countries in terms of diversifying their energy deliveries infringes 
upon our interests. We see this as part of the overall process of improving the global efforts to 
ensure global energy security” (ibid). Exemplifying this, the TAPI project was indeed 
endorsed by Moscow. Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin noted that Gazprom was ready to 
participate in the TAPI both as a contractor, “a projecting company and as a member of the 
consortium” (Kommersant 13/12 2010). This would give Moscow indirect access to the 
pipeline, which corresponds with the Russian approach outlined above. Furthermore, the 
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geographical direction of the new pipelines is noteworthy, as it means that Turkmenistan 
mainly directed its diversification towards different parts of the Asian markets, rather than 
seeking to approach Europe. This very reason seems to constitute the main reason for 
Russia’s support of the project, as it could reduce Ashgabat’s desire to participate in the EU’s 
Nabucco project, which was scheduled to bypass Russia (ibid).  
Hence, by giving Turkmenistan room to operate in Asia, Russia could enhance its position 
vis-à-vis the EU by denying Brussels diversification opportunities that sought to exclude 
Russia. Related to the point above about creating mutually beneficial projects, this would 
diversify Turkmenistan’s energy resources by giving another outlet, while Russia would gain 
by preserving its position in the profitable European market. Realizing that Ashgabat would 
follow its own agenda, we here see that the framing sought to merge the parts through the 
realization of mutually beneficial projects, rather than through closer overall Russo-Turkmen 
interaction. Hence, Russia was not necessarily strictly opposed to Turkmen diversification as 
such, but rather sought to influence developments in such a way that the diversification took 
place in directions that avoided bringing Russia’s and Turkmenistan’s main interests onto a 
collision course.  
Kazakhstan 
Energy cooperation also constituted an important component of Russia’s relations with 
Kazakhstan. In a speech at the Russia-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum in 
September 2009 president Medvedev noted the following: “Over the last several years, we 
have been implementing joint projects in all areas. We have just mentioned prospecting, 
mining, refining and transporting hydrocarbons and constructing new facilities” (Prezident 
Rossii; 11/9 2009). What can be noted about this framing is the extensiveness of the joint 
energy efforts; encompassing a wider format of cooperation than what Russia promoted in 
relation to the gas transport integration. One explanation for this could be that Kazakhstan 
primarily exports oil and not gas (Paramonov & Strokov 2008b; 1), thus requiring Moscow to 
approach Astana in a manner that took this fact into consideration. Hence, the focus is not 
solely on infrastructure, although this also is mentioned in the passage above. However, it 
might also be suggested that this reflects the close overall Russo-Kazakh relationship, which 
then would move the energy cooperation from merely a business decision to a manifestation 
of amicable relations between the parts.  
57 
 
Perhaps merging these two aspects, president Medvedev went on to state that “the issues of 
integrating energy systems of Siberia and European Russia through Kazakhstan’s energy 
supply network and increasing capacities of supply lines from the Urals to Siberia via 
Kazakhstan are of particular relevance”, and that he thought it was a good idea to “ensure the 
parallel operation of the countries’ power systems43” on a “compromise basis” (Prezident 
Rossii; 11/9 2009).We should here notice two things. First, the framing here highlights the 
integration of energy systems as opposed to a focus on just gas. This way, this can be 
interpreted as both a signal and an explanation for a more comprehensive Russian energy 
cooperation with Kazakhstan than what was the case with Turkmenistan. Second, Kazakhstan 
is here categorized as both an energy supplier and a transit state, something that might explain 
the Russian wish for a large-scale cooperation so as to place itself in a better position to 
monitor Astana’s moves. Third, the focus on mutual harmonization suggests a Russian wish 
of mutual rapprochement, but the focus on achieving compromises on energy cooperation can 
be read as a sign that Russia saw its position in Astana as somewhat stronger than in 
Ashgabat, where Russia’s impact was smaller.  
Explaining the rationale for increasing the bilateral energy cooperation, Medvedev said:  
With Kazakhstan we have practically speaking identical technological base, but it has to be admitted 
that this technology is old and obsolete. We need to modernize it, including through joint projects. We 
have similar technological and climatically conditions, so the conditions for working together are 
therefore very similar (ibid.). 
 
An interesting contrast can here be seen in relation to the Russian framing of Turkmenistan. 
Whereas cooperation with the latter was explained with reference to the equal positioning in 
the energy structure of the parts, the focus here is on technological and geographical 
proximity, which connotes a need for a broader common platform. Hence, both framings have 
a normative element, but whereas the framing of Turkmenistan focuses on a structural 
normativity, we see in relation to Kazakhstan that Moscow employed what we might term a 
more cultural framing, based on a common Weltanschauung.   
 
 
                                                 
43
 Medvedev’s own phrasing was “обеспечение параллельной работы энергосистем“. 
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Summing up 
It is tempting to argue that the Russian energy framing of Central Asia undergoing a change. 
On one hand Russia was eager to maintain a structural status quo in its energy relations with 
the region, in the sense that Moscow sought to maintain the Russian monopoly on Central 
Asian energy through its pipeline system. On the other, the decision makers in Moscow had to 
take the new realities into consideration, which in turn required a new pattern of interaction. 
Merging these two trends, Russia promoted use of Russian-controlled pipelines to transport 
Central Asian energy products which would allow Moscow to monitor developments in the 
region; while simultaneously also transform its relations with the Central Asian states into 
more business-like relationships. This would also allow Russia to promote the use of Russian 
industry.  
In addition to this, Russia now needed to take greater notice of other powers’, most notably 
China’s, influence, leading Moscow to adopt a framing that focused on both regional and 
international cooperation and integration which Russia could use to keep track of the 
developments in the region. All of these framings point towards a rather pragmatic Russian 
assessment of the energy situation both in the region and in the wider energy complex. This 
way, we see that Russia’s energy assessment of Central Asia was based on a wide variety of 
factors. These include the historical fact that the pipelines from the Soviet era ran from 
Central Asia to Russia; Central Asia’s position in the energy market; interest in the region’s 
energy resource from other actors, and lastly the potential for development of the regions’ 
hydrocarbon resources which in turn would make Central Asia interesting for Russian 
industry. 
3.5.1. The Russian Debate on Energy Security  
Russia’s energy: Importance and challenges 
The importance of energy in Russian security thinking is increasing. An indication of this can 
be seen from the fact that the NSS mentions energy in relation to four different chapters; 
“Russia in the world community”, National defense”, “Raising the quality of life”, and 
“Economic growth”. Energy security becomes even more vital for Russia when we also 
consider that Moscow to a large extent relies on export of its energy resources in order to fuel 
the economy. It is therefore not surprising that the ES 2030 stated that energy security 
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constitutes one of the main components for ensuring national security, relieving the state 
“from the threats to reliable supply of fuel and energy” (ES 2030; 28). Stating the foreign 
energy policy’s strategic objectives, the ES 2030 outlined three main aims: full-scale 
integration into the world energy market, enhancement of Russia’s position thereon and 
finally gaining the highest possible profit for the national economy (ibid; 55). Using the 
challenges outlined as a starting point, we will in the following examine the Russian 
understanding of energy security. 
Market integration 
Reflecting on Russia’s position on the global energy market, the ES 2030 stated that 
“currently Russia has already occupied one of the leading positions in the world system of 
energy resource turnover, it takes an active part in international cooperation in the sphere of 
fuel and energy resources production and their supply to energy markets” (ES 2030; 55). 
Given Moscow’s central position as the biggest exporter and producer of gas and second 
biggest exporter of oil, it is possible to assume that what was meant by the Russian wish for 
market integration was in fact to solidify Moscow’s position in the market. In practical terms, 
this meant that an important aspect of ensuring Russian energy security was ensuring security 
of demand through market access. This would create stability and predictability, which had 
the double advantage of both help promoting Russia as a stable and reliable supplier of 
energy, while also giving Moscow some relief in terms of concerns regarding income. 
However, this is not to say that the integration had not solely been unproblematic for 
Moscow. This can be seen from the fact that Russia has been exposed to both market trends 
and changing market circumstances. Both of these points became very pertinent following the 
2008 financial crisis when oil prices plummeted from $147 a barrel in July 2008 to $30 a 
barrel in December 2008 (Desai 2010; 145). Naturally, this also made any it very difficult for 
Moscow to enhance its position in the energy market. Due to this, it could be argued that the 
goal during the crisis was to retain market shares and secure revenues under the conditions of 
falling demand for energy and increased pressure from other energy producers competing on 
the same markets.  
The Russian market integration’s main goal was also presented in the ES 2030: 
Stable relationships with traditional consumers of Russian energy resources and forming just as stable 
relationships on new energy markets are the most important vectors of the country’s energy policy in 
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the sphere of global energy security provision in accordance with national interests of the country (ES 
2030; 34) 
 
As to the practical implementation of this, Russia sought to construe a framework for 
dialogue that included all parts of the energy chain. To this effect, president Medvedev 
presented the Conceptual Approach to the New Legal Framework for Energy Cooperation in 
April 2009. The framework drew upon the principles agreed upon during the 2006 G8 
meeting in St. Petersburg, where energy security was an important theme. More specifically, 
emphasis was placed on predictability, responsibility, mutual trust and taking into 
consideration the interests of both consumers and producers. Outlining the Russian 
perspective on the new energy security concept, Medvedev said the following:  
What is meant by this? It is an opportunity to create a new equal system of energy security where the 
interests of all the participants in the energy chain are well-balanced: countries and, accordingly, 
companies that produce oil, gas, as well as other energy products; transit countries; and consumer 
countries. This may be the most complex problem, but nonetheless this is the most important one. This 
is because we do not consider the existing regulations to be sufficient, and in some cases these are not 
beneficial for the Russian Federation. However, this does not mean that we are not going to comply 
with some rules that we ourselves have adopted. This simply means that we must think about the future 
(Prezident Rossii 16/11 2008). 
  
In a sense, this reiterates the Russian wish to revise the international framework, as the 
proposed framework necessarily places a Russian perspective on energy relations. This could 
suggest that Moscow was discontent with the current format of energy dealings, promoting 
energy egalitarianism as a means to overcome a perceived (and presumably Western) bias in 
international energy dealings
44
. In turn, this would place the energy security of exporters on 
an equal footing with the energy security of importers; thus in effect upgrading the security 
concerns of exporters.  
                                                 
44
 This can be seen from the fact that energy security as a concept has often been examined from the viewpoint 
of energy importers, which in turn have given security of supplies prevalence over security of demand. This also 
clarifies Russia’s rationale for seeking to install a new framework that would bring these considerations on par. 
Although not solely being the reason for Russia’s reluctance to wholly commit itself to the Russia-EU energy 
partnership, this relationship can serve to illustrate the Russian concerns. The overall objective of the partnership 
is stated to be the following: “To enhance the energy security of the European continent by binding Russian and 
the EU into a closer relationship in which all issues of mutual concern in the energy sector can be addressed 
while, at the same time, ensuring that the policies of opening and integrating energy markets are pursued” 
(Europa.eu 19/3 2009). We here see that Russia’s energy security is framed as secondary to the EU’s, which can 
be seen from the fact that European energy security is the main aspect to be achieved, while also move Russia in 
such a way as to make Moscow more susceptible and compatible to the EU. 
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Investments 
It was also a clear objective to modernize the Russian energy sector. On this note, the FPC 
stated the following:   
[The Russian Federation] continues to build up and modernize the capacity of the fuel and energy 
industry, hereby confirming its reputation of a responsible partner in the energy markets, while ensuring 
sustainable development of its economy and contributing to the maintenance of balanced world energy 
markets (FPC). 
 
A seemingly vital aspect of this was investments in Russian energy infrastructure. That this 
indeed was a priority, if not to say requirement, can be seen by the fact that the ES 2030 
mentions “investments” no less than 83 times. Forecasting the required capital investments 
into the development of the fuel and energy complex and energy supply, the ES 2030 stated 
that this would amount to some $1,819–2,177 billion up to 2030 (ES 2030; 11).  
In context of the global economic recession this undoubtedly posed a major challenge to the 
maintenance of Russia’s energy security, as failure to provide the sufficient funding for 
developing new energy fields could hamper Russia’s ability to produce and export energy 
resources. In turn, this would be damaging not only for Russia’s reputation as an energy 
supplier, but furthermore also lead to bring the global energy equilibrium out of balance. 
Potentially, this could aggravate the energy security of the countries belonging to other parts 
of the energy chain’s energy security, thus forcing these to look to diversify their own 
imports. In turn, this could be damaging for Russia. 
In line with Putin’s “Russia first”-approach, there has been an increasing trend to limit foreign 
companies’ involvement in the Russian energy sphere to as large a degree as possible. This is 
due to the fact that the energy sector is considered one of the strategic sectors in Russian 
economy. This so-called “resource nationalism” can also be detected in Moscow’s adoption 
of the Strategic Sectors Law in 2008. The law placed limitations on foreign investments in 42 
types of activities that are seen as having a strategic significance for national defense and state 
security, hereunder also exploration and development of subsoil areas, i.e. Russia’s energy 
fields. This seemed to signal that protectionism still was an important tool in ensuring Russian 
energy security. 
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At the same time, the obvious and precarious need for investments in the Russian energy 
sector has consequently led Moscow to at least partly ease its restrictions on foreign 
investments, as Russia’s available capital to invest in new production has decreased 
considerably. Among the measures deliberated were, inter alia, a reduction of regulations on 
strategic industries, as well as more favorable taxation (Shadrina; 59). This shows the other 
side of the Russian energy security debate, namely the Russian need for Western capital and 
know-how in order to replace the energy fields that are in the process of being depleted.  
An illustrating example of both of the points described above is the much-discussed 
Shtokmanovskoye field which is located in the Russian sector of the Barents Sea. The field 
contains vast resources, an estimation has been 3.7 trillion cubic meters which is more than 
three times Europe’s annual consumption (Bloomberg 12/7 2007), but Gazprom is incapable 
of financing and developing this project on its own. This has lead Gazprom to invite two 
Western companies, France’s Total and Norway’s Statoil to participate in the project, but 
Gazprom is still the major shareholder. However, the cooperation is limited to the planning 
financing and construction of the field (statoil.com 7/10 2009), in effect meaning that the role 
of the non-Russian companies is limited to being suppliers of capital and technical solutions. 
Hence, we see that the companies have assets in the development of the field but not in the 
field’s resources, this way rendering Gazprom in charge of the further developments.     
Diversification  
As we noted earlier in the thesis, the North-East Asian markets have gained importance in the 
Russian energy outlook, giving Moscow another outlet for its energy resources. This point 
becomes even more important when considering the economic boom these markets have 
experienced over the past years, as the Russian diversification to these markets helps ensuring 
Russian energy security by providing Russia with a stable and probably also increasing 
demand for its hydrocarbons. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that Europe still 
constitutes the largest market for Russian energy goods; being the final destination for 88 % 
of all Russian oil export and 70 % of Russian gas in 2009 (Minenergo/EC 2010; 2). 
Diversification projects have also been initiated in relation to Russia’s energy deliveries to 
Europe, two of which are the Nord Stream and South Stream. This has also been reiterated by 
Medvedev, who stated that “expansion of gas pipeline infrastructure [and] the implementation 
of such ambitious projects as the “Nord Stream” and “South Stream” contribute to the 
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diversification of Russian gas exports” was the main foreign energy policy tasks for Moscow 
(Vesti.ru 18/11 2008). 
Not only would these projects increase the geographical number of flows Russian energy can 
take, but also serves to counter the EU-proposed Nabucco-pipeline, which is scheduled to 
circumvent Russia, thus in a sense cutting Russia out. Moreover, this would also help 
avoiding Russian reliance on transit through Ukraine and Belarus, the former being the 
greatest “problem” of the two. This can be seen from the various energy conflicts between 
Kiev and Moscow, the two most notable in 2006 and 2009, where reduction of Russian gas 
flows due to what Russia considered to be unreasonably cheap prices led to accusations from 
both Ukraine and the EU about Moscow employing energy as a political tool to force 
concessions from Kiev. Russia’s ability to act as a reliable supplier was also drawn into 
question, and debates on European energy diversification started. Hence, we see that from the 
point of view of an important energy supplier being, dependence on other countries for transit 
of its resources to key markets could be seen as a strategic challenge. This may explain 
Russia’s interests in realization of some projects that are to make Russia less dependent on 
transit countries. Based on this, we see that diversification has a double meaning in the 
Russian outlook: signifying both new pipelines to new customers as well as additional 
pipelines to preexisting importers.  
Summing up 
What we have seen in the last pages is that market access and security of demand serve as the 
starting point for Russian energy security. In addition, Moscow sought to attain a higher 
degree of market integration, which should be seen as a means to enhance Russia’s standing 
in the global energy market. At the same time, it was clear that the Russian energy 
infrastructure was in dire need of modernization. This situation became more difficult when 
the full implications of the financial crisis set in. In turn, this meant that Moscow was forced 
to look abroad to obtain the necessary financing. However, the Russians were still skeptical to 
give foreigners too large an influence over the Russian energy complex. In order to gain a 
larger control over Russia’s own energy destiny Russia sought to diversify their energy 
exports, both to the West and the East. We will in the following pages examine the role of 
Central Asia in fulfilling the Russian objectives. 
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3.5.2. Central Asia’s Role in the Russian Energy Security Understanding 
As we have touched upon earlier, Russia belongs to several of the groups in the energy chain. 
This means that Moscow needs to take into consideration Russia’s interests as an energy 
producer, consumer and transit state simultaneously when deciding upon which energy 
security course to take. Central Asia plays a role in several of these considerations. Russia 
imports Central Asian gas to supplement its own consumption, and Central Asian 
hydrocarbons are exported through Russian pipelines to Europe and Asia, meaning that 
Russia serves as both a re-exporter and transit area for Central Asia’s energy. Last but not 
least, both Russia and Central Asia are net energy exporters (see tables below), meaning that 
they are de facto competitors on the international energy market.  Therefore, Russia has to 
approach Central Asia in such a manner as to balance the different considerations outlined 
above, while still fulfilling the main principles of ensuring energy demand and market access. 
In practical terms, it seems possible to argue that the main role of the Central Asian states has 
been related to two of the abovementioned aspects, namely to ensure the aims of market 
integration and diversification. These will be discussed in the following.  
 
 
Figure 3: Central Asian and Russian proved natural gas reserves
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 At the end of 2009 At the end of 2010 
  Trillion cubic meters Trillion cubic meters Share of world total 
Kazakhstan 1.9                       1.8 1.0 % 
Turkmenistan 8.0 8.0 4.3 % 
Uzbekistan 1.6 1.6                     0.8 % 
Total Central Asia 11.5 11.4 6.1 % 
Russia                44.4 44.8                23.9 % 
 
Figure 4: Kazakhstani and Russian proved oil reserves
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 At the End of 2009 At the End of 2010 
 
Thousand Million 
Barrels 
Thousand Million 
Barrels 
Share of World Total 
Kazakhstan 39,8 39,8 2.9 % 
Russia 76,7 77,4 5.6 % 
 
                                                 
45
 Data for both tables retrieved from BP (2010). 
46
 Although both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also possess some oil reserves these are modest; each 
constituting a share of less than 0.05 % of the global total. Due to this, they have been omitted from the index. 
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Russo-Central Asian energy integration 
As was shown in section 3.1.4., one aspect concerning Russia’s energy framing of Central 
Asia related to the creation of a regional Eurasian energy space. Although not evoking any 
notions of a neo-Soviet approach, something that was clear from the fact that this space was 
to be construed on the basis of a realpolitikal and business-like manner that took into account 
the growing power of the Central Asian states. Naturally, it would be erroneous to equate this 
with a direct Russian control over Central Asia’s energy resources. Rather, the reintegration 
would allow Russia to influence or at least monitor decision making processes in the Central 
Asian states. Although the newly built Chinese pipelines had disrupted the Russian control of 
Central Asia’s energy resources, Russian still had an infrastructural edge. By further 
integration with the Central Asian states Russia could maintain its preferential access to the 
region’s energy sources. In turn, this would allow Moscow to control the direction and 
volumes of energy exports from Central Asia. Moreover, the integration could be an opening 
for Moscow to display a Russian power to act, hereby legitimizing the Russian foreign policy 
framing of Russia as being a regional driving force.  
Given that Russia and Central Asia occupy partly similar positions in the energy chain as 
producers and exporters, it is obvious that the proposed Russo-Central Asian energy 
integration does not include any energy end markets besides the Russian one. Rather, by 
being able to monitor and influence other energy producers, Russia could retain some control 
over the Central Asian states’ energy policies, and in the prolongation of this also over energy 
importers. 
Diversification 
In line with what we outlined above, the Russian goal of diversifying its exports should be 
seen as a mechanism for ensuring that Russia had access to markets which Russian oil and gas 
could be sent to. By establishing stronger bonds with the Asian markets Russia could decrease 
its export dependence on the European market while also gaining increased access to the 
increasingly growing Asian one. However, this also meant being able to keep an eye on the 
actions of other energy producers. By being able to coordinate its actions with Central Asia, 
Moscow could dissuade the Central Asian states from establishing stronger bonds with the 
EU. It could also be argued that the Russian endorsement of Central Asian energy export 
diversification towards Asia serves as a point in favor for just this, as it ties up energy 
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resources that otherwise could be exported to the European market, where Russia had a strong 
standing.  
This underlines the importance for establishing closer bonds with Central Asia, as this 
arguably would make it easier for Russia to convince the Central Asian states of this move. 
However, it should also be noted that this also was the result of pragmatism: The rise of China 
made Beijing’s presence in Central Asia almost unavoidable. By spurring the Central Asian 
states to orient themselves towards the east, Moscow signaled that there was room for both 
parts on the Asian market, something that becomes even clearer when taking into 
consideration the fact that growing development of the Asian economies would trigger a 
larger demand for energy. This meant that both parts’ market shares could be protected. At 
the same time, and as noted above, Russia wanted to keep its preeminence on the European 
market to a large an extent as possible.   
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Chapter 4: Central Asia in the EU Discourse on Energy Security 
4.1. The EU-Central Asian relationship in context 
Introduction 
The fall of the Soviet Union meant that the EU nearly overnight had to establish relations with 
15 new states, many of which that the EU never had dealt with directly before. Thus, unlike 
Russia, whose primary task in relation to the Central Asian countries was to re-frame the 
relationships, Brussels needed to start anew; creating a fundament upon which future relations 
could be based. The EU-Central Asia relationships have moved through several phases and 
since the republics’ independence; all of which have led to a specific framing of the region. 
This is what will be addressed in the following pages. This will be done by examining the 
relationship in three stages; the first running from 1991 to 1995, the second from 1995 to 
2007, and, lastly, the third stage will deal with the relationship between 2007 and 2008. 
First stage (1991-1995) 
The Central Asian states were officially recognized by the EU member countries already in 
1992 and the larger EU members opened diplomatic representations in most of the states in 
the region shortly after. One of the first EU attempts to approach the former Soviet states 
were through the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States Program 
(abbreviated TACIS). Implemented by the European Commission (EC), the objective was to 
help the CIS members making the transition from Soviet-style planned economy to free and 
market-based economies and the development of democratic institutions
47
. This way, the 
program had both an economic and normative side to it. From an EU perspective this had the 
double advantage of promoting European norms and principles such as democracy and human 
rights, whilst also seeking to transform the Central Asian states into potential trade partners 
through the focus of market economy.  
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 Except for the Central Asian states, the TACIS-program also included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Mongolia (covered by the program from 1991 to 2003). 
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TACIS worked as a financing program, through which regional programs and projects were 
backed
48
. One of these was the so-called Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia 
(TRACECA) in 1993,  where the objective was to establish a regional network of transport 
routes in order to develop economic relations, trade and transport communications between 
the East and the West (Yazdani 2008; 25). This also meant promoting a trade pattern that 
went counter to the traditional one the Central Asian countries had experienced during the 
Soviet period, where trade largely was facilitated between south and north (Matveeva 2006; 
86-87). This indicated that the EU recognized the region’s potential as an equal partner in 
terms of trade, whilst also pointing out that the Central Asian states could benefit from 
cooperation with the more powerful and economically superior EU.  
However, the TACIS-approach was criticized for being too fragmented and project-driven 
rather than strategic. On a bilateral basis, steps were taken towards the adoption of directives 
for starting negotiations of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan respectively, and later also with Uzbekistan
49
 (Hunter 1996; 
156). By dealing with the Central Asian states on a bilateral basis, the EU could also help 
bolster their independence, which in turn might make them more willing to accept European 
influence in the region. These agreements were designed to formalize bilateral cooperation 
and create a common platform and framework, and covered a range of topics; from economics 
and trade to political and human rights (ibid; 156). Additionally, the PCAs contained a social 
dimension, stipulating that the agreements could be voided if human rights are violated. This 
may work as a mechanism for putting pressure on the Central Asian states (Lamulin 2002; 
214-215).  
However, despite these pushes the EU engagement at this point was rather limited and 
cautious, being rather ad-hoc and issue-based (Matveeva 2006; 85). On overall, Neil Melvin 
writes that the EU’s engagement in the region in this period “remained modest, lacking both a 
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 On overall, five sectors were identified as priority areas for assistance: training, energy (including nuclear 
safety), transport, support for industrial and commercial enterprises, and food production and distribution 
(International Crisis Group 2006; 11). 
49 The PCAs with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were concluded in 1996; and with Turkmenistan in 
1998. However, Turkmenistan’s PCA was not ratified, and has consequently not come into force, making 
Turkmenistan at the time of writing the only Central Asian country without a PCA. Tajikistan’s PCA was not 
finalized until 2004 due to the civil war in the country (Melvin (ed.); 2; EC External Relations 2010)  
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clear sense of political priorities and the resources necessary to have a significant impact on 
the countries of the region” (Melvin (ed.); 2-3).  
Second stage (1995-2007) 
The EU’s viewing of Central Asia changed considerably in the mid-1990s, as Brussels 
recognized the enormous potential in Central Asia’s oil and gas reserves. Due to this, the 
policies pursued at this point were mainly organized around energy related issues, most 
notably how to extract and transport oil and gas from the region to the EU members (Yazdani; 
249). To this purpose, the program Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) 
was launched in 1995. This project was centered on four key areas: (1) Converging of the 
energy markets of the member states on the basis of the principles of the EU internal energy 
market, (2) enhancing energy security by addressing the issues of energy export/imports, 
supply diversification, energy transit and energy demand, (3) supporting sustainable energy 
development, and finally (4) attracting investment for energy projects of common and 
regional interest (EU Integration 2011).  
However, a sole focus on the establishment of commercial ties turned out to be an insufficient 
regional approach. By the late 1990s the region, sometimes referred to as the “neighbors of 
our neighbors”, had also become a security concern for Brussels. An example of this came in 
August 1999 when Kyrgyzstan was invaded by Islamic insurgents, thus threatening to 
destabilize the whole region (Lamulin; 228). Adding to this, the Central Asian countries 
experienced socio-political unrest and a surge in drug traffic. In sum, this affected the EU as it 
led to suboptimal cooperation, increased the danger of disruptions regarding the transport of 
energy and increased the flow of drugs in the EU.  The initial EU response came in 2000 in 
the form of an Action Plan to combat the flow of drugs through Central Asia (Yazdani; 251). 
However, in the bigger picture the Action Plan alone was not sufficient in order to wholly 
address the region’s challenges.  
This approach changed following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent U.S.-led 
invasion of Afghanistan, which turned Central Asia into a geopolitical hotspot. The 
emergence of internationally powerful actors in the area necessitated the EU to redefine its 
relations with the countries in the region. At this point, the EU was concerned with three main 
security issues in relation to Central Asia; Islamic radicalism, terrorism and regional conflict. 
Furthermore, Brussels worried about spillover-effects to other countries in the region if these 
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issues were not dealt with in an adequate manner (Yazdani; 251). The EU member states 
sought to prevent this by providing large-scale bilateral assistance in order to secure the 
Central Asian states. Border issues were here prioritized, which made the Border 
Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA) emerge as a flagship in the EU approach 
(Matveeva 2006; 88). This also helped strengthen the EU’s Central Asian Drug Assistance 
Program (CADAP), which had been launched in the late 1990s but had failed to set its mark 
on the ground (Melvin (ed.); 4).  
Steps were also taken to enhance the regional dialogue regarding energy security. The EU, 
afraid of being too reliant on Arab oil, saw Caspian oil to be a good alternative source 
(Rakhimov 2010; 3). The Baku Initiative, launched in 2004, merged INOGATE’s focus on 
energy and TRACECA’s emphasis on transport, and aimed at “progressive integration” of the 
respective parts transport networks “in accordance with EU and international legal and 
regulatory frameworks” (EC 2010a). Furthermore, a new Energy Road Map was agreed upon 
in November 2006. Its implementation paved the way for a comprehensive legal and 
regulatory governing and integrated EU-Black Sea-Caspian Sea common energy market 
based on the EU Community acquis (Rakhimov; 3)
50
. This was even more important in light 
of the Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict that emerged in January the same year. By streamlining 
and enhancing energy relations with Central Asia, the EU seems to have wanted to create a 
counterweight to Russia’s dominance regarding energy. 
Unfortunately for Brussels, the security situation in the region also became more precarious 
during this period. In May 2005 a large number of protesters were killed by Uzbek state 
security forces in what has become known as the Andizhan massacre. On one side 
Uzbekistan, with its relatively large population, its geopolitical position in the heart of Central 
Asia and its importance for energy issues occupied an important position in the EU approach, 
and Brussels worried, as we noted, about spill-over effects and instability. On the other side, 
this called EU’s normative side into play, making it necessary to take some sort of action. The 
result was that the EU opted to impose sanctions on Uzbekistan, while regional cooperation 
was set to proceed as normal (ibid; 4, Matveeva 2006; 90). This marked that adherence to rule 
of law was a necessary condition for continued cooperation, while also framing the EU as a 
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 The road map was agreed by the European Commission and governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Russia (to act as an 
observer). 
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normative power. Despite this, the incident was largely interpreted in geopolitical terms; with 
Russia and China seen as advancing their hold on Central Asia at the expense of the West 
(Melvin (ed.); 4).  
On overall, we see that a more sector-driven EU approach emerged in this period, with a 
specific focus on energy and security related issues, whilst also seeking to maintain regional 
stability. The complexities of the challenges the region met coupled with the increased 
geopolitical weight of the Central Asian states, meant that Brussels needed to choose its 
approach wisely. In practical terms, the focus on inter-governmental bodies in order to ensure 
effective cooperation and mutual benefits for both sides was continued, while violations of 
EU norms were struck down on.  
Third stage (2007-2008) 
2007 saw the launching of the Strategy for a New Partnership (in the following named the 
Strategy), a more far-reaching and coherent EU initiative vis-à-vis Central Asia. The initiative 
reflected both the new geopolitical position of Central Asia; the implications of this in relation 
to the region’s security and energy situation, as well as the perceived weakening of Western 
power in the region (ibid; 4). This point was also stressed by the Union in the 2010 Joint 
Progress Report
51
 (JPR), where it was stated that the adoption of the Strategy was due to “the 
realization by the EU of the growing importance of Central Asian countries for the EU” (2010 
JPR; 2). Neil Melvin and Jos Boonstra noted that the introduction of the Strategy signaled a 
fundamental shift in the EU’s relations with Central Asia, for the first time “linking general 
political goals to a concrete working prospectus in the region” (Melvin & Boonstra 2008; 1).  
Set to unfold both regionally and bilaterally, the EU sought to use this platform as a means to 
widen the scope of its engagement in the area. The “new” relations were to cover a wide 
range of issues, including energy, security, environment, transport, education, democracy and 
human rights (ibid; 5, Yazdani; 253). This integrated matters of development, security, crisis 
management and political dialogue into one overall structure, hereby marking the 
interdependence between these issues
52
. Also, the Strategy called for a higher degree of 
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 The JPR is filed under Council of the European Union and the European Commission (2010) in the 
bibliography.  
52
 The notion of interdependence was also supported by German Minister of State Gernot Erler, who presented 
the following three principles as the fundament for the new Strategy: (1) Stability in Central Asia is vital for 
peace and prosperity in the whole region around the Caspian Sea. Peace in Afghanistan cannot be achieved 
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political dialogue with all five Central Asian states (Rakhimov; 4). This way, the 
comprehensiveness of the Strategy signaled that the EU saw Central Asia as a long-term 
commitment. This comprehensiveness also brought with it positive synergy effects in the 
EU’s eyes, as it hindered monopolization of Central Asia by either Russia or China, which 
both addressed the area through a narrower focus on energy and security (Melvin (ed.);  5). 
Accordingly, Brussels sought to present itself as a holistic or “complete” partner by merging 
both interests and ideas into one overall structure. This can be contrasted by the Russian 
approach, which was more issue-specific.  
From the preceding pages it is clear that Brussels’ relations with the Central Asian states have 
gone through various phases. In the beginning the main features of the EU’s engagement was 
a project-based approach that sought to find concrete goals to the challenges the region faced. 
The discovery of energy resources in the area made the EU presence more visible. However, 
the region also became increasingly more complex, illustrated by the growing number of 
potential security threats. Following the 9/11 terror attacks the EU’s engagement increased, 
but in terms of practical measures Brussels continued to address specific threats and aspects 
through technical assistance rather than prepare an overall strategy. This changed, however, in 
2007. The launching of the new Central Asian Strategy signaled a move away from a project-
based approach to a more strategic approach, thus serving as a recognition of the growing 
importance of Central Asia not only in the European outlook, but also in global politics.  
4.2. Central Asia in the EU’s Foreign Policy 
Introduction 
Due to the comprehensiveness of the EU’s Central Asia approach the aforementioned 2010 
JPR underscored the need for regular reviews of the implementation of the Strategy, so as to 
indicate within which spheres of commitment progress had been achieved; and where 
additional measures ought to be taken. The EU experiences for the first years are described in 
the same JPR, and due to this the following pages will to a large extent be based on this 
document. 
                                                                                                                                                        
without stability in Central Asia. (2) This goal can only be attained by gradually establishing democracy and the 
rule of law as well as guaranteeing the observance of minimum human rights standards in the societies affected. 
(3) The countries of Central Asia are becoming increasingly important for German and EU energy security, due 
to the energy resources’ strategic significance (Erler 2007; 5). 
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For the sake of orderliness have the areas of the EU’s engagement have been subsumed under 
three separate categories, according to the goal of interaction with the states in the region: a 
normative one (human rights, good governance and cultural dialogue
53
); a technical one 
(education, environment and economic development); and finally an interest-based one 
(energy and security). In accordance with the theme of the thesis the interest-based category 
will be dealt with later on.  
The normative dimension 
Human rights, rule of law, good governance, and democratization 
Commenting on the normative development in Central Asia over the past few years, the JPR 
noted:  
Although some positive developments have taken place, such as the abolition of the death penalty in 
Uzbekistan and some judicial procedure reforms, the situation in the region remains worrying. Despite 
regional differences, reports on the use of torture remain frequent, severe restrictions on the freedom of 
expression and of the media continue, as do arbitrary restrictions to freedom of association and 
assembly. Little progress can be noted as regards judicial independence and fair trial rights (2010 
JPR; 7). 
 
The picture presented of the region here is rather stark. We here see that democratic ideals 
were being employed by the EU as a benchmark and a goal for progress. This also explains 
the discontented tone in the statement, as the EU was displeased with the lack of progress 
towards these ideals. This can also be exemplified by examining the Freedom House’s ratings 
of Central Asia from 2007 to 2010, which shows that none of the states have improved their 
standing on democracy and human rights. In fact, Kyrgyzstan, the only state that was not 
considered “Not free” before the implementation of the EU Strategy, moved from its initial 
category “Partly free” to “Not free” in 2009 (Freedom House 2011).  
This lead to a framing of the Central Asian states are here framed as -at best- semi-
totalitarian; lacking both the ability and will to adjust in accordance with Brussels’ wishes. 
Moreover, we here see that the EU sought to move the region towards a more 
liberal/egalitarian direction, but with very limited success within this field in practical terms. 
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 Due to a lack of relevant coverage in the official EU discourse, the cultural aspect will not be addressed in the 
following. The absence of initiatives in this sphere is in itself noteworthy, as it suggests that cultural dialogue 
was not a prioritized task for Brussels.  
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This raised difficulties for the EU, which saw observance of human rights, rule of law, good 
governance and democratization as important underpinnings for “the long-term political 
stability and economic development of Central Asia” (ibid;.8). Furthermore, a picture of 
Brussels as an advocate of reforms is conveyed, which consequently turns the Central Asian 
states into an area where these norms are to be implemented. However, as was also reflected 
in the JPR quote above, this push for reforms did not necessarily manifest itself in a 
welcoming of the EU norms in Central Asia. In order to remedy this, the EU seems to have 
employed framing that suggested that the current situation and leadership led the Central 
Asian states to work on a suboptimal level. This could be mended by adhering to EU 
principles. 
Hence, from an EU point of view Central Asia does not fulfill its potential, leaving the region 
in a state of underperformance. In this context, the emphasis placed on Kazakhstan’s 2010 
OSCE Chairmanship is interesting. This was hailed as “an historical opportunity to bring 
Europe and Central Asia closer to each other through the commitments and values they 
share”, something that could be seen as an attempt to create a bridgehead between the parts 
(ibid; 3). This is also interesting in light of the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), where Kazakhstan was the only one of the Central Asian countries 
that markedly improved its position in the period 2007 to 2010; from being placed as number 
150 out of 179 countries in 2007 to 105. place out 179 countries in 2010. The remaining 
Central Asian states, however, only experienced minor changes, and then mostly for the 
worse (Transparency International 2011). Hence, Brussels frames Kazakhstan as being in a 
middle position between the EU and the other Central Asian states, thus being somewhat 
more similar to Brussels than the other states in the region. In turn, by winning Astana over, 
the EU could also gain a gateway for introducing EU norms in the region.  
Despite the Central Asian “underachievement” described above Brussels maintained that 
attempts had been made, and were continuously being made, to change the situation. The 
establishment of “structured human rights dialogues” with all the five states in the region had 
allowed the conveyance of “good European practices, experience and policies in this field” 
(ibid; 8). This presupposes that the practices as they were executed in Europe were in some 
sense qualitatively better than the Central Asian procedures. In turn, this says something 
about the perceived relation of strength between parts. That the EU was the strong part among 
the two was also apparent in the focus on exploring the scope for practical cooperation where 
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the perceived goal was “sharing EU experiences in human rights and democratization issues” 
(ibid; 8). Brussels here appears as a “sharer”, that is, holder of knowledge, whereas the 
Central Asian states are the receivers of this know-how. 
It could also be argued that the EU, through its focus on creating a common normative 
platform, sought to transform or change Central Asia by making the countries in the region 
adopt measures that would make them more similar to the EU. This is interesting, as it also 
seems to assume that the region’s societal structures in general ought to be changed if a solid 
fundament for stability and development is to be developed. In line with this, Brussels also 
addressed the troublesome situation for the Central Asian countries’ civil societies and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs); stating that “a developed, independent civil society and 
an independent media are vital for social and economic development” (ibid; 8).  
In terms of the implementation of the normative aspect of the Strategy, the 2010 JPR stated 
that for the plans to succeed this also required “a genuine commitment of the partner countries 
to engage in meaningful, effective reform” (ibid; 10). In effect this transmits part of the 
responsibility for the implementation of the reforms over to the Central Asian side. This 
signals that Brussels can only encourage reforms, while their implementation was the 
responsibility of the individual countries in question.  
The technical dimension 
Education 
Explaining its involvement in the Central Asian education sector, the EC noted that 
“education institutions play a key role in society contributing to sustainable development, and 
economic growth which is why the EU regards education and research as strategic sectors for 
development cooperation with Asia (EC 2011a)”. This was also an area in which Brussels 
“has extensive experience and expertise” (2010 JPR; 11).  
This reiterates the structure outlined earlier, where the EU is in possession of knowledge and 
the Central Asian countries are to benefit from this knowledge through interaction with 
Brussels. In this context it could therefore be argued that Brussels sought to “educate” Central 
Asia, which was seen as lagging behind the developed Europe. This frames the EU 
educational approach as something for Central Asia to aspire to; constituting, from Brussels’ 
76 
  
point of view, a qualitative improvement. In turn, a Central Asian accession to this approach 
would represent a step forward in terms of progress and development in the region. This way, 
the education framing continued to emphasize the normative element in the EU approach. 
Also, it is interesting to note the repeated accentuation of Kazakhstan as a regional spearhead. 
Moving Astana into what we can call a European sphere correlates with Brussels’ wish to 
bridge cultural and normative differences between Europe and Central Asia
54
. Hence, the 
education program was designed to increase EU-Central Asian commonalities through 
Central Asian adherence to European norms.  
Economic development, trade and investment 
Pointing out the EU’s economic importance for the Central Asian states the JPR noted that the 
EU remained “a leading trade partner for the region and the main trade partner for its biggest 
economy, Kazakhstan” (2010 JPR; 14). In effect, this firmly places the EU in the forefront, if 
not center, of both Central Asia’s and Astana’s trade relations. The EU was also determined 
in creating a picture of itself as a benefactor to the region was also apparent as the EU 
discourse highlighted that a significant increase in EU assistance had made the EU one of the 
leading donors in the region (ibid; 4). Hence, this framing can be read as a signal that 
mutually beneficial arrangements can be continued and developed further, but this is based on 
the premise that the European direction is being prioritized. This conditionality has two 
functions from an EU perspective; placing a certain pressure on Central Asia, and at the same 
time accentuate the advantages that could be gained through enhanced cooperation with 
Brussels. 
This framing could also be read in context of the geopolitical situation. China had, by flexing 
its economic muscles, gained foothold in the region, something that naturally made Beijing a 
competitor to Brussels in terms of trade. By framing the EU-Central Asian economic 
relationship as the single most important regional economic collaboration the EU could 
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 This point is also explicitly referred to in the JPR, where it says: “It is noteworthy that Kazakhstan has 
become a member of the European Cultural Convention, which means that Kazakhstan is now a fully-fledged 
member of the Steering Committee for Education and of the Steering Committee for Higher Education and 
Research of the Council of Europe and that it can take part of in all activities in the education field (2010 JPR; 
11)”. This framing highlights that Kazakhstan is indeed a part of the European community. Apart from the 
aforementioned “bridgehead aspect”, this also helped Brussels in the “claiming” of a key geopolitical player, 
which in turn would make it harder for any great power contender to win Astana over again.  
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manage a dual task: retaining its position as Central Asia’s main trade partner by drawing the 
Central Asian states closer, while also keep China at arm’s length.  
As with Russia, China pursued “pure” business relations, meaning that Beijing did not draw 
attention to improving the internal normative situation in the Central Asian countries within 
such spheres as for instance economic freedom. In light of China’s increasing geopolitical 
weight, it could be argued that this also forced Brussels to prioritize business over reform 
work inside Central Asia. Exemplifying this, we might examine the Heritage Foundation/Wall 
Street Journal’s Index of Economic Freedom (IEF)55, which examines the degree of economic 
freedom in the world’s countries56. Since 2007 the situation within this field has improved 
somewhat for such countries as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but this progress is more than 
offset by declines elsewhere. Although parts of this decline may be attributed to the effects of 
the 2008 financial crisis, this may also indicate a lack of fruition in terms of the stated EU 
engagement. Despite this, the JPR noted that “there still is scope for strengthening EU-Central 
Asian trade and investment relations” (ibid; 14).Brussels pursued this through two channels; 
mutual projects and promoting accession to the WTO. Both will be briefly assessed in the 
following.  
In terms of regional projects, the EU aim was to encourage “regional economic integration”. 
Apart from the obvious aim of generating economic gains, Brussels could here appear as a 
moderator or even peacemaker in the region by virtue of its role as a facilitator of this 
cooperation. This reiterates the perceived distance and discrepancy between the collected and 
stable Europe and the potentially disarrayed Central Asia. By keeping its trade partners close 
not only to Brussels but also to one another, the EU could here control the developments. 
Furthermore, this could also promote regional stability, making Brussels appear as a 
facilitator of this as well.   
The other EU mechanism was to promote accession to the WTO as a key objective for the 
Central Asian states. The EU supported this move “as an important catalyst for economic 
reform and a basis for the further development of trade and economic relations” (ibid; 15). In 
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 See bibliography for links to the web sites with the tables for the relevant years.  
56
 In this context, economic freedom is understood as: “All liberties and rights of production, distribution, or 
consumption of goods and services. The highest form of economic freedom should provide an absolute right of 
property ownership; fully realized freedoms of movement for labor, capital, and goods; and an absolute absence 
of coercion or constraint of economic liberty beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain 
liberty itself “ (Miller & Kim 2011; 20). 
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light of what we have discerned so far, it seems reasonable to suggest that also tool for 
introducing Western rules and regulations to the Central Asian states. Thus, the WTO serves 
as an institutionalization of the assimilation process that the EU sought to promote. In this 
context it is also worth mentioning the particular interest taken by the EU in Kazakhstan 
joining the WTO. As the largest trade partner to the EU in the region, “the EU takes a 
significant interest in seeing Kazakhstan join the WTO soon in order to have a shared 
framework for strengthening economic ties” (ibid; 15). 
Transport 
In the field of transport priority was given to the South East pan-European Corridor through 
the Caspian Sea, supported by the TRACECA program. The corridor remained important 
even though “some Central Asian countries attach relatively more importance to north-bound 
routes”, a clear hint of Russia’s involvement in the region (ibid; 18). In addition to this, the 
JPR stated that “cross-Caspian routes are rapidly gaining significance as greater quantities of 
oil become available for shipping”, thus highlighting the link between transport and energy 
(ibid; 18). Apart from indicating that Brussels saw Moscow, not China, as the main 
competitor within this field, the correlation between the increasing importance of transport 
routes and the growing available quantities of oil could be read as a signal that increasing 
energy production in Central Asia could make the area more subjected to great power 
struggles in the future. This way, the mentioning of the increasing significance of westward-
bound routes serves a specific function in the EU framing, as it places Europe as the main 
destination of Central Asia’s energy resources. Given that the Central Asian states are net 
energy exporters and Europe is a net importer, this has the effect of underlining Europe’s 
importance to Central Asia as a buyer of energy products; while also placing Russia in a 
secondary position in relation to energy matters. This way, the transport framing also 
underscores the geopolitical importance of energy, something that consequentially is 
emphasized by Brussels as well. 
Environment 
EU Special Representative for Central Asia Pierre Morel noted in an interview that 
environmental issues were of great importance for Brussels in its relations with the Central 
Asian states. Outlining the reasons for this, Morel stated that this was so  
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not only because they are of unquestionable importance for the countries of Central Asia, but also 
because the consequences of environmental processes in the region might stretch as far as Europe. They 
can be seen as a common challenge for the EU and Central Asia. Besides, the Europeans subscribe to 
the philosophy that the environment is a global system and we all are responsible for it, regardless of 
where on the planet the damage occurs. Addressing environmental problems, including in Central Asia, 
can be seen as part of our concern for the World that we all live in and that we will leave to the future 
generations (European Dialogue 2008). 
 
First, we can here note that the proposed cure for the problem suggests that a comprehensible 
solution is needed, including both the EU and the Central Asian states. This way, a sense of 
community was being constructed; highlighting that all the parts were required to act in order 
to assume control over the situation. Related to this, it is here hinted that Brussels could and 
should involve itself on outside the Union in order to protect the common good, i.e. a 
habitable and sustainable environment. This has the function of justifying the EU’s presence, 
by pointing to the righteousness that constituted the foundation for the EU’s engagement. This 
way, the EU took the moral high ground in relation to environmental issues.  
Also, Central Asia here is framed as a potential problem. Hence, in order to stop the problems 
from reaching Europe, these ought to be contained within its “region of origin”. Based on this 
we can see that Central Asia here is framed as a possible danger to Europe. Concurrent with 
this, it also seems as though a certain dualism exists in the EU approach; wavering between 
framing the EU-Central Asian relationship within this sphere as a fellowship or as a 
hierarchical relationship with the holistically solution oriented EU and its protégé, i.e. Central 
Asia. However, an interesting question relates to whether improvement actually was 
noticeable following the increasing EU interest in Central Asia. The Environmental 
Performance Index (EPI) paints a somewhat ambiguous picture of just this
57
. Most of the 
Central Asian states experienced improved ratings from 2006 to 2008, but this progress was 
more than offset by sharply decreasing trajectories in the period from 2008 to 2010. Based on 
this, one may again ask whether the EU presence really had an impact on the ground in terms 
of improving the region’s situation. 
Summing up 
Despite EU efforts to implement Western norms in Central Asia, something that in praxis 
meant approximation to the West through adherence of Western norms and principles, were 
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unsuccessful. This was framed as being due to Central Asian reluctance and inability to do so. 
First, we here see that Brussels sought to appear as a benefactor to the region, which construes 
a hierarchy between the advanced EU and the less-developed Central Asian countries. 
Second, we see that by extending this argument, the Central Asia states are depicted as being 
somewhat dysfunctional and because of this in need of European assistance.   
This also seems to serve as a rationale for the implementation of technical dimension of the 
EU approach, as it construes a framework for enhancing commonalities between the parts. 
Through investments and other financial support, seeking to introduce market principles and 
fostering regional cooperation, Brussels could bring the Central Asian closer to the EU and 
hinder regional turmoil in the process. If we continue this line of thought, we also see that this 
approach had a geopolitical aspect to it: by implementing these measures the EU could draw 
the Central Asian states into Brussels’ realm, which in turn would make it more difficult for 
the other players in the region to draw the regional states into their sphere of influences. 
Hence, although the Central Asian states still were seen as lesser developed than the EU and 
therefore in need of assistance, the focus on EU-Central Asian cooperation and integration has 
the function of placing the parts on a more equal stance structurally, here constituting a united 
position. 
4.3. Central Asia in the EU’s Security Discourse 
Threat perceptions 
Central Asia’s growing geopolitical role also increased the importance of regional security. 
The JPR reflected an awareness this as it stated that cooperation within this field was of 
“growing importance” in the EU-Central Asian relations; pointing to the EU-Central Asia 
Forums on security in Paris in September 2008 and again in Brussels in a year later as 
demonstrations of just this (2010 JPR; 21). That Central Asia faced a broad range of complex 
security challenges was also evident from the fact that the EU itself called for an expansion of 
the concept of security to fit the EU engagement in the region. As an example of this, suffice 
it to list some of the issues addressed by the abovementioned Forums: the threat of terrorism 
and extremism, the fight against human and drug trafficking, non-proliferation, as well as 
issues related to energy, water and environmental security (ibid; 26; Council of the European 
Union 15/9 2009; Presidency of the Council of the European Union 25/11 2008). In terms of 
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the EU’s main Central Asian operational activities in the security field, these were mainly 
centered on the issues of border management and drugs. Because of these issues’ centrality in 
the EU discourse, the following pages will mainly be using these themes as a backdrop. 
Security political community or Central Asia as security buffer? 
Addressing the security situation in Central Asia, Commissioner for External Relations and 
European Neighborhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner said:  
Central Asia is a region of increasing importance for us and we need the Central Asian countries to be 
strong partners in the fight against shared challenges. Therefore, we have considerably increased the 
intensity in our relations over the last months, notably through our Central Asia strategy. During my 
visit to Central Asia earlier this year I underlined the importance of stability for a region that is so close 
to Afghanistan and our commitment to work with the Central Asian countries to achieve this. I am 
happy to see that a security partnership is a very important element of this reinforced cooperation 
(Ferrero-Waldner 17/9 2008). 
 
To the same effect, the JPR also stated that “the EU and Central Asian countries share a 
common interest in tackling these [developments] and the destabilizing effects they can have 
both in the EU and Central Asia” (2010 JPR; 21). The statement highlights that the precarious 
security situation in the region was important for Brussels for several reasons; both in terms 
of potential spillover effects to Europe due to the transnational character of many of the 
threats and challenges mentioned and as a stumbling block to Brussels’ stated strategic goals 
of securing and stabilizing Central Asia. Last but not least, this framing made it possible for 
the EU and the Central Asian states to construe a united front against unwanted 
developments, hereby creating a sense of community. This allowed the Union to side with 
Central Asia almost regardless of the nature of the threat or challenge at hand: if this was due 
to internal Central Asian factors, Brussels could assist the states in overcoming the threat; 
whereas any threats emanating outside Central Asia would see the Central Asian states and 
the EU working together for the common good.   
Although these categorizations by no means are mutually exclusive, we may illustrate a 
tendency to this type of thinking by relating them to Afghanistan, something that also was 
reflected in Ferrero-Waldner’s statement above. The JPR noted that the fragile situation in 
Afghanistan had “increased the potential spillover of extremism from Afghanistan into 
Central Asia”, which renewed the importance of cooperation in order to combat terrorism and 
extremism (ibid; 23). Hence, the EU-Central Asian “united front” can be seen as operating on 
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two levels; employing proactive and preventive measures in Central Asia to hinder 
radicalization, as well as seeking to isolate Central Asia from Afghanistan by containing the 
Afghan threats inside Afghanistan. Indirectly, the former of these levels may potentially lead 
to a viewing of Central Asia as “problem area”, turning the region into a European buffer 
zone.  As with Russia, it would here seem that also the EU sought to employ a concentric 
security approach to Central Asia, seeking to contain and minimize the problems in the region 
rather than risking that they would spread towards Europe.  
Regarding Brussels’ involvement in the spheres of border management and drugs the EU 
pointed out that it was “heavily engaged” in the region as “one of the leading donors in the 
area of border management and combating drug trafficking with its BOMCA Program and 
CADAP” (ibid; 21). First, we can here notice the use of the word “donor”, which in this 
context evokes a notion of something being handed down from an affluent actor to a more 
needy part. In addition, it is interesting to note that Brussels referred to the implemented 
programs as “its” as opposed to “joint”, hereby implying that the EU was the architect behind 
the programs, and Central Asia is the area in which the program is being executed.    
Program implementation  
As to the implementation of the EU’s regional security programs Brussels stated that it had 
“proceeded well and has made a significant contribution to building modern border 
infrastructure in order to help provide border security as well as to facilitate licit border traffic 
and thereby promote regional cooperation and trade” (ibid; 21). It is here created a linkage 
between the modernization of the Central Asian countries’ border systems, which was 
brought about by the EU; an increase in the legality of cross-border activities; and enhanced 
regional cooperation. This way, Brussels helped developing Central Asia by directly 
addressing the transnational character of many of the threats. In addition to reaffirm the 
containment aspect of the EU framing, Brussels here emerges as a security provider to the 
beneficiary Central Asia. This way, the EU contributed to the region’s stability.  
Moreover, the EU saw introduction of a “European-style integrated border management 
practices” as one of Brussels’ regional key objectives (ibid; 21). This would seem to foster 
intra-regional cooperation through increased trade and investment flows. Additionally, the 
European-ness that constituted the fundament for the system would also ensure approximation 
to the EU in terms of both norms (togetherness) and technique (implementation of the EU 
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structure/system). This would ensure that the Union’s security model is pointed out as an 
ideal to which the Central Asian states could and should adhere.  
Related to the problematic drug situation in the area the JPR noted that the EU-Central Asia 
Drug Action Plan had been revised in order to better fit the current context, updating “the 
policy orientations that are at the core of the reform processes in the region and the EU-
Central Asia cooperation agenda, and is supported by the various technical assistance 
programs under implementation” (ibid; 22). This passage again shows that there is no clear-
cut distinction between the normative and technical dimension of the EU approach to Central 
Asia, in the sense that reform processes are to be supported by technical assistance so as to 
merge into a single and comprehensive approach to Central Asia. This also underlines that 
Brussels saw Central Asia as a complex security challenge, which in turn defied any easy 
solutions to the region’s challenges.  
Drugs: Central Asia as transit area and producer 
The complexity described above can also be exemplified with reference to the JPR, where the 
following was stated:    
Given that the region remains a significant corridor for drug trafficking, the prevention of drug use in 
Central Asian countries has become an increasingly important aspect of EU assistance programs while 
the increased production of drugs in the region has made the issue of precursor trafficking a crucial one 
to address (ibid; 22). 
 
We see that the Central Asia’s geographical position as a transit site is highlighted, a framing 
which is consistent with the 2000 Action Plan. What is new here is the focus on increased 
drug production in the area. Whereas Central Asia hitherto had been considered to be a 
passive part in terms of drugs the region had now emerged as a more active player, which in 
turn altered the threat scenario. Hence, measures needed to be installed not only to hinder the 
pass-through of drugs to Europe, something that reiterates the concentric security framing of 
Central Asia as a buffer, but also to stop production and use of drugs in the Central Asian 
states.  
This further complicates the security dynamics, as the Central Asian states are here seen as 
being a security risk by virtue of the countries’ active partaking in the upholding of this 
problem. This is also important for another reason, as this also provided the EU with a 
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rationale for pursuing reforms inside Central Asia, in this case as a means to stop the drug 
production. This may help explain the emphasis placed on norms to supply the technical 
programs to address EU security concerns, underscoring that the normative and technical 
dimensions were not mutually exclusive entities in the EU Strategy, and that solutions to 
Central Asia’s security challenges necessitated a comprehensive approach. This reiterates the 
perception of the EU and the West at large as a prime mover for Central Asia’s security, and 
also supports the notion that Central Asia was being cared for by the West. 
Summing up 
The EU faced a complex security situation in Central Asia. As the different security threats 
required to be addressed in different manners, Brussels seems to have sought to overcome this 
be alternating between a framing of the EU-Central Asian security relationship as a security 
political community and Central Asia as a problematic area that turns it into a European 
buffer zone. Both of these aspects can be related in relation to viewings of the security threats 
related to Afghanistan: by containing threats inside Afghanistan, Brussels and the Central 
Asian states would be working together for the best of the region, and if the threats spread to 
Central Asia, the region needed to be isolated in order to stop it from causing further 
“contamination”.  
In practical terms Brussels centered its security involvement on border management and drug-
related measures through already existing programs. The approach suggests that Brussels saw 
to improve the security situation by stabilizing the region through the use of Western security 
systems. The Central Asian countries were starting to become more actively involved in 
criminal activity, as seen from the fact that the region moved from being mainly a transit area 
for drugs to an active partaking in drug production. This reiterated the need to treat the region 
as a buffer zone, but also provided Brussels with an opportunity to enhance its normative 
engagement in the region, as seen from the various implemented programs’ attempts to 
dissuade security breaches while at the same time make sure that Brussels appeared as the 
main facilitator of Central Asian security.   
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4.4. Central Asia in the EU’s Energy Policy 
Introduction 
The EU has a “twin-track approach to cooperation in the energy sector” in the Central Asian 
and Caspian region (EC External Relations 2009; 2). One “track” is pursued through regional 
energy dialogue. The dialogue is administered within the framework of the so-called Baku 
Initiative which in turn is supported by the INOGATE program. Here, short, medium and 
long-term objectives for enhanced energy and transport cooperation between the EU and the 
other participating countries are put forward. The other “track” consists of bilateral 
cooperation which is based on the framework of the so-called Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoU). The energy cooperation memoranda “opens up the possibility of strategic energy 
partnerships with a special focus on  energy security and industrial cooperation, development 
of the energy sector and improvement of the investment climate” (ibid; 2). We need to 
consider both the multi- and bilateral EU approach to Central Asia in order to construe a 
comprehensive depiction of the EU’s view on Central Asia in terms of energy. Hence, we will 
here start by a general outline of Central Asia in the EU outlook, before we go on to examine 
the mechanisms through which the EU’s objectives are pursued, that is, the “twin tracks”.   
Mutual benefits: Limiting Russia’s leverage 
Ambassador Norbert Jousten, Head of the EU Delegation in Kazakhstan, noted that the EU’s 
energy situation was not all rosy as he stated the following: 
Our situation is straightforward. In the EU, our energy supplies are dominated by fossil fuels. Oil, gas 
and coal represent around 80% of energy supplies. More than 80% of oil and almost 60% of gas used in 
the EU is imported.  Moreover, Europe's own production of fossil fuels is declining. It is also clear that 
despite the current economic crisis, and no matter how successful EU countries are in boosting 
renewable energy and energy saving, our levels of import dependence will grow (Jousten 5/10 
2010). 
 
The EU’s increasing dependence on energy import in the coming years also creates the 
context for the Union’s policies in Central Asia. Outlining the reasons for the EU’s interest in 
Central Asia’s energy resources, European Commissioner for External Relations and 
European Neighborhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner noted in a speech in September 2008 
that 
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strengthening our energy partnership with Central Asia is a top political priority for the European 
Union. The region is central to our strategy of diversification of energy supplies and supply routes, a 
policy that is all the more pertinent after the events of this summer. The events in the Caucasus have 
given both Central Asia and Europe food for thought. The security dimension of our energy policies has 
been thrown into sharp relief. And, while we in the EU are intensifying efforts with regard to the 
security of our supplies, Central Asia also has a strong interest in diversifying its export routes 
(Ferrero-Waldner 18/9 2008). 
 
First, we here see that Central Asia fulfills a double function in the EU energy strategy: as an 
area from which Europe could receive additional energy supplies and via new supply routes. 
This focus is logical given the expected increased EU import dependency. The strengthening 
of energy relations between the parts are here seen mutually beneficial, as Central Asia would 
also get another outlet for its energy resources. This last point is noteworthy, as in addition to 
the stated strategic goals of diversification certain geopolitical overtones come into play. 
The recent “events” referred to should obviously be seen a reference to the Russo-Georgian 
conflict in August 2008. The excessive Russian use of military power in it’s the conflict 
showed both Moscow’s will and ability to play hard. In turn, this gave both Brussels and the 
Central Asian states “food for thought”, i.e. necessitating them to reassess and adjust their 
positions. In practical terms, this could be interpreted as a signal to the Central Asian states to 
reconsider their relations with Russia and their dependence on Russian transit, thus seeking 
new strategic alliances that were to counterbalance Russian influence in the region. The EU, 
presenting itself as having largely complementary interests to the Central Asian states, here 
promotes itself as one of those new strategic partners, supposedly sharing the energy interests 
with the Central Asian energy producers. This way, both the Central Asian states and Russia 
would be able to mark their distance to Russia. 
Hence, the EU underlined that diversification of EU supplies combined with the 
diversification of export routes would be beneficial for both the EU and Central Asian energy 
producers. Expanding on this point, Ferrero-Waldner stated the following: 
We intend to redouble our efforts to develop energy links between the EU and Central Asia through 
diversified energy transportation routes and new energy infrastructure, including Nabucco. Making a 
reality of the long-discussed "southern corridor" must be the focus of our work together in the coming 
months, and I hope that at our next Baku ministerial in late November we can give new impetus to the 
creation of a Trans-Caspian energy corridor (ibid.) 
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This way, and in relation to what we outlined above, we can here argue that the EU saw itself 
and Central Asia as having mutual interests in avoiding Russia to as large an extent as 
possible. This notion would also be found in the JPR, where it was stated that the Nabucco 
pipeline project was of “paramount importance for the diversification of energy supplies in 
both regions” (JPR 2010; 4). Hence, through the construction of the Nabucco-pipeline 
Russian energy leverage could at least partially be ended and at the same time bring the EU 
and Central Asia closer together.  
Dependency 
Satisfying both of these objectives stated above, Brussels continued to reinforce its efforts in 
the region. The EC stated that   
Energy is a crucial area for the economic growth of the countries of Central Asia, which have requested 
assistance from the EU. A more secure and efficient energy supply, distribution and pricing policy are 
essential features for the sustainable economic and social development of the region (EC 2010b; 19). 
 
Central Asia is here presented as being more dependent on energy than the EU, as the 
region’s resources are not primarily seen as being advantageous in itself, but rather as a means 
to achieve further growth. This creates an impression of Central Asia as being reliant on 
energy in order to progress within other fields. At the same time, this helps taking the sting 
out of Central Asia’s strong structural bargaining position as an energy producing region, as 
the regional states here are depicted as requiring assistance from the energy consuming EU to 
develop. This reiterates the overall framing we examined earlier. Hence, Brussels here frames 
Central Asia as being in a form of double dependency, between energy being the key to 
unlock overall development in the region, and the EU, which had the means to bring these 
developments about.  
The regional approach 
Brussels approaches Central Asia in terms of energy as a region. Outlining a rationale for this, 
the EC noted that “enhanced regional cooperation in the energy sector has been recognized as 
a prerequisite for achieving sustainable economic and social development, as well as 
contributing to peace, stability and prosperity in the region” (ibid; 19). 
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The framing of energy cooperation as a necessary precondition for socio-economic 
development in Central Asia reiterates the framing we saw above, and makes cooperation in 
this field appear as not only desirable but more importantly imperative and vital for further 
progress in the region. What is new here is the less technical approach taken as more focus is 
on the link between energy, peace and prosperity. The premise here is that by strengthening 
the regional energy approach, not only would Central Asia as a region gain substantially; this 
would also have positive domestic synergy effects for the participating states that went well 
beyond a mere development of the countries’ energy structures. As to the actual energy 
cooperation, the European Commission noted that  
The EU and its partners in Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus have a mutual 
interest, as consumers, producers and transit States, in ensuring a stable and predictable framework for 
the flow of energy, including the modernization of existing energy infrastructures and the establishment 
of new ones (Market Observatory for Energy ; 3). 
 
Connecting the three links in the energy chain, it is here an outspoken goal to establish a 
common framework for interaction for the whole energy structure, based on mutual interests. 
This would indeed satisfy one of the chief objectives Brussels has in Central Asia, which is 
the convergence of the energy markets “through the harmonization of the relevant legislative 
and regulatory frameworks” (ibid; 1). This integrated energy complex would institutionalize 
energy relations on the basis of a common understanding of the possibilities and challenges 
related to energy, which in turn could be interpreted as not only a framework-convergence, 
but more importantly a normative convergence between the parts. Hence, the regional 
approach would not only contribute to the facilitation of  Central Asian regional approaches to 
key energy issues, but also to create a common EU-Central Asian legal and normative space 
that would enable and facilitate energy cooperation. 
That Central Asia occupied a very central and distinct role in this conceived EU framework 
could be seen from the following statement by the 2010 JPR: 
Of particular value is the fact that the Central Asian countries participate in the Baku Initiative 
alongside Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries to the East of the EU. This allows an exchange of 
experiences with these countries and contributes to the construction of a Central Asian regional energy 
market based on the principles of the EU’s regulatory model and promoting the development of the 
necessary cross-border infrastructure (2010 JPR; 16). 
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This is in accordance with the stated INOGATE objective to achieve “approximation of legal 
and technical standards with a view to the creation of a functioning integrated energy market 
in accordance with EU and international legal and regulatory frameworks” (EC 2010b; 19). 
We can here detect a slight dualism in the EU framing. On one side, and in connection with 
what we saw above, the energy integration would imply that there was a common fundament 
or basis for the impending unification; in other words something to build further relations on. 
On the other, the statement outlines an asymmetrical manner in which to achieve just this, as 
it is the Central Asian markets that are to be integrated into the European ones and not a 
mutual process where the parts are to converge on the basis of mutual concessions and 
compromises. Hence, it seems possible to argue that it was European rules and regulations 
that were to constitute the foundation for the integration, meaning that it was Brussels that 
was to act as a supplier of terms and conditions. In turn, this focus suggests that Brussels 
sought to use its internal market as a template for dealing with Central Asia, meaning that 
expansion of the internal market was the means through which to approximate the Central 
Asian states (Youngs 2009; 105).  
Furthermore, we see that promotion of “necessary” infrastructure was highlighted as an 
important feature within the regional strategy, by which we can deduct that the aid that were 
to be given to the Central Asian states, was of a technical character. In addition to this and in 
line with what we outlined above about the importance of energy for the development of 
Central Asia and the EU as a facilitator to bring these developments about, it could here be 
argued that the regional energy cooperation was based on a trade-off: European funding and 
investment for infrastructure in return for a guarantee of supplies to the European markets 
(ibid; 105).  
The bilateral approach 
Turkmenistan 
Energy is one of the key strategic objectives in the EU’s dealings with Turkmenistan. 
Outlining its views on the situation within this field, the EC stated the following: 
The energy sector is crucial to the Turkmen economy. Policy reform in this sector, enabling a 
comprehensive approach towards sustainable energy development at the country level, as well as 
promoting better use of energy resources, energy efficiency and reduction of energy loss will require a 
substantial buildup of national expertise across the board, from policy analysis to management skills to 
technical and scientific know-how and best practices (EC 2010b; 50). 
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Despite stating the importance of energy in the economic and thus also political structure of 
Turkmenistan, we can here detect a discrepancy between the perceived importance of the 
energy sector and the actual state of things within this field. The framing here suggests that 
Turkmenistan’s energy sector is at best underdeveloped, something that obviously is 
problematic and ominous given the sector’s centrality for policy makers in Ashgabat. 
Through cooperation with the EU these problems could be solved, hereby creating a modern 
and sustainable energy structure in Turkmenistan.  
This would create a common platform upon which relations could be strengthened later on. 
Arguably, the need for creating more favorable conditions for strengthening ties within the 
energy sector also seems to be the main motive behind the entering of the EU-Turkmen 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), as this would place EU-Turkmen energy dealings 
within a planned and mutually consented framework. Upon the signing of the memorandum, 
EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs stated that 
Turkmenistan can be an attractive destination for EU investments for the development of new gas and 
oil fields, and at the same time, the EU offers an attractive consumer market for Turkmen energy 
products. The MoU signed today shows clearly how much both parties gain from a mutually beneficial 
and constructive energy relationship (Europa.eu 26/5 2008). 
 
We can here detect a certain restraint in the EU’s description of the relations, an indication of 
which is that Turkmenistan is framed as a potential rather than an actual attractive destination 
for EU investments. This can be read as a form of reservation on Brussels’ part, signaling that 
reforms needed to be implemented in order to fulfill the Turkmen potential. At the same time, 
EU investments would bring Brussels and Ashgabat closer together, as the EU would gain 
influence through its investments, this way being able to affect the formulation of Turkmen 
energy policies. This was important in light of the increased attention Turkmen energy 
resources had gained over the past few years, the Turkmen-Chinese pipeline being a good 
example. Hence, the wish to gain influence should be seen not only as a means to gain power 
of definition in the bilateral EU-Turkmen relation, but also to hinder other powers in 
establishing themselves in Turkmenistan. This way, the EU framing could also be seen as 
having geopolitical connotations, something that also reiterates the Russian framing.      
As to the content of the MoU we can note that the memorandum laid out two main directions 
of cooperation that were to be pursued: structural reforms through strengthened cooperation 
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on energy security and cooperation in enhancing industrial development (EC 2008a; 1-2).  
Combined, the implementation of the provisions outlined in the MoU would create stability 
and predictability by establishing mechanisms for forecasting energy demand and supply. 
Also, this would help attract investments into the Turkmen energy sector and facilitate 
exchange of methods. Apart from being a telling sign of Brussels’ view on the deficiencies of 
the Turkmen energy structure, this also shows where the EU saw itself as contributing to 
mend just this. The EC stated: 
This is an area where the EU could greatly contribute in support of the efforts of the Turkmen 
authorities regarding the modernization of the energy sector in line with sustainable long-term policies 
and environmental concerns, as well as in support of the EU-Turkmenistan Memorandum of 
Understanding in the field of Energy (EC 2010b; 50). 
 
The EU here frames itself as a substantiating partner of the Turkmen energy modernization, 
this way adding weight and legitimacy to Ashgabat’s efforts within this sphere. This 
underlines the perceived structural EU edge within this field, and shows how Turkmenistan 
would benefit from strengthened cooperation with Brussels. We should here note that the 
statement above does not point to any direct Turkmen dependence on the EU, but rather that 
Brussels’ involvement would ease Turkmenistan’s energy transformation considerably. 
Hence, the focus is on Brussels accommodating and assisting Ashgabat. The highlighting of 
advantageousness rather than sheer dependency should, as with the abovementioned focus on 
Turkmenistan’s potential, be seen as means to attract Turkmen attention to cooperating with 
the EU, which shows the need for the EU to stand out in the crowd of potential partners. In 
turn, this highlights Turkmenistan’s power at this point, rather than the EU’s. 
Kazakhstan 
Outlining the scope of EU-Kazakhstani energy cooperation, Ambassador Norbert Jousten 
stated that there in large were three reasons for this partnership: mutual EU-Kazakhstani 
importance; diversification of export routes; and finally that the energy cooperation between 
the parts was both so well established and wide in scope that moving forward, i.e. 
strengthening the partnership, was necessary in order to “harness its full potential” (Jousten 
5/10 2010). Obviously, this should be read as an EU signal towards bolstering its relations 
with Astana within the field of energy. 
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In line with this, it was important to frame the partnership as a mutually advantageous 
arrangement that created positive returns for both parts. The advantages that this arrangement 
generated to Astana were outlined by Jousten as “alternative export routes widen your market 
opportunities and will enhance your ability to obtain internationally competitive prices” 
(ibid.). The point about prices can be interpreted in a dual manner. First, this indicates that 
Astana did not get competitive prices everywhere, which seems to refer to the, in Brussels’ 
eyes, obsolete Russian pricing policy, which as we saw was due to Moscow’s until-recent 
transport control. Here we can also deduct a second point, namely that market diversification 
could be used as leverage vis-à-vis Russia, meaning that securing Kazakhstan’s energy 
supplies could be read as both a means to secure sufficient supplies, but also as a way to 
bypass Moscow.  
Hence, it seems possible to argue that the benefits gained from the cooperation were different 
for Brussels and Astana respectively: the former would strengthen and diversify its energy 
supplies, whereas the latter would gain through economic and technical contributions and 
through getting a more direct access to the attractive EU energy market. This advantageous 
reciprocity was also clearly expressed by the President of the European Commission José 
Manuel Barroso, as he stated that “all this shows that Kazakhstan and the EU share an interest 
in the diversification of energy routes and an open investment climate. This is a win-win 
partnership!” (Barroso 26/10 2010). This way, the EU saw the strengthening and further 
development of the trade-off as the way to proceed in its future dealings with Astana. 
Summing up  
With increasing dependence on energy imports in the coming years, Brussels understood that 
a larger degree of interaction between the energy chains in order to maintain stable and secure 
energy imports. To this effect, Brussels also made sure that diversification was framed as a 
mutually advantageous endeavor, which was done by highlighting how EU-Central Asian 
cooperation would reduce both parts’ dependence on Russia: Central Asia would get another 
outlet for its energy resources, hereby securing the Central Asian states market access, 
whereas the EU would gain from a new inlet. In practical terms, Brussels sought to construe 
an energy political community, bound together through the integration of the separate energy 
markets and a common understanding of the framework of cooperation. As with the previous 
EU framings we have considered it was also here important for Brussels to present the Union 
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as a necessity for Central Asia’s energy development, hereby seeking to place the EU in the 
center of Central Asia’s energy policy orientation as well.  
On a bilateral level, the focus may be said to be somewhat more nuanced, where the main 
emphasis was placed on how cooperation with the EU could be beneficial for the EU’s 
counterparts. This serves as an illustration of the increased power of the Central Asian states 
vis-à-vis Europe, something that at least partially can be ascribed to the increased global 
interests in the countries’ resources. Accordingly, due to the Central Asian states’ enhanced 
geopolitical clout, the EU tread more carefully on a bilateral basis than on a regional one, so 
as to make Brussels a more attractive partner for the Central Asian states.  
4.5.1. The EU Debate on Energy Security  
EU and energy: Outlook and perspective 
Outlining the importance of energy, the EU’s Energy Strategy to 2020 opened by stating that 
“energy is the life blood of our society. The well-being of our people, industry and economy 
depends on safe, secure, sustainable and affordable energy” (EC 2010c). Being a major 
energy importer, securing sufficient supplies of energy is therefore vital for the Union. This 
even more so in light of volatile energy prices, the growing scarcity of fossil fuels as well as 
the growth of the energy-thirsty economies of India and China. Adding to this, increasing 
energy consumption in the coming years will also increase the EU’s dependence on imported 
energy goods, a figure that may rise to a total of 66.6 % of consumed energy by 2030 (EC 
2008b).  
Due to this, it was clear that Brussels needed to take steps in order to ensure European energy 
security for the future. The pillars of the Union’s energy approach have been stated in the 
Lisbon Treaty, consisting of ensuring the functioning of the energy market; ensuring security 
of energy supply in the Union; promoting energy efficiency and energy saving and the 
development of new and renewable forms of energy; and promoting the interconnection of 
energy networks (Lisbon Treaty, 2009). In addition to mark a wish to emerge as a leading 
international energy actor, the points above also highlights that energy concerns were a shared 
responsibility within the Union
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. In more concrete terms, the 2
nd
 Strategic Energy Review, 
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 The stated need for the EU to “speak with one voice” was especially important in light of the fact that energy 
relations historically had been dealt with through bilateral deals between individual EU members and energy 
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officially named the EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, stated that Brussels was 
to construe its energy agenda around the core objectives of sustainability, competitiveness and 
security of supply (Europa.eu 13/11 2008). In terms of the external EU engagement securing 
sufficient supplies is the most important focal point. In practical terms, it may be argued that 
Brussels has based this engagement on a bifurcated process, concentrated around the issues of 
integration and diversification. These will be addressed in the following. 
Integration 
Outlining the volatility of oil prices for both consumers and producers, the increasing 
distances between energy resources and  customers as well as disruptions to pipelines and 
shipping, Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated that “cooperation is all the more important since 
energy security is becoming ever more complex” (Ferrero-Waldner 18/6 2009). This was also 
addressed by the EC which stated the following about the Union’s foreign energy dimension: 
If it is to achieve its goal of secure, competitive and sustainable energy the EU must involve and 
cooperate with other countries, be they producers, transit countries or consumers. (…) At a time of 
vulnerability of imports, potential energy crises and uncertainty surrounding future supplies, the EU 
must make sure that it adopts measures and creates partnerships that guarantee the security of its energy 
supply (EC 2011b). 
 
Hence, in light of Europe’s need to ensure access to resources it seems fair to argue that a 
focal point for just this was enhancing the Union’s interaction and cooperation with the other 
links in the energy chain. The practical EU response was to strengthen interaction by using 
the internal market acquis as its fundament for action externally. That this indeed was 
Brussels’ objective was also clear from the Europe 2020 strategy adopted by the EC in 2010. 
It was here stated that “expanding the area where EU rules are applied will create new 
opportunities for both the EU and its neighbors”, and furthermore that this could help third 
party countries in anchoring their reform efforts (EC 2010c). In addition to noting the EU 
tendency to frame its efforts as a mutually beneficial exercise, we here see that EU rules and 
                                                                                                                                                        
suppliers. The fact that this has not been done in the past can partially be attributed to the fact that the various 
EU countries have various perspectives on what constitutes energy security, which makes it difficult for Brussels 
to unite the parts. The move from bilateral to multilateral energy relations would also have positive synergy 
effects in terms of augmenting Brussels’ external energy security, as the united EU would be more competitive 
vis-à-vis other players. The Energy Strategy also noted the need for this as it stated that “despite accounting for 
one fifth of the world’s energy use, the EU continues to have less influence on international energy markets than 
its economic weight would suggest” (EC 2010c). 
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regulations were to be exported, meaning that Brussels sought to extend the domain of the 
internal EU market structure. 
This would foster integration through the interconnections of the various energy networks, 
hereby creating a common, harmonized and transparent market that plays by an EU-designed 
set of rules. By increasing the compatibility between the markets, Brussels could enhance its 
energy security through greater market flexibility to overcome unanticipated events, which 
could have great implications for both security of supplies and prices, as well as creating a 
larger degree of self-sufficiency within the structure. This could also help contributing to 
further increase Brussels’ bargaining power with energy actors outside this structure. 
Diversification 
The Energy Strategy to 2020 stated that  
For oil and gas, rising import requirements and increasing demand from emerging and developing 
countries call for stronger mechanisms to secure new, diversified and safe supply routes. As well as 
crude oil access, refining infrastructure is a crucial part of the supply chain. The EU is a strong 
geopolitical partner in energy markets and must have the ability to act accordingly (EC 2010c). 
 
By diversifying its energy imports Brussels would satisfy two concerns related to supply 
security. First, this relates to avoiding too large a dependence on one single energy producer. 
The obvious example here is Russia. The previously mentioned gas conflicts with Ukraine 
undoubtedly helped bringing energy security high up on the EU agenda. Not only did the 
crisis uncover the vulnerabilities of the EU supply network; Brussels also read the events as 
manifestations of Russia using its energy resources to obtain political concessions. Hence, in 
order to avoid both future supply disruptions and giving Moscow too much leverage over 
Brussels, the EU sought to establish contacts with other energy exporters
59
. Second, it could 
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 Commenting on the initiatives taken by the EU following the first Russo-Ukrainian incident in 2006, Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner stated that her priority as External Relations Commissioner had been to diversify energy 
sources and supply routes, “by developing the Commission’s energy diplomacy with supplier, transit and 
consumer countries around the world” (Ferrero-Waldner 9/3 2009). This also highlights the interlinks between 
the two external energy processes of the EU.  
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be argued that the growing economies of such countries as India and especially China were 
seen as a challenge in itself as competition for resources would increase
60
.  
By establishing direct contacts with energy producing states the EU could here secure its 
import of non-renewable resources before these were being tied up by others. The need for 
diversification of supplies and routes has also been addressed in a recently released EC 
document, named The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders.  The 
document notes that the EU engagement in both the Caspian region and the Middle East 
should be adapted so as to reflect the regions’ importance in a long-term EU perspective. In 
relation to this, the opening of the Southern Gas Corridor was named as a “key infrastructure 
priority” for the EU (EC 2011c; 5). Although not mentioned explicitly it seems natural that 
what is meant here is the Nabucco pipeline. This would help fulfilling both of the above 
stated objectives, as it would lead to the construction of infrastructure that circumvents Russia 
and gives Europe a new source of supply to complement its preexisting ones, meaning that the 
EU would diversify both sources and transport routes.  
To this effect the EC adopted the Communication on security on security of energy supply 
and international cooperation in September 2011, which was the first comprehensive strategy 
for the EU’s external energy relations. It was here stated that “the EU (…) must build on the 
strength of its market, expanding links between the European energy network and 
neighboring countries and creating a wider regulatory area, beneficial for all” (EC 2011b). 
Another point can be extracted from the adoption of the strategy, as the newly-released 
strategy serves as an illustration that the EU’s external energy actions so far has been more of 
a theoretical character than a practical, meaning that it remains to be seen whether something 
is to be done, and, if so is the case, if this in congruence with the presented plans. 
Summing up 
From the preceding pages we have seen that ensuring sufficient supplies in order to counter 
the ever-increasing dependence on exports is the main issue for the EU’s external energy 
engagement. This also meant that Brussels was forced to outline practical steps to move upon 
in order to be prepared for just this. Internally, that is, inside the EU, the main measures taken 
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  Echoing this the EC’s 2020 Energy Strategy stated that “global energy markets are becoming tighter, with 
developing Asian countries and the Middle East accounting for most of the growth in global demand. As the 
world's largest energy importer, the EU is likely to be more vulnerable to supply risks as a result” (EC 2010c). 
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were the promotion of the interconnectivity of infrastructure, energy efficiency and the 
promotion of renewable energy sources. Externally, we saw that Brussels promoted energy 
market integration and diversification as the main vehicles for guaranteeing EU energy 
security. The next subchapter aims at examining the role Central Asia played in satisfying 
these objectives. 
4.5.2. Central Asia’s Role in the EU Energy Security Understanding 
The EU is a global actor in terms of its economy, but it is far from self-sufficient in terms of 
energy to fuel this economy. In turn, this makes the EU a large-scale energy importer. In this 
context, and as can be seen from the tables below, Central Asia is important as one of the 
areas from which the EU can buy the required energy resources. As we saw above, the EU’s 
practical engagement to overcome this problem has been centered on two points, namely 
integration and diversification. We will in the following see how and why this is important in 
relation to Central Asia. 
 
Figure 5: Central Asian and EU proved natural gas reserves
61
 
 At the end of 2009 At the end of 2010 
Trillion Cubic Meters Trillion Cubic Meters Share of World Total 
Kazakhstan 1.9                       1.8 1.0 % 
Turkmenistan 8.0 8.0 4.3 % 
Uzbekistan 1.6 1.6 0.8 % 
Total Central Asia 11.5 11.4 6.1 % 
Netherlands                1.2                       1.2                  0.6 % 
Poland                0.1                       0.1                  0.1 % 
Romania                0.6                       0.6                  0.3 % 
UK                0.3                       0.3                  0.1 % 
Total EU                2.2                       2.2                  1.1 % 
 
Figure 6: Kazakhstani and EU proved oil reserves62 
 
At the End of 2009 At the End of 2010 
Thousand Million 
Barrels 
Thousand Million 
Barrels 
Share of World Total 
Kazakhstan 39.8 39.8 2.9 % 
EU 6.2 4.7 0.4 % 
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 Data for both tables retrieved from BP (2010). 
62
 Although both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also possess some oil reserves these are modest; each 
constituting a share of less than 0.05 % of the global total. Due to this, they have been omitted from the index. 
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Integration 
The EU sought to expand its internal market structures to also include external ones. Central 
Asia was obviously one of the targets for this approach. By including Central Asia, that is, an 
energy producer, the EU would naturally strengthen the EU’s bargaining power by having 
several links within the energy chain cooperating in a common framework. In turn, this would 
increase the EU’s competitiveness, which we also saw was an EU aim, against actors that 
stands outside the integrated EU energy structure. This seems to be especially pertinent in 
relation to Russia, as this hopefully would discourage Russia from using energy as weapon to 
achieve political concessions from others. Moreover, and in relation to this, the infrastructural 
interconnectivity between the parts in the structure would make Europe more resilient to 
“energy emergencies”, whilst also give Central Asia increasing market shares in Europe. This 
way, the EU-Central Asian energy integration could be framed as a mutually beneficial 
endeavor: stable supplies in turn for stable demands. Furthermore, as the proposed structure 
would be based on EU norms and regulations, expanding the EU energy market to Central 
Asia would give Brussels another avenue through which to introduce European norms in 
Central Asia. 
Diversification 
Next, the goal for EU was to increase the number of routes, sources and types of energy that 
flowed into Europe. Central Asia would play a role for the EU in fulfilling the first two of 
these objectives. This has also been the rationale behind the proposed Nabucco-pipeline. 
Moreover, and equally important, the construction of Nabucco would lessen the EU’s 
dependence on Russian energy, hence further decreasing Moscow’s energy leverage over 
Brussels. Hence, Central Asia would here serve as an EU counterweight to Russia.   
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Chapter 5: Energy Security and Central Asia: Cooperation, 
Competition or Confrontation? 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine how Russia and the EU frame Central Asia in 
their discourses on energy security. The research question has been approached by examining 
four aspects, using a matrëshka model: the parts’ foreign policy framings; security policy 
framings; energy policy framings and finally their energy security framings. The theoretical 
presupposition the thesis is based on has been that energy security means different things to 
different actors, depending on how they define their interests and objectives. Other elements 
that had to be taken into consideration were current political and economic circumstances, and 
the impact the identity of the parts has had on the way they have approached those issues. All 
those elements seem to have affected the representations and framing of the parts. This 
chapter seeks to sum up the findings of the thesis, and to discuss whether the situation can be 
described as developing in the direction of cooperation, competition or conflict.  
Summing up the findings 
Foreign policy 
The first aspect we considered was the foreign policy framing of the parts. In the case of 
Russia, two aspects were dominant. First, Moscow placed an emphasis on the fact that Russia 
is by far the most powerful actor in the region. This way, Moscow framed itself as the “big 
brother” in its relations with Central Asia, which in turn allowed Russia to act as the prime 
mover in its relations with Central Asia. Russia framed itself as being a supplier and 
facilitator of stability in the region, hereby implying that Central Asia indeed was dependent 
on such support from Moscow in order to keep afloat. Second, the Russo-Central Asian 
relationship was depicted as being the result of centuries of interaction. By highlighting the 
common history, heritage and civilization that had emerged between the parts, Russia framed 
the relationship as being nearly historically determined. Thus, the cultural closeness between 
the parts led Russia to frame its relationship with Central Asia as somewhat of a union 
between parts that share the same historical experiences.  
The EU, on the other hand, has centered its foreign policy involvement in Central Asia on two 
dimensions; a normative one and a technical one. Starting with the former, Brussels framed 
Central Asia as underdeveloped, lacking the proper normative foundation, i.e. Western ideals, 
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necessary to achieve substantial progress. The EU portrayed itself as a Central Asian 
benefactor, helping the region in overcoming its backwardness by “exporting” democracy, 
human rights etc. This way, Brussels framed its presence in Central Asia as sheer necessity to 
achieve development in the region, and consequently that Central Asia would be rendered 
helpless. This also seems to be the underpinning of the latter of the EU’s foreign policy 
dimensions, namely the technical one. By promoting development projects within a rather 
wide variety of fields, Brussels could strengthen its position in Central Asia, hereby 
illustrating in practical terms how Central Asia could benefit from closer relations with the 
EU. However, the EU engagement did not result in very concrete results. One could here 
argue that this suggests that the EU focused more on pursuing own interests rather than on 
reforms inside Central Asia. 
Security policy 
The Russian possession of “local knowledge” also propagated to the Russian framing of the 
security situation in the region. Central Asia’s interests were here framed as being best 
preserved by solving the region’s problems locally, that is, through regional organizations in 
which Moscow had a dominant position. It should here be underlined that the security threats 
in the region were seen as having not only regional but also supraregional character. 
However, by framing the security challenges in the region as best managed through regional 
security solutions, Russia secures its position in the region by acting as a regional security 
facilitator. This would allow Russia to secure Russia by securing its “zone of influence”, 
while also hindering “foreign” actors’ involvement in the region. This last point was however 
not set in stone. This can be seen from the fact that Russia displayed a differentiated Central 
Asian security framing vis-à-vis other actors: Against the West, CSTO were pointed out as 
the main security institution, hereby highlighting that Moscow saw military measures as the 
best way to counter an increased Western security presence in Central Asia. Towards the East, 
the SCO was promoted. Through its main emphasis was on socio-political and economic 
issues, Russia probably treated it also as a way of controlling China’s increasing presence in 
the region. Thus, Moscow sought to present the Russo-Chinese co-operation as beneficial for 
both parts, and, not least, for the Central Asian states. 
On its side, Brussels sought to frame the EU-Central Asian cooperation on security as a 
security union. However, parallel with Russia, Brussels also sought to address security issues 
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in Central Asia so as to avoid them to grow and thus also spill over to Europe. This way, 
Central Asia was simultaneously framed as both part of the solution and part of the problem. 
This also provided the Union with a way to promote its normative side: by adhering to 
Western-made security mechanisms Central Asia could gain in a two-fold manner; getting rid 
of its security problems and approximate the EU.  
Energy policy 
In terms of energy policy, Russia sought to legitimize its presence in Central Asia by pointing 
to the strong position of Russia in the global energy structure. In turn, Central Asia was 
portrayed as being to a large degree structurally dependent on Moscow in terms of energy. An 
example of just this is the Soviet pipeline system, which naturally also increased the 
importance of Russia in the Central Asian states energy policies. However, Central Asia’s 
powers were increasing, something that also was reflected in the Russian framing of the 
region. In practical terms, this manifested itself through increasingly more business-like 
relations, illustrating that Moscow needed incorporate the interests of the Central Asian states 
into the Russian energy considerations. Moscow’s goal can perhaps be seen as two-fold: tying 
up Central Asian gas in Russian deals, hereby securing Russia’s market shares and preventing 
Central Asian producers from competing with Russia on the most attractive markets; and in 
the prolongation of this, establish Russia as a Euro-Asian “power bridge”. Consequently, 
Russia needed to frame these points as beneficial also for the Central Asian states; hereby 
moving from a focus on projecting interests in Central Asia through power, to using an 
incentive-based approach. Illustrating this, Moscow promoted the creation of a Russo-Central 
Asian Eurasian-energy community as a part of the common economic space that was to give 
Russia an additional clout in the post-Soviet space. 
In the case of the EU, EU-Central Asian energy cooperation was framed as a mutually 
beneficial endeavor. First and foremost, this would help both parts reduce their dependence 
on Russia, albeit in different ways: the EU would gain from getting a new area to import 
energy from, whereas Central Asia, by dealing directly with Brussels, would gain from having 
guaranteed market access to the EU, whilst also circumventing Russia, thus establishing itself 
as an increasingly independent global energy actor. To implement this, the EU promoted the 
introduction of a common regulatory framework for the EU and Central Asia. Not only would 
this create a common understanding of the issues at hand; this could also allow Brussels to 
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promote its normative fundament. This way, energy cooperation, if not to say integration, was 
framed to have overall positive synergy effects for the Central Asian states.  
Energy Security 
The Russian energy security discourse was mainly centered on three issues. The first of these 
was market integration. This would ensure that Russia had markets to which Russian energy 
products could be exported, something that in turn was essential in order to secure Russian 
market shares on the international energy market. Indirectly linked to just this, the second 
point highlighted in the discourse was the need for investments in the Russian energy sector. 
Finance was needed to develop new energy fields as well as maintenance on the existing 
infrastructure, both of which were necessary factors if Russia was to keep its strong position 
on the international markets. However, Moscow remained until recently wary of letting 
foreigners into the Russian energy complex. The last point was the question of export 
diversification. Russia sought to lessen its export dependence on Europe, thus leading 
Moscow to pay more attention to the East. This is however not to say that Europe was 
becoming unimportant in the Russian outlook: new pipelines, the Nord and South Stream, 
were either under planning or even construction. This was done to avoid transit of Russian gas 
through other countries but also to check the Nabucco-pipeline, which was to circumvent 
Russia. This would have the double advantage of both avoiding transit states that may 
potentially be troublesome for Russia, whilst also give Russian energy several outlets. 
Central Asia was framed as having a place in two of these three aspects, namely market 
integration and diversification. By promoting integration with the Central Asian states Russia 
could retain a certain degree of control over the Central Asian states’ energy policies. This 
would allow Russia to create a fundament for coordination of energy matters, and could 
perhaps also help Russia in influencing the same states. The establishment of a Russo-Central 
Asian energy framework would allow Russia to use its multiple positions in the energy chain 
alternately. The second point was as we saw above related to diversification. The point here 
was to direct the Central Asian scope of attention elsewhere than Europe, so as to keep the 
Russian market shares in the valuable EU market. The Asian market was seen as sufficiently 
large for both parts, meaning that Moscow’s diversification effort was both a matter of 
securing markets for itself and also to hinder competition over markets with the Central Asian 
energy exports as far as possible.  
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The EU’s energy security understanding revolved around primarily two objects: integration 
and diversification. The former of these meant expanding the internal EU market structures, 
this way also including external actors. This focus on transparent market rules and networks 
would strengthen Brussels, as it would increase access and availability of energy resources to 
the EU. Moreover, by interlinking energy infrastructure the Union would become more 
resilient to possible supply disruptions. In terms of the EU’s diversification efforts, these were 
mainly related to attempts to establish new routes, seek to include new energy suppliers and 
finally to promote different energy types. All these three factors can be seen as having the 
same fundament in the EU energy thinking; as too large dependence on any one of these 
would constitute an energy security risk. Central Asia played a role in both of the EU 
concerns. By integrating the Central Asian energy producing states into the EU network 
Brussels could formalize and institutionalize energy relations with the region.  
Consequently, this would turn Central Asia into a stable supplier of energy to the EU, and the 
EU into a stable market for Central Asia. Moreover, the EU-Central Asian energy structure 
could become a counterweight to Russia, hereby seeking to “calm” Russia down. Related to 
these points, Central Asia was also an alternative for Brussels as a possible area of 
diversifying EU energy imports. This would enhance EU security of supply and Central Asian 
security of demand, while also lessening the parts’ respective dependence on imports from 
(the EU) and exports to and transit through Russia (Central Asia). 
Energy realities and patterns of interaction 
Our main focus in this thesis has been on two actors’ – Russia and the EU – understandings of 
Central Asia’s role in solving their energy dilemmas. In light of what we outlined above, it 
seems tempting to argue that both Russia and the EU seek to control the Central Asian energy 
resources, but with different strategies and for different reasons. However, realities must also 
be taken into consideration, which have been reflected through the framings of the respective 
parts. As we dealt with earlier, Øystein Noreng has noted that energy relations principally can 
take three forms; cooperation, competition or confrontation. Theoretically speaking, this 
means that we in principle can be dealing with a total of nine different interaction patterns 
among those three actors – Russia, the EU and Central Asia. However, as we saw above, the 
respective parts’ discourses make some scenarios more and other less probable. In praxis, this 
means that some interactional patterns have crystallized, which may point to different future 
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development directions, whereas others must be considered less plausible. We will in the 
following look at some of these. 
Before starting, it should be noted that the energy situation in Central Asia at this point is 
rather opaque, meaning that there are many open-ended questions that still remain 
unanswered. An example of this may be Kazakhstan’s and Turkmenistan’s bargaining game 
between different actors, which have yet to see a definitive result. A change in this situation, 
for instance a Turkmen commitment to the EU-promoted Nabucco-pipeline would completely 
change the situation in the region. Thus, due to the complex and nebulous situation, this is not 
an attempt to predict future developments in the region, or to make the case for any one 
scenario. Rather, we will see how the coinciding and competing interests between the parts 
that we tried to identify by looking at those parts’ respective energy discourses on Central 
Asia may develop in relation to Central Asia, and to point out plausible and less plausible 
scenarios.  
In terms of the resource bases of the respective parts it can be argued that the Central Asian 
energy resources mean widely different things to Russia and the EU respectively. Russia, 
being massively superior in terms of resource bases to both Central Asia and the EU, has in 
principle enough resources both for own consumption and to export. However, due to 
required investments, costs associated with extraction and maintenance, and, not least, lack of 
available Russian funding for this, Moscow prefers to import the necessary energy from 
Central Asia. This suggests that the Central Asian resources basically have a strategic 
meaning for Russia.  
The EU on the other hand, is becoming increasingly more dependent on energy imports, and 
thus consequently also on external energy actors. This weakens the EU’s bargaining position 
In order to secure the well-being of EU citizens, as well as sustaining economic development; 
it is therefore becoming increasingly important to secure sufficient volumes of energy 
“abroad”. Because of this, it may be argued that the Central Asian energy resources carry a 
more fundamental meaning in EU thinking, meaning that Brussels also has higher stakes in 
ensuring supplies from Central Asia than Russia. Hence, we here see that not only interests, 
but also bargaining position plays a role in the determination of interaction patterns in the 
energy complex.  
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As we have seen from the previous chapters, both Russia and the EU have sought to establish 
cooperative relations with the Central Asian states. In relation to the energy strategies we 
have outlined, this seems to make the option of either Russo-Central Asian or EU-Central 
Asian energy confrontation counterintuitive and thus much less probable. A Russian move in 
this direction would most likely be interpreted as another attempt from Russian authorities to 
use energy, albeit in a different way, to put pressure on other players. This could put the 
Russian market shares in risk, as other actors would seek to avoid energy interaction with and 
increased dependence on Moscow. As to the EU, this notion also seems strengthened from the 
fact that confrontation with energy exporters would seriously weaken Brussels’ international 
standing, especially in light of the growing global demand for energy. This may make it even 
more difficult to obtain the necessary supplies. Moreover, military intervention in Central 
Asia by either parts would probably be responded to by other players, perhaps most notably 
the US or China. In turn, this could endanger the energy security of all parts. Hence, it may 
here be argued that cooperation and competition are the two most important strategies in 
relation to Central Asia.  
Moving on, Noreng has noted that “basic features of the oil and natural gas markets give 
strong incentives to suppliers not to compete indiscriminately for market shares, whereas 
cooperation among the many buyers is difficult” (Noreng; 214). First, this may be interpreted 
as an argument in favor of an increasing degree of future energy cooperation between Central 
Asia and Russia. By coordinating their efforts on the international energy markets, they 
reduce the risks of oversupplying the markets, which in turn may drive prices down. This may 
also be the very reason why Moscow promotes the Eurasian energy exporting union. The 
obvious Russian interests in the European market may perhaps best be safeguarded by 
coordinating Russian actions with Central Asia, and preferably guide the Central Asian states 
towards the Eastern markets, where Moscow seems to think there is room enough for both 
actors. Hence, although Russia and Central Asia have competing interests as energy 
exporters, in the sense that securing market shares for themselves is the most important 
objective, the expanding Asian market makes competition between Russia and Central Asia 
unnecessary. 
This is also noteworthy in another sense. As Russia also is an energy importer from Central 
Asia, this means that they have both coinciding interests as exporters, as well as competing 
ones as importer and exporters. In light of Noreng’s statement, as well as the Russian framing 
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examined earlier, we may argue that Central Asia is more important for Russia as a fellow 
energy producer rather than as a region for Russian energy imports. This suggests that Russia 
indeed highlighted the coinciding interests it had with Central Asia, rather than the conflicting 
ones. This may substantiate the claim about increasing future Russo-Central Asian 
cooperation, which also may gain weight from the long-standing historical relations between 
the two parts. At the same time it should not be forgotten that the two parts also have 
complementary interests as importer and exporter of energy. Thus, closer bonds with Central 
Asia could have the positive spill-over effect of securing Central Asian energy imports for 
Russia. 
Second, as cooperation between buyers is less probable, this in turn also decreases the 
likelihood of a Russo-EU coalition of buyers. In principle the parts have compatible interests 
in the sense that both wish or need energy supplies, but in practical terms this transforms into 
conflicting interests as they in effect are competing for the same resources in Central Asia. 
Moreover, should such a coalition emerge, it should not be forgotten that Central Asia could 
reorient themselves, primarily towards China, and in the longer term also India. China has 
indeed taken advantage of the infrastructural opening of Central Asia in the past few years. As 
was seen in the previous chapters, it may be argued that Beijing is indeed the one player that 
has made the most headway in Central Asia during this period, as illustrated by the Turkmen-
Chinese pipeline opening in 2009.   
The EU has, as we have seen, sought to engage Central Asia through a holistic approach that 
highlights cooperation and interdependence. In energy terms, the rationale behind this 
approach is, in Noreng’s words, to “offset energy dependence with more comprehensive 
economic relations”, hereby incorporating energy into an overall package (ibid; 224). It might 
here be argued that Brussels hopes that this in time can develop into a more structured 
cooperation relationship between the parts, which can be illustrated by the EU’s promotion of 
the Nabucco-pipeline. This also seems logical as the parts have complementing interests as 
producer and buyer of energy. Moreover, this would establish a common stance against 
Russia, hereby seeking to limit Russia’s energy power. In this sense, it might be argued that 
the EU efforts to enhance cooperative relations with Central Asia might lead to more 
competition between Brussels and Moscow, as they both strive to become the dominant part 
in the region. 
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However, it might be fitting to ask how a possible EU-Central Asian energy relationship 
might look like in practical terms. As we saw above, the EU’s bargaining position vis-à-vis 
Central Asia is weakening as a result of the Union’s increasing import dependence. This may 
jeopardize the comprehensive EU approach, as Brussels due to this may be incapable of 
carrying it out. One might therefore argue that the EU faces a dilemma and will have to 
choose between ideas and more material interests: human rights and democracy inside Central 
Asia, or ensuring energy supplies to the EU. The stated EU conditionality, that is making 
cooperation and assistance dependent on internal reforms, seems to be in serious difficulties, 
as Central Asia easily can reorient towards either Russia or China, which do not attach these 
types of demands to their business dealings. Moreover, the lack of progress within this field 
over the past few years also indicated that the Central Asian stated themselves were, and still 
are, unwilling to accept the conditions posed. 
Concluding remarks 
As has been shown in this thesis, Central Asia’s energy resources are subjects to considerable 
attention from many different actors. This creates an overall picture that is complicated and 
multifaceted, which in turn makes it difficult to present any definitive conclusions. We can 
however point out a few lessons that are determinant in this form of interaction. First, we have 
seen that Russia’s and the EU’s understandings of Central Asia can indeed influence the parts 
political choices, as they create possibilities that can be acted upon. Second, coinciding 
interests, perceived or factual, make cooperation more probable. Thus, in order to understand 
political choices we must take into consideration not only representations of things as they are 
framed in political discourses  but also realities on – and in the case of energy resources – 
under the ground. Third, although Central Asia mostly is being seen as one region, attention 
must also be paid to distinct national features, if not say mentalities. In this case we have for 
instance seen Kazakhstan pursues a much more extrovert foreign policy than Turkmenistan. 
Fourth and finally, it seems as birds of the same feather indeed flock together. Russia and 
Central Asia are both energy exporters, have a long shared historical relationship, and are also 
somewhat similar in terms of regime types. However, this situation can change quickly, 
meaning these points are by no means set in stone. Central Asia is firmly placed high up on 
the international political agenda, and will in all likelihood stay there in the foreseeable future. 
Thus, this story will indeed be continued.  
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